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RESUMO 
A percepção destinada a guiar a ação é um processo ativo e contínuo em que os atores 
ressoam suas características corporais para medir constantemente as relevantes propriedades 
físicas do meio ambiente. Ao invés de serem guiadas por nossas crenças, nossas ações são 
guiadas por affordances. Ou seja, as oportunidades de ação que emergem do sistema ator-
ambiente e que são limitadas pelas nossas capacidades de ação - os limites dinâmicos do nosso 
corpo que estão intrinsecamente relacionados aos estados morfológicos, fisiológicos e 
psicológicos do corpo. Aqui analisamos as evidências que demonstram que somos sensíveis e 
que acessamos informações sobre nossos limites de ação para antecipar ou realizar ações reais. 
Nosso objetivo é entender como os atores são informados sobre seus próprios limites de ação 
quando uma oportunidade de ação emerge. Por exemplo, como os atores que rastreiam 
visualmente uma bola a reduzir o tamanho são informados de que o tamanho da bola se encaixa 
(ou não) nas mãos quando estimando a agarrabilidade da bola? 
Nesta tese abordamos diretamente a hipótese de que os sentimentos que surgem como 
parte de qualquer processo cognitivo são integrados como informações não-visuais sobre 
nossos limites de ação. Assumindo a perspectiva da incorporação (a integração da informação 
sensório-motora como moldando e integrando a cognição), combinamos dois quadros teóricos 
distintos e relevantes para investigar nossa hipótese: a teoria das affordances (Gibson, 1979) e 
a abordagem do sentimento-como-informação para o julgamento e tomada de decisão (Clore, 
1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). A primeira teoria torna claro como as capacidades de ação estão 
intrínsecamente relacionadas à nossa percepção do entorno em termos de possibilidades de 
ação. A segunda abordagem mostra como sentimentos positivos e negativos informam o 
processamento em termos de custos e benefícios quando na interação com o contexto. 
Em três artigos, testamos se os sentimentos informam nossas capacidades de ação. No 
primeiro artigo, examinamos se os casos anedóticos que sugerem a decisão dos atletas com base 
em sentimentos apresetam suporte fenomenológico. Em um estudo de campo que aplicou o 
método correlacional, encontramos evidências de que peritos jogadores de futsal se reconhecem 
como confiando em sentimentos em contraposição à experiência de pensamento deliberativo, 
principalmente em situações de jogo categorizadas por eles como imprevisíveis, complexas e 
dinâmicas. No segundo trabalho, iniciamos nossa série de investigações de laboratório, 
primeiro rastreando a atividade muscular do corrugador e do zigomático (índice de experiência 
afetiva negativa e positiva) numa configuração de capacidade de ação. Os resultados indicam 
que uma experiência de negatividade parece ser subjacente às estimativas baseadas em ações, 
uma vez que o músculo corrugador é ativado somente quando os atores precisam realizar 
acoplamento perceptual-motor para eventos dinâmicos, mas não quando eles apenas apreendem 
os mesmos eventos. Em adição, uma manipulação subliminar de primação afetiva indica que 
esse resultado não se deve apenas ao processo atencional. No terceiro artigo, replicamos a 
manipulação afetiva e, mais uma vez, descobrimos que ela promove mudanças confiáveis nos 
limites de ação percebidos pelos participantes. Isso ocorreu especialmente quando restringimos 
o tempo e os movimentos do corpo. 
Juntos, esses achados sugerem que os sentimentos têm um papel nas estimativas 
baseadas em ações e em nossos limites de ação percebidos. Estes dados estendem a abordagem 
do sentimento-como-informação aos julgamentos que acoplam percepção-ação. Estudos 
futuros devem esclarecer melhor a natureza desse papel. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Sentimentos, Corporalização, Percepção, Capacidade de Ação, Julgamento, 
Affordance 
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ABSTRACT 
Perception intended to guide action is an active and ongoing process in which actors 
resonate their body features to constantly gauging relevant physical properties of the 
environment. Rather than by beliefs our actions are guide by affordances. That is, opportunities 
for action emerge from the actor-environment system and which are constrained by our action 
capabilities – the dynamic boundaries of our body that are intrinsically related to morphological, 
physiological, and psychological states. Here we review evidence demonstrating that we are 
sensitive and accede information regards our action boundaries to anticipate or perform real 
actions. Our aim is to understand how actors are informed about their own action boundaries 
when an affordance is made emergent. For instance, how actors visually tracking a shrinking 
ball are informed that the ball size fits its hands when estimating grasping? 
We directly approach the hypothesis that feelings arising as part of any cognitive 
processes are integrating as non-visual information regards our action boundaries. Assuming 
an embodiment perspective (the integration of sensorimotor information as shaping and taking 
part on cognition) we approach our hypothesis by merging two distinct and relevant theoretical 
frameworks: the theory of affordances (Gibson, 1979) and the feeling-as-information approach 
for judgment and decision making (Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The first theory turns 
clear how action capabilities are intrinsic related to perception of surrounding in terms of action 
possibilities. The second shows how positive and negative feelings inform processing. 
Across three papers we test if feelings inform our action capabilities. In the first paper, 
we examine if the anecdotal cases suggesting athletes’ decision based on feelings had 
phenomenological support. In a field study applying correlational method we found evidence 
that expert futsal players indeed acknowledge themselves as relying on feelings in 
contraposition to deliberative thinking experience, mostly in game-situations categorized by 
them as unpredictable, complex and dynamic. In the second paper, we start our series of lab 
investigations, by first tracking the muscular activity of the corrugator and the zygomatic 
(respectively index of negative and positive affective experience) in action capabilities setting. 
Results indicate that a negativity experience seems underlying the action-based estimations, 
since the corrugator is activated only when actors need to perform perceptual-motor coupling 
to dynamic events and not when they merely apprehend the same events. In addition, a 
subliminal affective priming manipulation indicates that this is not merely due to attentional 
process. In the third paper, we replicated the affective priming manipulation and once more we 
found it promotes reliable changes in the perceived action boundaries of the participants. This 
occurring, especially when we constrained time and body movements.  
  Taken together these finding suggest that feelings have a role in action-based 
estimations and in our perceived action boundaries. This data extends the feeling-as-
information approach to judgments coupling action-perception. Future studies should better 
clarify the nature of this role.
 
Keywords: Feelings, Embodiment, Perception, Action Capabilities, Judgment, Affordance 
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Feeling as Information for Action Capabilities 
 
For many years cognition was enclosed by computer metaphor in which the brain was 
the richness process of mentally transformation of poor stimulus (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 
1988; Chase & Simon, 1973) and feelings and actions the sub-product of this machine (Hurley, 
2001). 
Breaking with this hierarchic and disembodied view, cognition starting to be envisage 
as interdependent of the whole-body system and also the context (embodied and embedded), 
and reintegrates the affective and sensorimotor processes (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Clark 1999; 
Gibson, 1979; Glenberg, 2010; Smith & Semin, 2004; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Wilson 
2002). 
The goal of the work here presented is to explore the idea that feelings that arising as 
part of the nature of any cognitive processes (memory, perception, sensorimotor activation) 
integrate the process by which we sense our action capabilities. Although the functional role of 
feelings has been widely investigating and demonstrate in judgments and decision making of 
attitudes and preferences (e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 2003, 1983), there is still 
a lack for investigate feelings as information to the perceptual-motor coupling involved in the 
affordances (Gibson, 1979; Zadra & Clore, 2011). 
The general idea is that, the action-perception literature provides cues that the felt 
experience has an important role in the perceptual-motor fit. For example, evidence has shown 
that actors take in account their action capabilities when anticipate action or performing in 
online basis (Fajen, Diaz & Cramer, 2011). In addition, it has also been demonstrated that non-
visual information seems to embody information when actors visually scaling the spatial layout 
(e.g., Proffitt, 2013, 2006), performing action-based estimations (e.g., Geuss, McCardell, & 
Stefanucci, 2016; Pijpers, Oudejans, Bakker, & Beek 2006), and decide to change their patterns 
of motor actions (e.g., Mark, 1997; Warren, 1984). However, none has investigated the direct 
role of the felt experiencing in these data. Specifically, whether feelings (while functional 
information of cost and beneficious of the system) underlying the perception and adjustment of 
our dynamic action boundaries when performing the actor-environment fit? 
To answer this question, in this thesis I adopted the embodied perspective of cognition 
regards the action-perception coupling, and precisely the embodiment perspective of action 
capabilities. Therefore, at the Chapter I my aim is to elucidate that indeed our whole body as a 
role in shapes (or constraining) cognition. To this end, I review the literature around body-and-
2 
 
action scaling mechanisms of the physical surrounding, and how changes on morphologic, 
physiologic and psychologic states of the body have a direct impact in our interaction with the 
environment in terms of functional actions. 
Because my second assumption is that feelings likely to inform judgments and decision 
processes are also likely to inform action capabilities, next at the Chapter 2, I review the 
literature support by the feelings-as-information approach, in order to understand how feelings 
can also be information in action-perception processes.  
At the Chapter 3 my aim is to create the bridge between the two previous and distinct 
frameworks reviewed in the Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, and provide support to theoretical 
hypothesis of bodily feelings embodied functional information regards our action capabilities. 
To this end, I review specific findings over the literature that corroborate to the role of feelings 
in our perceived action boundaries. 
Finally, at the Chapter 4 my hypothesis is empirically adresses, and I provide the 
overview from the package of five studies presented through three papers and that in different 
ways approach my general question. Specifically, at the first paper we questioning if anecdotal 
cases underlying feelings as source of information regards the action decision of expert athletes 
has a phenomenological support? To this end, we set a field study to examining if athletes 
acknowledge themselves as rely on feelings when performing action choices in real game 
context.  The second paper is supported by a lab study and aim to understand whether action 
capabilities can be informed by feelings? Two different perspective are applied to approach this 
question. First, the psychophysiological tracking of the electrical activity of two facial muscles 
that index subjective experiences of positivity and negativity while participants concomitantly 
perform action-based estimation. Second, by subliminally priming emotional faces with 
opposite valences (neutral, positive and negative) at the baseline of participants and examining 
whether it is possible to interfere with the perceptual-motor estimations grounded in the 
participants action boundaries. At the end, we present a third paper also applying the affective 
priming paradigm, and where we test whether and how induced feelings interfere with the 
estimation process. 
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Chapter I 
Action capabilities and its calibration: theory, mechanism, and evidence 
Puzzled about how air-force pilots were so accurate in landing their aircrafts, J.J. Gibson 
(1966; 1979) questioned the assumption that an accurate perception of the environment resulted 
from representations in the pilots’ heads. Alternatively, he proposed that the environment 
offered reliable information, and postulated perception as a direct process sharing close 
relations with the environment. In addition, Gibson also proposed that action was guided by the 
detection of affordances- opportunities for action that match our action capabilities. Action 
capabilities entail properties associated with our body morphology and physiology, 
constraining our movements to fewer possibilities, and limiting the functionality of our motor 
interaction with the environment. 
We start this chapter by reviewing some of the main assumptions behind Gibson’s 
(1979) theory of affordances. Next, we examine evidence showing how actors rely on their 
dynamic boundaries as an intrinsic metric to scale size and distance. Following, we explore the 
mechanism of calibration and how it might support functional fits of the actor-environment 
system. We then conclude by presenting several reports showing that when changes of different 
levels happen in our body (i.e., morphologic, physiologic and psychologic) our action 
boundaries also change, directly impacting the perceptual-motor adjustment. 
 
Affordances as the bidirectional properties of the actor-environment system 
For many years, the dominant view of cognitive psychology sustained the hypothesis of 
indirect perception, assuming that to perceive meaningful information from the environment, a 
series of brain processes was needed (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Supported by 
psychophysics’ concepts, the traditional approach presented a chain of serial processes initially 
triggered by the passive stimulation of the senses, followed by brain inferential processes to 
provide the actor meaningful and reliable information of the environment. In addition, the 
perception was understood as apart from the action. The two being linked by the activation of 
informational nodes that were stimulus-related to the perceptual information and the 
correspondent pre-programed ruled based orders (i.e., motor plan), responsible of sending the 
executive information to the muscles to generate the action response. So, according to this 
traditional framework the brain is understood as a potential biological hardware, and cognition 
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as the rich processes of mental computations, which has perception, and consequently action, 
has its byproduct (Hurley, 2001). 
James Gibson (1979) assumed perception as a “psychosomatic act, not of the mind or 
of the body but of a living observe” (p. 240), and denied the brain the responsibility of mediating 
perception by simply assuming the environment offered information full of structure (i.e., 
meaning and value). For instance, he proposed that rather than separate snapshots (i.e., printed 
images on the retina) that were integrate by brain processes to produce movement perceptions, 
visual information was available in a continuum stream of apparent relations of the physical 
structure – the optical flow. These patterns could be perceived by simply detecting changes or 
invariances of the spatial-temporal relations (e.g., the displacement of two edges), with actors 
being a reference point embedded in the relational context and actively able to restructure their 
relation with the environment (Chemero, Klein & Cordeiro, 2003; Michaels & Carello, 1981). 
Overall, the whole hypothesis was grounded by the assumption that organisms were 
endowed by evolution with a sophisticated perceptual system with active modes of overt 
attention and overlapped functions (i.e., more or less integrate and subordinated to other system 
levels). Unlike simple organs of reception, a perceptual system allows experiencing states of 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium, and can be used to support movement orientation (i.e., orient, 
extract, optimize and resonate a set of environmental features of the actor’s body), as well as, 
fast and dynamic interactions with the environment (Gibson, 1966; Turvey, Shaw, Reed & 
Mace, 1981). 
Affordances as the ecological level of information. Although the conceptual level of 
information is important for language and communication, to guide action, the perception of 
abstract physical measures (e.g., meters and seconds) is not a functional standard unit of 
information. That is, a crawling baby can cross the gap of a door even before the concept of 
“door”, "width" and “distance” exist within the baby’s head (Gibson, 1988). Thus, Gibson 
(1979) proposed a more ecological level of information that should share law-full relations with 
the environment. He stated that although information is always available to be collected, it is 
only when taking in reference to the actor’s body that the value and meaning become available. 
This means that a ball by itself is only a set of physical combinations possible to be conceptually 
described in abstract units (e.g., mass and diameter). However, the ball becomes meaningful 
and functional when the actor with a member of apprehension, that is morphologic compatible 
in size and shape, interacts with the object to grasp or to throw it (Gibson, 1982; Mace, 1977). 
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Therefore, Gibson (1979) stated that what actors perceive in the environment to guide 
actions are not conceptual and abstract physical units, but rather affordances. That is the 
opportunities for action that emerge from the interaction between the actor and her/his 
surrounding when the physical properties of the world resonate the actor’s features. Gibson 
describes affordances as what the environment “offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, 
either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127), representing a higher order relation of the actor 
with her/his environment (Chemero, 2003; Stoffregen, 2003). So, an affordance is neither 
located in the environment nor in the actor’s body, but rather is rooted in a relational principle 
of complementarity of the actor-environment system. 
 
Fitting the body with the environment, and the environment with the body 
Therefore, the affordance implies that “to see things is to see how to get about among 
them and what to do or not do with them” (Gibson, 1979, p.223). Due to that, affordances are 
rooted in a principle of bidirectionality that establishes a functional relation in terms of action 
categories – what is possible and impossible (Araújo, Davids, & Hristovski, 2006; Fajen, Riley, 
& Turvey, 2009; Franchak, & Adolph, 2014). However, to make use of the environmental 
information at a given moment and under a set of constraints, the actor needs to become 
sensitive to the properties of the environment that fits the body system. Thus, throughout the 
literature, it has been suggested that actors need to relativize environmental dimensions to some 
intrinsic metric that resonate the complementarity relation supported by affordances (Carello, 
Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Gibson, 1979; Shaw, Turvey & Mace, 1982; 
Stoffregen, 2003). In this sense, affordances reduce what could be an infinite number of options 
two only a few; the ones that fit the actors’ body. 
The body as a dynamic ruler. An important fact underlying the detection of a possible 
or impossible action is the role the body plays in shaping affordance detection. Affordances are 
not the ultimate result of deliberative processes, and not even boundaries of action are imposed 
(or made up) by the actor’s will. Instead, opportunities for action emerge during the constant 
activity of matching our body features with the properties offered by the surrounding. This 
entails a continuous process of learning about and development of our body, and also of ways 
to coordinate the body with the target situations (Gibson, 2002). 
Thus, a large body of evidence has demonstrated that actors rely on their own body to 
action-scaling the physical surrounding in terms of affordances (e.g., Carello et al., 1989; Fajen 
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2007a, 2005a; Franchak & Adolph, 2014; Ishak, Adolph, & Lin, 2008; Mark, 1987; Pepping & 
Li, 2000; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009; Warren, 1984). Early studies, focused on the body 
morphology of animals and its action decisions (e.g., Ingle & Cook, 1977), inspired the 
pioneering work of Warren (1984). Warren (1984) demonstrated that a relational ratio of the 
actor-environment system could constrain the perceived climb-ability of actors. Using two 
groups of participants (taller vs. smaller), that performed the same action estimation (climbable 
or not-climbable), Warren found a higher estimation of climbable in the group of taller 
participants. Interestingly, by adopting a dimensionless ratio (i.e., the ratio between riser height 
and leg length) that normalized the participants’ height, he demonstrated that participants of 
both groups used similar ratios constraining their perceived climb-ability. This lead to the 
conclusion that participants took into account their leg length to estimate their perceived climb-
ability, favoring the assumption that a relativized metric is used to measure the environment.  
This initial body-scaling evidence was replicated by studies manipulating different body 
relations, like the influence of eye-height in the perception of maximum climb-ability, sit-ability 
or pass-ability of apertures (Warren & Whang, 1987; Mark, 1987). Other reports have also 
shown that actors rely on their leg-length to perceive the jump-ability of barriers (van der Meer, 
1997) and arms-length to anticipate the maximum perceived reach-ability of targets (Carelo et 
al., 1989; Rochat & Wraga, 1997). 
Although when taken together the findings of body scaling mechanism indicate that 
biomechanical properties of the actor’ s body are important constraints that influence the 
detection of affordances, this does not mean they are the unique body properties implied in this 
process. Stoffregen (2003) advices that “any property of an animal can bear a relation to some 
property of the environment that gives rise to an affordance” (p.125). So, to guide action in real 
time other sources of information need to be taking into account, as for example the dynamic 
properties of an actor’s system (Fajen & Turvey, 2003; Fajen, 2013, 2007a). 
Through a series of studies using a simulated braking task, Fajen (2005a, 2005b) 
demonstrated that participants controlled their actions within a safety margin that took into 
account their maximum capacity of deceleration. Thus, when the brake was manipulated to a 
middle-to-weak level of resistance participants initiated deceleration later, whereas when the 
brake was manipulated to a middle-to-strong level of resistance participants initiated 
deceleration early. Similar evidence was found in more ecological paradigms. For instance, 
researchers investigated the perceptual-motor performance of goalkeepers in penalty-kick 
situations and demonstrated that goalkeepers action-scaled their timing dive (i.e., fasters 
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goalkeepers took longer to initiate their diving in comparison to their slower counterparts) 
(Dicks, Davis & Button, 2010). 
In short, these findings report that to decide between crossing or not-crossing the closing 
gap of a slid-door, the actors rely on information about how fast and large their bodies are 
relative to the spatial-temporal information offered by the door space. If the actor is quick and 
thin enough, it is likely that the closing gap will afford to cross in safety. If the actors are not 
so quick and thin enough, it is likely that the same gap will afford to cross as unsafe. Due to 
that, theis evidence suggest that action capabilities define the boundaries between a possible 
and an impossible action (Fajen, 2007a; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker & Dolné, 1996; Pepping 
& Li, 2000), and raise an important focus on the accurate sensitiveness of these boundaries. 
 
Calibration and the proper adjustment of an actor’s body to the environment 
Coupled with the detection of affordances, a growing body of literature has investigated 
the perceptual-motor adjustment that underlies an accurate fit of the actor-environment system 
(e.g., for a recent review see van Ander, Colen, & Pepping, 2017). That is, action capabilities 
entail a critical constraint of the actor’s body when detecting affordances, but calibration it is 
what makes possible that actors “perceive the world in intrinsic units even after changes in body 
dimensions and action capabilities” (Fajen et al., 2009, p.97).  
Calibration has been claimed as a mechanism that allows actors to detect what they can 
do in reliable ways, whereas miscalibration has been claimed as a mechanism that signals to 
the actor that an inappropriate action was scaled (resulting in underestimation or overestimation 
of the perceived action capabilities) (Fajen, 2007b; Fajen & Turvey, 2003). Hence, to guide 
successful interactions with the environment, actors need to be able to re-adapt fast and be 
accurate about the changes in their dynamic boundaries. The importance of this mechanism can 
be exemplified with the nonfunctional fit (i.e., overestimation of action) that increases the risk 
of falls in elderly adults (Luyat, Domino, Noel, 2008). Due to that, when some feature of the 
actor’s body changes, the probability of an action (becoming possible or impossible) can also 
change, and consequently, the accuracy of the perceived fit of the actor’s body with the 
environment can oscillate. Fluctuations in the dynamic boundaries of the body happen due to 
different process, as aging (Konczak, Meeuwsen & Cress, 1992; Withagen & Caljouw, 2011), 
addition of implements as prosthesis (Ishak, et al., 2008), mental illness (Keizer, et al., 2013) 
or pregnancy (Franchak & Adolph, 2014). Having this in mind, researchers have manipulated 
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body changes and investigated how fast these manipulations are embodied and recalibrated as 
new information that actors rely on to anticipate or perform an action. 
Calibration due to morphological changes. Under the perceptual-motor literature, a 
large body of evidence has demonstrated that body morphology is integrated into the perception 
of affordances and that actors body-scale the surrounding to estimate whether an action is 
possible or not. Thus, Mark (1987) investigated the influence of morphological changes at 
action-perception by adding a 10cm block to the participant’s feet. He found that participants 
fast recalibrated and embodied the block height to scale the perceived maximum sitting and 
climbing ability. Ishak and collaborators (Ishak et al., 2008) investigated the perceive 
affordance for fitting an hand through different apertures sizes and found that participants 
scaled motor decisions based on their own hand size. They also found that participants fast 
recalibrated their motor decisions when wearing a hand-enlarging prosthesis. Indeed, it had 
already been demonstrated (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005) that when actors hold a tool that 
expand their maximum reaching, this information is fast recalibrated to classify objects that 
were previously unreachable as reachable. Another example is provided by Higuchi and 
colleagues (Higuchi, Cinelli, Greig, & Patla, 2006). The authors analyzed the kinematic 
variables of participants when passing through three different sizes of aperture, under “normal 
walking” or “walking carrying a horizontal bar”. Results showed that when participants were 
prevented to rotate their shoulders (due to carrying a horizontal bar), the smaller the aperture 
the slower the participants’ speed, the larger the number of errors (i.e., stop moving and door 
collision), and the greater care participants took to accurately position their bodies in the center 
of the aperture.  
The robustness of these experimental findings is corroborated by evidence grounded in 
natural and virtual changes in body size. Studying real body changes, Franchak and Adolph 
(2014) investigated the “gut estimates” of pregnant women when squeezing through different 
doorways apertures. They found that in line with increases in body size, previously passable 
doorways switched to the opposite category (without lost accuracy). In a set of studies 
manipulating body changes through an immersive virtual-environment, researchers increased 
and decreased participants’ own hand size. They found that when participants experienced big 
hands the objects within hand reach looked smaller than when they experienced the smaller or 
standard size hands (Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2013). It was also demonstrated 
that when the standard size of the body was virtually manipulated to smaller and larger virtual 
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bodies, estimations of affordance (i.e., an indirect measure) and body size (i.e., a direct 
measure) also changed accordingly (Piryankova et al., 2014). 
Calibration due to energetical changes. Warren (1984) was the first to demonstrated 
that energetic costs could determine a space of “best fit” of the organism-environment system, 
such that affordances could be defined as the preferred regions of minimum energy expenditure 
(i.e., an optimal window). Thus, Konczak and collaborators (Konczak, et al., 1992) investigated 
the perceived climb-ability of younger and older adults and demonstrated that the older group 
operated within a smaller range of action capabilities relatively to wider action range of the 
younger group. Their analysis reported a trend for young adults overestimating their own action 
boundaries and indicated that older and younger could rely on information coming from 
different parts of the body when perceiving their maximum climb-ability. 
Another interesting series of studies investigated the effects of energetic costs on the 
perceived geographic slant (i.e., specified in relation to a fixed environment frame) and 
demonstrated that fatigue could lead people to consciously estimate hills as steeper than reality 
(for a review see Proffitt, 2006). In a first study that integrated visual judgment of out-of-door 
and virtual geographic slants, Proffitt and collaborators (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & 
Midgett, 1995) demonstrated a higher tendency for participants to overestimate hills when 
providing verbal assessment and visual measures, from the top of the hill and under fatigue. In 
a second study, Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) tested the relation between energetic cost and the 
adaptability of the visual-motor system by manipulating the physical conditions of participants 
(i.e., when wearing a heavy extra load, tired, with low fitness, elderly or in declining health). 
Results indicated that energetic costs have a direct impact on the conscious perception of slant 
degrees, leading participants to overestimate the perceived hills. Finally, in two recent studies, 
the fatigue states of participants were direct manipulated with the ingestion of glucose (Schnall, 
Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010) and carbohydrate (Zadra, Weltman & Proffitt, 2016). Results revealed 
that higher concentrations of glucose lead participants to estimate hills as less steep, as well as 
higher concentrations of carbohydrate, leads participants to estimate distances closer. 
Calibration to emotional changes. Regarding the influence of emotions in the 
perceptual system, findings have demonstrated that elicited states of emotions, categorized as 
higher on activation as fear and anxiety, are able to disturb visual accuracy and increase 
variability in the perceived fit. For instance, Bootsma and co-workers (Bootsma, Bakker, van 
Snippenberg, & Tdlohreg, 1992) investigated the effects of elicited states of anxiety in the 
detection of affordances. Reports demonstrated that although anxiety was not able to change 
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the nature of the affordance, elicited anxiety increased the variability of perceived action 
capabilities of participants, leading the authors to suggest a detriment of the accuracy of the 
perceived fit. Importantly, other researchers demonstrated that elicited anxiety not only affects 
the estimation of action but also the patterns of the action itself. Pijper et al. (2006) found that 
elicited anxiety states reduced the maximal reaching of climber not only when anticipating 
action but also when performing real climbing. The effects of elicited anxiety in visual scaling 
were replicated in a paradigm that induced anxiety immediately prior to the perceptual task and 
found a tendency for underestimation of different action capabilities (Graydon, Linkenauger, 
Teachman, & Proffit, 2012). 
In what concerns the effects of fear in the visual scaling mechanism, results have been 
similar to the findings investigating the effect of anxiety.  For example, studies relating fear and 
altitude demonstrated a tendency for overestimating height when fear is elicited (Stefanucci & 
Proffitt, 2009). This overestimation of perceived vertical heights happens, not only in 
association with acrophobia (i.e., fear of height), but also when participants on the top of a 
balcony are asked to imagine themselves falling (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & 
Teachman, 2009). Additionally, this effect can be extended to the estimation of horizontal 
distances (Stefanucci, Gagnon, Tompkins, & Bullock, 2012). Finally, within a virtual 
environment, researchers found that elicited states of fear associated with an overestimation of 
the width of gaps, as well as with a shift on motor-behavior (i.e., change from stepped over 
fewer gaps to stepped farther over the gap widths) (Geuss, et al., 2016). So, as reported for the 
effects of anxiety, elicit states of fear is also able to change action estimation or action itself. 
Calibration due to mental changes. In what concerns the effects of mental states and 
the perceptual-motor adjustment, we report bellow studies investigating illness associated with 
body size, as anorexia. In a first study researchers found that relative to the control group, 
anorexic patients not only perceived themselves as not fitting-through on wide enough apertures 
but also demonstrated higher relational ratios between shoulder and aperture width. A clear 
indication that anorexic patients experience their body as larger than reality (Guardia, et al., 
2010). In a second study, researchers investigated whether the disturbing experience of body 
size was associated to the conscious perceptual level (i.e., body image) or if it was associated 
to the unconscious level of action-related representation (i.e., body schema). Without the 
patients and the control group being aware, researchers recorded the action of walking through 
door-like openings that changed in width and subsequently analyzed kinematic variables. 
Results demonstrated that while control groups started rotating their shoulders for apertures 
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25% wider than their shoulders, anorexic patients started rotating their shoulders for apertures 
40% wider than their shoulders (Keizer, et al., 2013). Finally, in a study investigating the effects 
of obesity and perceived distance, Sugovic and collaborators (Sugovic, Turk, & Witt, 2016) 
investigated whether action-specific effects were due to the unique contributions of beliefs 
about body size versus physical characteristics of body size. By comparing distance estimation 
of participants targeted as normal-weight, overweight and obese, results revealed a tendency 
for heavier participants to estimate distances as farther. This tendency was not related to 
participants’ beliefs about their body size. 
Taken together these results show that people are very sensitive to their dynamic 
boundaries and rely on action capabilities to scale spatial-temporal relations that guide their 
actions. Moreover, these findings also indicate that calibration is a mechanism that can be 
sensitive to changes of morphologic, physiologic and psychologic states of the body. 
Despite the robustness of this evidence, several questions regarding the mechanism of 
our dynamic action boundaries remain unanswered. For instance, there is still a lack of 
understanding about (1) the nature of the information that underlies action capabilities and (2) 
how fast actors recalibrate new information about their action boundaries to keep accurate 
relations with the surrounding. Another piece missing falls on the sensitiveness experience of 
our dynamic boundaries, and how actors “know” and integrate it when anticipating or 
performing actions. 
 
****** 
 
Throughout this first chapter, we define our position in accordance with Gibson’s (1979) 
assumptions of (1) perception as a dynamic act of living observers and (2) action guided by the 
detection of affordances. We also show robust evidence that actors rely on their body to scale 
the environment in categories going from possible to impossible actions and to detect 
affordances the opportunities for actions that entailing a reciprocity principle of the actor-
environment system. 
In this process, the dynamic boundaries of action are an important constraint, given that 
action capabilities limit what could be an infinite number of possibilities of action to only the 
ones that fit the body system. Also, to a functional and adaptive fit of the properties of the actor 
and the properties of the environment, two main assumptions are needed: (1) the sensibility of 
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the actor to the properties of the environment that suits her/his needs, and (2) the accurate 
calibration of the body to these properties. Therefore, an accurate calibration allows a good 
rescaling of the physical properties (i.e., size and distance) in functional units, whereas 
miscalibration leads to errors of underestimation and overestimation. 
Data have indicated that changes in different levels of the body system – the 
morphologic, physiologic, and psychologic- are able to affect both the boundaries of action and 
the calibration of action. Specifically, the evidence indicates that morphologic changes (e.g., 
body size) can be rescaled as new information and be (relatively fast) integrated into the 
perceived action boundaries. This evidences have been found, for instance, when asking actors 
to estimate/anticipate their own action. In turn, changes at the physiologic (e.g., fatigue) and 
psychologic levels (e.g., anxiety and anorexia) seem to induce actors to miscalibrate the 
perceived spatial layout. Importantly, none of this evidence is restricted to conscious judgments, 
given that changes in the patterns of movement have also been shown. 
Because of the involvement of different systems of the body and the dynamic features 
involved in the sensibility of action boundaries, the theories and data reviewed in this chapter 
lead us to hypothesized that sensorial levels – as feelings that agglutinate a myriad of bodily 
process- could be integrated as information from the experience of our action capabilities. In 
addition, data also suggest a clear connection of body-mind-environment, which is a 
fundamental claim of embodiment theories. These two topics are reviewed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter II 
Feelings as information 
The idea of visceral and physiologic changes feeding cognitive processes has been 
commonly pointed as a sophisticated upgrade to William James’ (1894). Nowadays, this brain-
body connection has been investigated as an important source of information that supports 
judgment and action, with different research lines (ranging from the neurobiological, 
physiological and psychological levels) indicating that feelings index positive and negative 
information (e.g., Cabanac, 2002; Clore 1992; Damásio, 1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 
2001; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003; Pankseep, 2011; Schwarz, 2012; Zadra & Clore, 
2011).  It has been suggested that some kind of law of affect constrains animals’ behavior given 
that “animals do seek brain/mind affective comfort zones and avoid discomforts (Panksepp, 
2010a, p. 51). 
These findings are especially relevant for this thesis, which hypothesizes an 
informational link of feelings as modulating the dynamic boundaries of our body (action 
capabilities). Therefore, we begin this first chapter reviewing neurobiological findings that 
suggest an informational role of feelings. Next, we examine the experiential level of non-
emotional feelings, and how it has been studied as an information route to judgment and 
decision making. To this end, we first distinguish emotional from non-emotional feelings, to 
subsequently approach the interplay of feelings and cognition. Specifically, we focus our review 
on findings showing that people rely on their subjective experience of “comfort vs discomfort” 
as a fast and direct route of information to judgment and decision making. We conclude this 
chapter by approaching feelings within an embodiment perspective. 
 
Feelings at its roots 
From its primal manifestation, the valence nature of feelings has its causality associated 
with changes in physiological aspects of the body-mind and it is related to survival, life 
regulation and the experience of sentience (e.g., Craig 2010; Damásio, 2003; Gu, Hof, Friston, 
& Fan, 2013; Pankseep, 2011). Under the scope of neurobiological research, feelings have been 
associated to brain sub-neocortical regions with the assumption that these brain regions are able 
to produce affective mentality on their own (Pankseep 2011, 2003). Researchers have also 
investigated the support of all subjective experiences, under the assumption that some brain 
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regions allocate a mapping of visceral states of body, (e.g., Craig, 2003, Damásio, 1999; 
Damásio et al., 2000; Polattos, Gramann, Schandry, 2007). 
For instance, studies focused on interoception (i.e., the faculty to sense the physiologic 
state of our body; Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2002) have reported that primary interoceptive 
representation of the physiological state of the body seems to be strongly correlated with 
activation of the insular cortex (e.g., Craig, 2011, 2009; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). 
Important to our goals, interoception has also been associated with body-ownership, 
specifically, the insular cortex activation has been correlated with body awareness and control 
of direct effort. For instance, Craig (2009) refers that “the insular cortex contains a somatotopic 
representation of the subjective feelings of one’s current movements as part of a representation 
of all feelings from the body” (p.60). In this sense, evidence have demonstrated the plausibility 
of an immediate connection of the insular cortex with exercise (e.g., Williamson, McColl, & 
Mathews, 2003) and the voluntary control of hand movements (e.g., Brass & Haggard, 2007; 
Farrer et al., 2003; Tsakiris, Hesse, Haggard, & Fink, 2007). Finally, findings have also 
supported the emergence of theoretical models suggesting a multimodal integration of 
interoception and exteroception at the roots of body movement awareness (e.g., Suzuki, 
Garfinkel, Critchleym & Seth, 2013). 
Overall, the primal feelings identified on the neurobiological level sustain the valenced 
phenomenal experience of emotions and emotional learning (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & 
Gross, 2007; Pankseep, 2011). A growing body of theoretical proponents have indicated that 
the affective power of primary sensory can be cognitively re-symbolized to support social 
constructions (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Damásio & Carvalho, 2013; Pankseep, 2011; Seth, 2013). 
That is, the body experience, triggered by the visceral and homeostatic changes, constitutes raw 
information for cognitive processes as memory and learning because the primal bodily 
information is redirected to social demands. For instance, the felt experience of nausea 
understood as a bio-evolutionary answer of the body is a somatosensory experience that gives 
support to the emotional experience of disgust. It can also be conceptually used to guide 
communication (e.g., That place is dirty!) or leading to a preferable pattern of action (e.g., I 
jump the garbage on the floor). 
Although the focus of this thesis is not to demonstrate the mechanism but rather to focus 
the experiential level of feelings, we speculate that a similar process might underly the 
experience of our perceived action boundaries and their adjustment to the properties of the 
environment. For instance, several sensory receptors located at neuromuscular structures (e.g., 
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the Golgi tendon organ and the muscle spindle) feed the central nervous system with 
information about the level of tension and stretching of the muscle (e.g., Fortier & Bassett, 
2012). Also, the high concentration of acid lactic in the blood, which is related to the maximum 
oxygen uptake (e.g., Bassett & Howley, 2000), might be at the roots of our subjective 
experience of (dis)comfort (see Mark et al., 1997; and Warren, 1984). 
 
The felt experience matters 
Although the mechanisms underlying subjective experiences have been studied, 
describing how feelings originate is not enough, because it “does not substitute for a description 
of what is felt” (Barrett et al., 2007, p.373). At a psychological level of analysis, feelings can 
be a non-inferential route of bodily information that signals the advantageous or 
disadvantageous nature of mental processing and behavior. Therefore, in a broad sense, all 
mind-body phenomena that sustain our subjective experiences can be captured by the ancient 
definition of the Latin word affectus: a state of body, and especially of mind produced in one 
by some influence (Lewis & Short, 1879). However, within the scope of the felt experience, 
different categories and levels of information can be found due to the combination of brain level 
activation (i.e., conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious) and the spatial-temporal constraints. 
In this sense, pain and hungry can be categorized as different of sad and happy, although for 
both the informative roots are anchored in a scale of comfort and discomfort regarding survival 
and life regulation. 
 At the level of psychologic experience the literature (see Clore, 1982; Clore, Gasper, & 
Garvin, 2001) allows us to identify at least two distinct classes of experiential feelings: i) those 
that are associated with constructive processes that encompass higher brain levels of activity 
(as the tertiary process of language, categorization and inference) and that have been defined as 
emotions (e.g., Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barret, 2012; Scherer, 
2009a; Damásio, 1999); ii) and those that do not reach the higher levels of processing associated 
with emotions and so might happen without our full awareness (e.g.,mood, intuitions and other 
sensorimotor changes). In this sense, Damásio (1999) adverts to the puzzled distinction of 
“having a feeling” and “knowing that we have a feeling”, and argues that feelings encompass 
an online biological process in which be fully aware of all the stages and mechanism would be 
counterproductive to the biological system. Damásio refers to “state-of-feeling” to describes 
the second step of a continuum of feelings that are unconsciously represented, and that ends 
when the state of feeling is made conscious (i.e., reaches the emotional level of experience). 
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This definition considers that emotion encompasses the last phase of a cognitive process of 
neurophysiologic experience. 
Due to that, some researchers have proposed the existence of core feelings 
that“incoming sensory information from the external environment with homeostatic and 
interoceptive information from the body” (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p.04). It means that 
feelings that do not reach language and categorization are able to work as a barometer that 
informs us about our interaction with the environment. Specifically, it has been suggested that 
fluctuations at the level of core-affect are able to charge any emotional episode as well as free-
floating and assuming the same attributes of mood (Russel, 2003; 2009). Hence, in its mild 
manifestation, the core-affect corresponds to a diffuse and neutral subjective experience. 
However, because of its dynamic properties (i.e., time-sliced) during environment interactions 
the neutral state can quickly change and range from positive-to-negative and from lethargic-to-
energized (Barrett, 2006; Russel & Barrett, 1999). 
In this sense, emotional and non-emotional feelings can be both a structure in models 
that suggest at least a hedonic dimension (i.e., pleasure or displeasure), plus a dimension of 
intensity or activation (i.e., arousal) (e.g., Cabanac, 2002; Russel, 1980). However, there is 
strong controversy if the valence dimension is bipolar, with the increasing of one preventing 
the other (e.g., Barrett & Russel, 1999; Russel, 1980), or if the valence dimension is bivalent 
and positive and negative can be co-activate because they are independent (e.g., Cacioppo, 
Berntson, Norris, & Gollan, 2012; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999). In this sense, it is 
also possible that positivity and negativity are implemented dynamically in a general valence 
space (i.e., brain state rather than the ubiquitous relation between positivity and negativity) (see 
Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2016). Despite that, at the level of the felt 
experience and behavioral evidence the affective episodes can be represented in a bi-
dimensional semantic space (valence-arousal), in which angry states are categorized as a 
negative and with high arousal, and sad states are categorized as negative and low in arousal 
(Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russel, 1980; Lang & Bradley, 2007). 
Thus, Ekman (1999) and Plutchik (2001) have suggested that evolutionary roots shape 
our cognitive system with a set of defined patterns that include physiologic and mental 
responses. These basic emotions integrate a very complex mechanism of survival and play a 
preeminent role at the level of cognition and goal-direct behavior, being triggered to support 
daily life-tasks and action tendency (see, for example, Fridja, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). 
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Unlike the assumption of discrete emotions as entities, Barrett (2006) and Scherer 
(2009a, 2009b) has proposed a more dynamic approach in which emotions are tailored for the 
immediate and emerge from a dynamic process. Thus, for Barrett and collaborators (Barrett, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; see also Lindquist et al., 2012) emotions encompass a conscious 
experience that emerges only when the actor adds meaning to the sensory input from the body 
and the stimulus from the world (i.e., previous knowledge and the current sensorimotor 
experiences combine and constrain each other). In the same line, Scherer (2009a) considers 
emotional episodes to be anchored by five subsystems (i.e., cognitive, neurophysiological, 
subjective feelings, action-tendencies and motor expression) that feed cognitive process that is 
constantly re-feed and re-checked, linking brain information with the bodily state. Thus, 
emotions are categorized as the portion of the processes that reach the conscious level of 
categorization, with the mechanism anchored on the automatic, dynamic, unconscious and 
effortless process (i.e., rather than hard computations). 
In what concerns the subjective experiences associated with non-emotional feelings, the 
body of evidence does not allow a clear categorization, because the experiences can be anchored 
under different perspectives. Thus, described as a non-emotional feeling that is always running 
in our background with low intensity, mood is a general subjective experience that conveys 
generic information of positivity and negativity valence (i.e., that attracts or repels our goal-
motivation) that lacks a clear referent (Clore, 1992; Garcia-Marques, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007). The mood may or may not be appraisal-based (Clore et al., 2001).  
Other subjective experiences associated with non-emotional feelings are those linked 
with the nature of our mental operations, as the feelings-of-familiarity (e.g, Garcia-Marques & 
Mackie, 2001) and fluency (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Both of 
these feelings are associated with a specific valence that sustains an experience of pleasure, 
positivity, and easiness (Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 2004; 
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Winkelmand & Caccioppo, 2001). Thus, feelings-of-familiarity 
are rooted in memory process and can be used as information when re-encountering a similar 
stimulus or event (Garcia-Marques, Prada, & Mackie, 2016; Garcia-Marques et al., 2004). 
Specifically, when familiarity arises the feeler feels good because there is a match between the 
actual context conditions and the knowledge acquired and stored in previous experience, 
signaling the actor to “keep going with the flow”. Feelings-of-fluency can be due not only to 
memory processes but also to other instances, such as the effort to perceive contextual stimulus 
or task (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Reber, Schwarz, & Wilkman, 2004). Carver and Scheier 
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(1990) proposed that fluency indicates that everything is flowing to a positive outcome and so 
no additional effort is needed. Thus, the subjective experience of fluency is associated to the 
easiness of processing and low levels of effort, with disfluency signaling exactly the opposite 
feeling (e.g., Alter, Oppenheirmer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Topolinski & Strack, 2015). 
Recent evidence also suggests that subjective experiences rooted in non-emotional 
feelings (positivity, negativity) are rooted not only at the level of a central system but also 
integrate sensorimotor information. For instance, Regenberg and collaborators (Regenberg, 
Häfner, & Semin, 2012) found that participants experienced grasp-ability more fluently (i.e., 
easier and fast) when there was congruence between the anatomical position of their hands and 
the target object. Overall, studies integrating motor response and cognitive processes under a 
stimulus-response paradigm have indicated a trend for fast responses when there is a match 
between the properties of the body and the object (i.e., sensitivity to affordance detection) (e.g., 
Constantini, Ambrosini, Tieri, Sinigaglia, & Committeri, 2010; Tucker & Ellis, 2001; 1998). 
In this sense, Massumi (2002) visualizes feelings as being the body own grammar, 
happening beyond language and preparing the body for action prior to and/or outside 
consciousness. Thus, feelings signal the “suspension of the invariance that makes happy happy, 
sad sad, function function, and meaning mean” (pg. 27). 
To capture these informational experiences happening beyond language, researchers 
have used paradigms involving physiological levels, action tendency, and motor expression. 
Studies associating the subjective experience of positivity and negativity to the 
electromyography activity of facial muscles (e.g., Dimberg, & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg, 
Thumberg, & Grunedal, 2002) have reported that when participants are exposed (either at the 
supraliminal and subliminal levels) to pleasant stimuli (e.g., the picture of a flower or a happy 
face) a mild level of activation at the zygomaticus major (i.e., the muscle that pushes up lip 
corners to create a smile) is detected. In turn, when participants are exposed to unpleasant 
stimuli (e.g., snakes and a sad face) a mild level of activation at the corrugator supercilious (i.e., 
the muscle that knits the eyebrows to form a frown) is detected. A meta-analysis indicated that 
blood pressure, heart rate, and skin conductance were other reliable bodily correlates to 
discriminate subjective experiences charged with positivity and negativity (Cacioppo, 
Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000). For instance, Gomez and collaborators (Gomez, 
Stabel, & Danuser, 2004) tracked values of skin conductance, heart rate, breathing and also 
reports of affective judgments from participants who watched pictures with different levels of 
valence and arousal. Results revealed the association of higher levels of pleasantness with 
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lengthened inspiratory time, and of higher levels of arousal with a higher electrodermal activity 
and a short and accelerated breathing cycle. 
 
The interplay of feelings and cognition 
The assumption of a prominent role of feelings in human behavior rejects the idea of 
feelings as a merely residual phenomenon of a brain machine. In alternative, feelings have been 
investigated not only under the idea that they dictate the direction of cognitive processes (as 
claimed by dual systems theories; see Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2011), but rather that they 
constitute an integral part of information processing by regulating and/or modifying cognitive 
processes (Storbeck & Clore 2007).  
Advances in neuroscience research have demonstrated to be hard to find the physical 
boundaries that separate the cognitive from the affective systems (e.g., Okon-Singer, Hendler, 
Pessoa, & Shackman, 2015; Pessoa, 2008). Overall, these data favor a dynamic and integrated 
web of connections and re-connections with the same brain regions actively involved in several 
behaviors. However, decades before the advent of neurological findings, psychologists had 
already indicated a possible interplay between feelings and cognition (e.g., Duncan & Barrett, 
2007; Garcia-Marques, 2013; Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015; Pourtois, Notebaert, & 
Verguts, 2012; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). For instance, Bower (1981) showed that feelings 
support memory organization and activation by proposing the facilitation of memory processes 
under situations of congruency between the mood-state and the hedonic value of the assimilated 
content. In turn, Zajonc (2000; 1980) proposed that feelings and cognition were grounded in 
separate systems, with feelings having a temporal primacy over basic cognitive process as 
reason-based assessment (Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hugues, 2001). 
Feeling-as-information approach. Suggesting a different perspective Clore (1992; 
Clore et al., 2001) and also Schwarz (2012; 1990) have focused on the informative function of 
feelings as a direct route of evaluation, rather than effortful and analytical strategies. Thus, 
rather than facilitate the recall of material that matches the valence of our affective state (Bower, 
1981; Forgas, 2000), the initial assumption of the affective hypothesis suggested that actors 
inspect their own sensory experiences, triggered by the target-object, by implicitly asking “How 
do I feel about it?” (Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 2003, 1983). This means that feelings are 
informative of the own nature and not because of a biased effect due to memory processes, or 
a belief coming from an attributional process. Indeed, one of the fundamental claims of this 
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affective approach is that people rely on their bodily feelings as an immediate route of fast 
information about their interaction with the situational context. For instance, we do not think 
“Sara is a beautiful dog” because of its color, body shape, nose, tail and other attributes, we 
instantly feel the beauty when visually seeing the dog and, so we use the attributes to describe 
it (Clore et al., 2001). 
Overall, the idea behind the found evidence is that people always have incidental 
feelings rolling in their organism (i.e., without any relation to the current situation). Thus, 
because it is hard to detect the primary source of feelings, when new feelings are elicited at the 
current situation (integral feelings) people can misattribute the feelings triggered by the 
experiment as being from the target-object (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
According to Cohen and collaborators (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008), the third kind of 
feelings that are neither related to the actor’s baseline nor elicited by the object, but rather lie 
between them are the task-related feelings. These feelings are triggered by the demand implicit 
on choices and decisions (e.g., doubts and stress). 
To demonstrate that feelings integrate evaluative processes that follow a direct route and 
are not under the influence of cognitive content, researchers have used different sources of 
manipulation to induce feelings (e.g., using music, faces, words, imagination or episodic 
memory). Mood-congruence effects were found when participants reported more satisfaction 
about life: (1) in sunny days versus cloudy days; (2) after watching their national soccer team 
win versus tying a game; and (3) after being exposed to a room with very pleasant conditions 
versus very unpleasant conditions (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, , 
& Wagner, 1987). Research on marketing and consumer behavior have also demonstrated the 
integration of sensory information in judgment and decision making (e.g., Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen, 2012; Chang & Pham, 2013; Krishna & Schwarz, 2014; Pham 2004, 1998; 
Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007). 
Overall, mood effect is more relevant when the feelings are directly related with the task 
demand (Schwarz & Clore, 2007), however, despite the mood-congruence effect, feelings can 
assume different relations regarding the interplay of the baseline of actors, motivation, intention 
and contextual features. This happens because the informative value of feelings resides “in the 
interaction between these feelings and the questions that people are trying to answer when 
consulting their feelings, which depends on situational demands and more generally on the 
person’s currently active goals” (Cohen et al., 2008, p.56; see also Pham 2004). Therefore, 
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rather than main-effects “the feelings-as-information hypothesis predicts an interaction between 
affective states and the perception of their likely causes (Schwarz & Clore, 2007, p.9).  
In this sense, Schwarz (2002) suggests a cognitive tuning in which mood and 
environment have a bidirectional influence. Therefore, according to Scharwz, when the mood 
is experienced as a positive subjective experience it signals the actor a safe environment and 
the subject motivation is kept in a low level of processing style (i.e., without any need for 
change). However, when facing environmental changes an effortful processing might become 
necessary and feelings can be more informative than during regular conditions. In addition, 
contexts involving time pressure can also increase the impact of feelings given the short time 
available to the system to reach higher cognitive processes (e.g., attributional or discount 
mechanisms) (see also Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998).  
Also seeing feeling as information, Martin (2001; Martin, Abend & Green, 1997) 
assumes that mood serves as an input to the judgment process (i.e., the mood-as-input model) 
and so participants in initial happy mood (for example) differ from participants with initial sad 
mood when facing the same sad manipulation. This contribution revealed that mood effect in 
judgments could be context-dependent and not merely based on congruence as demonstrated 
by other models. 
Although at the beginning the feeling-as-information hypothesis was centered in the 
effects of mood in evaluative judgments, nowadays the perspective has been expanded to 
consider feelings as integrating different somatic experiences captured at the level of valence 
and arousal (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2008; Schwarz, 2004; Winkielman & Caccioppo, 2001; 
Zadra & Clore, 2011). In general, different sources of bodily feelings as physiological changes 
and metacognitive thinking can convey information about comfort and discomfort (Clore & 
Colcombe, 2003; Clore & Storbeck, 2006). 
Therefore, it has been suggested that whereas valence can inform about positivity and 
negativity, arousal can be informative of urgency (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Another field of 
study that has received increasing attention has been the interconnection of feelings as 
functional information integrating judgments of visual perception (e.g.; Gasper & Clore, 2002; 
Zadra & Clore, 2011). Mood has not only been associated with patterns of overestimation (e.g., 
Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2011), but also with emotional episodes of elicited arousal 
as fear and anxiety (e.g., Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009; Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 
2008) – a topic we will revisit on the next chapter. 
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Feelings-as-information: an embodied perspective 
The idea of psychological events as the experiential counterpart of physiological events 
considers subjective experiences as being a partially visceral and a partially mental process. 
Otherwise, the ebbs and flow of feelings would be meaningless sensations (Barrett & Bar, 2009; 
Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2014). Thus, “all basic psychological processes are 
thoroughly dependent on brain biophysical processes, working together with body, 
environment, and culture” (Panksepp, 2010a, p. 58). This body-mind integration is a crucial 
claim of embodiment theories which assume that the form and experience of our body in 
interaction with the physical and social environment constrains cognition in the resolution of 
adaptive problems (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Gibson, 1979; Glenberg, 
2010; Schubert & Semin, 2009; Thompson & Varela, 2001). 
Hence, the embodiment perspective assumes a critical position against the cognitive 
models supported by the functionalist view of the computer metaphor (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988, see also Harnad, 1990). Thus, rather than the disembodied brain that is conceptualized as 
the biological hardware that produces cognition, this approach favors the integrality of 
subjective-and-objective experiences. This means that the processes of the body (i.e., 
perception, sensorimotor system, and feelings) are not split from the processes of the mind (i.e., 
appraisals and inferences) (Colombetti & Thompson, 2008) and that somatosensory and motor 
experiences are not merely input-output devices that sub-serve a central processor. 
Supported by the body-mind integration, embodiment studies aim to understand “the 
dynamic interaction (coupling) of a system that is embedded into the surrounding environment” 
(Gomila & Calvo, 2008, p.11). That is, “how behavior emerges from the real-time interplay of 
task-specific resources distributed across the brain, body, and environment, coupled together 
via our perceptual systems” (Wilson and Golonka, 2013, p.01; for a dynamic perspective see 
also Chiel & Beer, 1997). For instance, Wilson (2002) defined six core assumptions that underly 
embodiment framework: that cognition is situated, time-pressured and used to guide action; that 
attentional and physical limits constrain actor’s interaction with the environment; the 
surrounding integrates the cognitive system so the mind itself is not a functional level of 
analysis; and offline cognition is grounded in mechanisms that evolved or were learned in 
interaction with the environment (i.e., perception and motor control). 
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Multimodal representations and reenactment. Under the assumption of body-mind 
integration, embodiment theories have considered representations of multi-modal patterns of 
neural activations acquired in real interactions with the world (Barsalou 2010; 2008). In this 
sense, Glenberg (2010) argues that no matter how many symbols one can trace inside a semantic 
network, the first meaningful one will be always grounded in our bodily sensory, motor and 
emotional systems in interaction with the object and the situation denoted by the symbol. 
Thus, rather than higher order mental contents that are stored in memory under the form 
of amodal symbols (i.e., knowledge representations that do not preserve any analogical feature 
of our interaction with the environment), under the perspective of embodiment theories the 
cognitive representations of any knowledge are delineate in partial mappings of perceptual, 
motor and introspective states of the body that are grounded in dynamic interactions with the 
environment (Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal, 2007). Hence, the mappings are not full records of 
the experience but only partial networks of brain activation that integrates information about 
the environment, the action and the interplay (or mapping) between them (Kiefer & Barsalou, 
2013). 
 In this sense, embodied simulation constitutes a partial, mild and not always conscious 
full-blown of physical and emotional episodes (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013; see also Garcia-
Marques, 2013). It is not merely an associative connection of concepts and somatic states, but 
rather constructive reenactments working as information processing, and that generate 
perceptual inferences that go beyond perceiving stimuli in useful ways. (Barsalou, 2008; 
Winkielman, Niedenthal, Wielgosz, Eelen, & Kavanagh, 2015). 
Thus, under the assumption that neural mappings acquired in later experiences can be 
reactivated by ongoing contextual similarity and embodied information to subjective 
experience (reenactment), researchers have investigated the activation and reactivation of 
bodily and neural responses rooted in lower-level brain functions (i.e., somatic and 
sensorimotor representations) (e.g., Barsalou, 2010; Niedenthal, 2007; Thompson & Varela, 
2001). 
Examples of the role of simulation can be found in the work of Hauk and collaborators 
(Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004). These authors have observed the cortical activation 
of motor cortex areas of participants while performing hand movements. They subsequently 
found an overlap of activation areas when the same participants passively read a relative action 
word (i.e., pick). Another evidence can be found in the reports that demonstrated that 
participants mimicked the muscles associated to sadness expression (i.e., corrugator) when 
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watching sad faces (i.e., a negative emotional experience) or judging words with context 
associated to emotions (in contrast with judging whether the words were or not capitalized). 
(Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). 
In what concern the reenactment of affective states, evidence have demonstrated how 
the activation of somatosensory states is able to trigger subjective experiences. For instance, in 
a study where participants hold a pen in ways that inhibited or facilitated zygomatic muscle 
activation, reports demonstrated that facial activity was able to influence the affective state. 
Specifically, it was demonstrated that activation of zygomatic major, the muscle associated with 
smiling, was able to elicit positive affect over the participants (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). 
Similar evidence is also found in the works of Dimberg (1982; Dimberg, & Thunberg, 1998; 
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal, 2002) who reported elicited activity of the zygomatic major 
when participants were exposed to happy faces, and elicited activity of corrugator supercilious 
when participants were exposed to angry faces (even when faces were presented subliminally; 
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000).  
Overall, at  least four possible influences of simulation on current action have been 
supported by empirical evidence: i) that action might be either facilitated or impeded regarding 
the match/mismatch between the actual context and the reenacted partial simulation 
automatically triggered by the stimulus; ii) that a concurrent task might block the simulation 
when the task involves the same sensorimotor resources; iii) that simulation can also work in 
offline mode; and iv) that simulations are dependent on expertise level (i.e., previous experience 
and skills) (Körner, Topolinsk, & Strack, 2015). 
 
 
****** 
 
Findings from neuroscience support the hypothesis of primal feelings linked with 
visceral and homeostatic states of the body, and also suggest the integration of these feelings in 
the roots of secondary and tertiary processes (i.e., memory, perception, reasoning). 
These findings have been corroborated by psychological approaches that consider 
feelings as arising as the counterpart of any cognitive processes supplies direct information for 
behavior. In this sense, several evidence have demonstrated that feelings have a functional role 
(e.g., are taken into account in evaluative judgments). Overal the experiential dimension of 
feelings have been captured in a bidimensional representation that split our felt experience in 
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the axis of valence versus arousal. Thus, researchers have applied words, songs, faces or 
pictures that are pre-tested in these bidimensional features and use them to induce bias affective 
responses as a method to investigate the role of feelings in behavior. Despite of that, it is 
important to note that the nature and causality of valence and arousal is still in current 
development. For example, it is not clear the relation between these two components of the felt 
experience (Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russell, & Barrett, 2013). Also, there is controversy as to 
whether the positive and negative experience associated with valence has its root in an unipolar 
or bipolar dimension, as well as, if the two valences have a relation of dependency or not. 
Although the idea of feelings as information started with a focus on cognitive feelings 
that were associated to mental operations (as memory retrieval), nowadays the sensorial 
information has been extend to different bodily processes, for example demonstrating sensorial 
fluency associated to affordances.  However,  mostly of the investigation in this field seems not 
approach the role of feelings when perception is intended to guide action in a dynamic context 
and when the own body system is the metric used to scale opportunities for action.We explore 
this point in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Feelings as an embodied route of information for action capabilities 
“What the organism senses is a function of how it moves, 
and how it moves is a function of what it senses” 
(Thompson and Varella, 2001, p.424). 
 
In this third chapter we use the theoretical lines of action-perception and feeling-as-
information that were reviewed on chapter 1 and 2 in order to elaborate how feelings can be 
understood as the embodied route of information for action capabilities. 
 
Can feelings modulate the actor-environment fit? 
When Gibson (1966) claimed that animals were equipped with a perceptual system he 
also indicated that the perceptual system was integrate or subordinate to other system levels. 
According to Gibson (1979), the visual system is not only about the eyes, but the eyes in the 
head, the read in the neck and the neck in the body. So, although evidences of direct perception 
have been provided through the detection of invariant relation on the optical flow rather than 
retinal and mental pictures, visual perception does not happen in the eye as an isolate fashion. 
Information available in the optical array is interconnected in an embodied experience, with 
this body embedded in a context (Barsalou, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Thompson & 
Varella, 2001; Wilson, 2012). 
In this sense, ocular models (e.g., Shaffer & McBeath, 2002; Lee, & Kalmus, 1980) 
have provided evidences that optical cues are able to carrier spatial-temporal relations and direct 
specify information about the actor-environment system. For instance, the bi-dimensional 
optical variable tau denotes the inverse of the relative rate of the retinal expansion during the 
approaching of an object and specifies time-to-collision (e.g., Lee, 1998). Thus, tau is 
informative of spatial-temporal relations when adjusting perceptual-motor coupling in 
processes involving for example, grasping (e.g., Savelsberg, Whiting, & Bootsma, 1991) and 
hitting balls (e.g., Lee, Young, Reddish, Lough, & Clayton, 1983). However, a classical 
criticism resting on this kind of approach is that information from the optical array is limited to 
explaining how the action is guided by pursuit affordances, given that optical flow can for 
example be constraining by non-optical as action potential and its boundaries (e.g., Fajen, 2013; 
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2007a). For instance, if we explore the classic problem of an actor moving forward to catch a 
flying ball (e.g., Chapman, 1968; McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995), when the actor moves 
toward the ball abruptly (running) changes in the optical flow happens fast, when the actor 
moves toward the ball slowly (walking) changes in the optical flow happens slowly, and fast 
and slow displacement are constraining by action capabilities.  
Thus, changes in the optical flow does not happening in disconnection with changes in 
neuro-physiologic processes at for example the level of muscular contraction and 
cardiorespiratory. It makes of running to catch a flying ball a embodied experience in which 
visceral and somatosensorial changes are in the roots of higher brain processes and shapes 
cognition. That is strategically important when considering feeling as information for action 
capabilities. 
In classical study researchers demonstrated with monkeys that looming effect (i.e., the 
optical expansion in the retina that specifies collision) was more threathening (a felt experience) 
than receding effect (i.e., the optical shrinking in the retina), (e.g., Caviness, Schiff, & Gibson, 
1962). Subsequently, it was demonstrated that when the approaching stimulus was felt as more 
threatening to the actor’s body a trend of participants to overestimate time-to-contact was found 
(Vagnoni, Lourenco, & Longo, 2012), suggesting the same threatening experience. In addition, 
when the visual looming is associate with the tracking of a dynamic stimulus going toward the 
face of the participants (i.e., higher in feelings of threatening), rather than passing at the side of 
the body the area of the face predicted for the collision may enhance in terms of tactile 
sensibility (Cléry, Guipponi, Odouard, Wardak, & Hamed, 2015), a clear evidence that the body 
is connected with the phenomena in the eyes. 
Another relevant point on the action-perception literature was raised by Fajen (2007a; 
2005) and refers to the fact that when controlling action by detecting opportunities for action 
(Gibson, 1979) models must take in account that our action is constraining within minimum 
and maximum boundaries. So, the perceptual-motor adjustment is possible only when our 
action capabilities are above the minimum and below the maximum, otherwise actors are not 
in control of their movements (Fajen & Turvey, 2003). For example, Dicks et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that faster goalkeepers adjusted the initial of their diving in penalty-kick 
situations significantly different from slow goalkeepers (i.e., took long to start the safety 
movement), and so took in account their action capabilities. In addition, in Chapter 1 we 
provided a series of robust evidence indicating that we adjust of our body dimension and action 
boundaries to target features of the contextual to estimate and performing action. 
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In this sense, an accurate fit of our body with the environment properties cannot result 
from abstract choices and imaginative processes, but rather is the ultimate outcome of a 
processes of an accurate perceptual-motor adjustment (i.e., calibration), with miscalibration 
being detected in patterns of overestimation and underestimation. However, some evidences 
suggest that perhaps that calibration is not about an exact matching but rather can variety within 
an optimal boundary that is constraining by other body system variables, as for example 
energetic expenditure (Warren, 1984).  
This means that within the window the minimum and maximum action boundaries (i.e., 
what could be possible for the system), there is another window that seems to be constrained 
by comfort-discomfort (i.e., a preferential range). If so, then it is plausible to hypothesize that 
feelings are informative of our action boundaries and actors learn to become sensitive and rely 
on them to perform perceptual-motor adjustment when fitting their body with the environment. 
In other words, feelings captured at the psychologic dimension of comfort-discomfort, 
positivity and negativity, costs and beneficious might be a functional and direct source of 
information regards our action capabilities and be integrated with optical flow information.  
Some evidences already suggest this role of feelings. We may find support for this 
hypothesis in the action-perception literature when they provide evidence linking the 
informational role of subjective experiences (feelings) to action capabilities. For instance, 
Warren (1984) measured the energy expenditure (VO2 maximum) of participants during a task 
of climb-ability and found that action was constraining by a preferred “optimal window” of 
energy expenditure. That is, it seems that actors prefer performed actions within a zone in which 
the body experience is felt as more comfortable in terms of energetic cost. This finding leaded 
Konzack and collaborators (Konzack, et al., 1992; for a similar evidence see Comalli, Franchak, 
Char, & Adolph, 2013) to demonstrated that an elderly body does not behavior in terms of 
perceived action boundaries as a young body (i.e., seems to have a different subjective 
experience of effort). Warren’s findings also inspired a series of studies of embodied perception 
claiming that bio-energetic costs embodied non-visual information (i.e., to our view by feelings) 
when visually scaling the spatial layout (see Profitt, 2013, 2006; Witt, 2011). 
Investigating control of action, Fajen (2013; 2007, 2005) also demonstrated that actors 
rely on their dynamic boundaries to keep action within a safety margin of maneuver and avoid 
the risks of collision. Another evidence that supports the claim that feelings or subjective 
experience constraining action-perception can be illustrated by studies investigated the reach-
ability of objects. When participants are asked to reach an object adopting a pattern of action 
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that involves lean forward using only the arm vs. lean forward using the arm-plus-upper torso, 
the transition from a pattern to other seems be constraining by feelings of comfort and 
discomfort (rather than biomechanical ratios) (Mark, et al., 1997; Petrovic, Berg, Mark, & 
Hughes, 2015). That is, although we can stretch our hand at the maximum to grasping a big ball 
with one hand, unless the reality demands it the maximum size of the ball perceived as graspable 
with one hand will not match with this biomechanical condition, but with a small aperture that 
is constrained by feelings of comfort and safety. 
Similar evidence is demonstrated by reports of other type of feelings such as confidence, 
indicate that participants were more confident about their judgments when reaching targets 
located on the extreme of their action boundaries (i.e., very near or very far), than when the 
target is located at an ambiguous distance and the perceived reachability of the participants is 
more susceptible of noise and variability (Mantel, Stoffregen, Campbell & Bardy, 2015). In this 
sense, and considering distance as relativized by body features, the link created by body-space-
feelings seems to indicate that experience of confidence direct translated a target that is clearly 
reachable or unreachable. In turn, when both possibility co-exists feelings of uncertainty are 
experienced. This U-shape pattern is typically from a dynamical system framework (e.g., Kelso, 
1995) that preconize stable regions of action in the extreme of the boundaries (stable system = 
certainty) and a transition point where patterns of action co-exist (unstable system = 
uncertainty). 
Thus, subjective experience or feelings of comfort has been linked as important 
information to shape the large and redundant number of options of the motor system (Barton, 
2014). In addition, it has been described that when two or more affordances are made available 
in the context it is likely that the one associate with the lower energy consuming will be a more 
salient invite for action (Withagen, Poel, Araújo, & Pepping, 2012). 
At this point, and as mentioning early in this chapter, it is interesting to note that feelings 
are aligned with the same principle of bidirectionality that entails the whole processes of 
affordance detection. That is, feelings constrain our action either because they are context 
sensitive, but also because they are informative of our bodily states. In other words, the features 
of the environment can modulate how feelings inform actions, but feelings can also constrain 
our body state and so modulate our perception of the environment properties. In this sense, it 
has been demonstrated that the feeling of fatigue (i.e., subjective experience of discomfort) can 
lead the participants to patterns of overestimation of size and distance (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999; Zadra, et al., 2016). However, that embodied information associate to the physiological 
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potential of action seems to be more relevant when the actors are positioned on the bottom of 
hill and need to conscious estimate the perceived uphill slope, than when the actors are 
positioned on the top of the hill and need to estimate the perceived downhill slope (Proffitt et 
al., 1995). Similarly, the fear-arousal relation seems embodied functional information when 
associated to dangerous (height perception from above) than safety (height perception from 
below (Storbeck & Stefannucci, 2014). 
 
Can feelings be a multimodal higher-order variable? 
The integration of feelings as functional source of information for the perceptual-motor 
adjustment preconize two main assumptions. First, the informational role of feelings is rooted 
in bio-evolutionary mechanisms of survival and life regulation, and second the felt experience 
(psychologic dimension) is the counterpart of the myriad neurophysiological and 
neurobiological changes when facing the flow of events (see Chapter 2; e.g., Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau 2009; Cabanac, 2002; Pankseep, 2011; Damasio, 1999). In this sense, perception is 
feeling, and feeling is perception, and there is no separation among them. According to 
embodied theories of cognition the processes of the mind are grounded in real interaction with 
the environment and separation from perception, feelings and other sensorimotor processes 
made no sense (e.g., Barsalou, 2008, Clark, 1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Wilson, 2002; 
see Chapter 2). Thus, not only sensorimotor information shapes cognitive processes but the 
features of the processes (the nature per se) is also able to constrain our behavior (see for 
example Thompson & Varella, 2001). 
This leads to the second assumption of perception being multimodal rather than 
supporting by only an energetic array. In this sense, rather than guided by one unique pattern 
of information (e.g., optical array) or assume that visual, acoustic and haptic information are 
serial modules of perception that needs different and specialized processes in typical areas of 
the brain, Cisek (2007) has investigated perception as multisensorial and constantly shaping by 
dynamic and parallel brain functions. His approach is in line with other cortical findings which 
have demonstrated to be hard interpreting neural activity in terms of distinct perceptual, 
cognitive or motor systems (e.g., Cisek 2007; Pessoa 2008). 
In a similar vein, some action-perception studies have also suggested that opportunities 
for action can be constrained by sensitive to a higher-order variable that extend across multiple 
and redundant forms of ambient array, that is a global array rather than a unique array (i.e., 
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isolate information of the optical array or acoustic array, for example) (e.g., Mantel, et al., 2015; 
Stoffregen & Bardy, 2011). In complement, an extend global array could be a high-order 
variable that integrates proprioceptive and interoceptive information (see Witt & Riley, 2014). 
Indeed, as reviewed in Chapter 2 interoception is the faculty of sense physiologic state of our 
body that it is in the roots of the experience of feelings and have been associated to body 
awareness and control of direct effort (e.g., Craig, 2011, Singer, et al., 2009). Hence, White and 
collaborators (White, Shockley, & Riley, 2013) tested the hypothesis of actors being sensitive 
to a cross modal informational variable (i.e., high-order variable) that captures the relation 
among metabolic cost of locomotion and the coincident optical information about distance 
traversed. Results indicated that actors indeed where sensitive to the multimodal variable 
hypothesized but not to the low-order parameters that integrates the changes on this variable. 
That is, changes on the values of the high-order variable by manipulating the low-orders 
parameters leaded actors to overestimated and underestimated distance. This finding might help 
to explain the series of findings of the embodied perception account (Proffitt 2013, 2006; Witt, 
2011), which have been demonstrating the interplay of energetic costs and changes on visual 
estimation of the spatial layout. 
The subjective experience grounded in feelings is likely to be a high-order variable to 
which actors are sensitive when estimating their action capabilities. This because feelings direct 
embodied information of cost and benefits, comfort and discomfort, safety and unsafety (e.g., 
Pankseep, 2010a; 2010b). In this sense, it is important to note that paradigms adopting an 
embodied account of action-perception not rarely instruct their participants to rely on 
“experience” as a strategy to minimize confounding effects. For example, White et al (2013) 
mentioned: “we selected the specific instruction to report on the basis of how far it felt (our 
emphasis) that he or she had waked in order to minimize the possibility that participants could 
adopt simple unimodal strategies” (p.1376). In addition, as a strategy to investigate energetic 
cost as embodied information for action-perception several researchers have not only 
manipulated fatigue states, for instance with exercise (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999; Zadra et al., 
2016) and body weight (Lessard, Linkenauger, & Proffitt, 2009; Sugovic et al., 2016), but 
indeed they have provoked changes on emotional states as fear and anxiety to create changes 
on energetic states from a neurophysiological via (e.g, Greydon, et al., 2012, Storbeck & 
Stefannucci, 2014). 
 
Can feelings inform action capabilities? 
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The idea of feelings as direct route of information is one important aspects underlying 
the whole processing of the actor-environment interaction and that have been largely approach 
on socio-cognition (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Clore, 1992; Clore & Colcombe, 2003; 
Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; 
Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). However, the informational role of feelings has been 
potentially neglecting in the action-perception literature (see Zadra & Clore, 2011). 
Due to that sensorial experiences can serve as a source of information in their own right 
and interplay with processes as judgment and decision making, an assumption that have support 
the feeling-as-information approach (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 1983; Clore et al., 2001). 
According to this theoretical framework, the experiential nature of feelings carries direct 
information of positivity and negativity, comfort and discomfort, beyond beliefs and 
deliberative processes.  
Overall, experiments of this approach have linking sensorial experiences like mental 
processing, mood, physical arousal and bodily sensations in process as evaluative judgment and 
decision making (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 2003, 1983; Pham, 1998). Evidences coming 
from this perspective have manipulate sources that promote feelings (e.g., pictures, words, letter 
fonts, smells) and tested the effects of the resulting feeling in biased a variety of judgments of 
effort, familiarity, risk, beauty, risk, life satisfaction, risk and probability of choices (see 
Schwarz, Son, & Xu, 2009 for a review). In addition, most of these judgments involving static 
events and feelings effects have been captured through rating scores or reaction times. So, 
perception is approach under the perspective of evaluative apprehension of forms and contents, 
but not connected with motor action itself and goal-task behaviors. 
Although physical properties of the environment are stable our body is not. During an 
ordinary day, for example, oscillations can happen grounded on changes in physiological, 
psychological and morphological states. Thus, when considering the same actor standing on the 
pavement and exploring the space between two vehicles to crossing a bustling avenue, the same 
gap (i.e., same spatial-temporal relation) can afford crossing-safe and be detected in terms of 
its pass-ability during the beginning of the day (i.e., with the body system not fatigated), but 
cannot afford crossing-safe or even be detect in terms of its pass-ability after an extenuate day 
of working (i.e., with the body system fatigued). As demonstrated in Chapter 1 our action 
boundaries are not stable, and we need to be a reliable mechanism of information regards our 
boundaries of action to not put life at risk. 
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It is precisely because feelings are always underlying our experience and they 
“incoming sensory information from the external environment with homeostatic and 
interoceptive information from the body” (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p.04) that we believe 
that its feelings interplay with action-perception in functional ways. Our system needs to be 
sensible to the felt experience to develop ways to solve problems with less effortful and risk, 
which might be constraining by pleasurable-unpleasable dimension. Indeed, when visual 
detection is integrated with sensorimotor experiences in terms of how effort is mobilized, 
opportunities for actions are easier and faster detected when the features of the objects and tools 
match with the anatomic position of our hands rather than constraining our body to motor 
adjustments (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt, Stefanucci, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2009; Regenberg et al. 
2012) have demonstrated a preference (i.e., fast detection and feelings of fluency) that visual 
perception is integrate with. Thus, it seems that feelings of fluency or familiarity that have direct 
relations with effort of the motor and cognitive systems (e.g., Garcia-Marques, et al., 2016) can 
constrain action-perception. 
Another relevant aspect to take in account when associating the approach of feeling as 
information to action capabilities it is the fact that feelings are diffuse states always running in 
our background (e.g., Damasio, 1999) and that lack of reference (e.g., Clore, 1992). Due to that, 
feelings that emerge from the process going on (i.e., online) can be confounded and 
misattributed to different features of the process. Therefore, feelings become informative when 
its ebbs and flow are associated to the current situation (Barrett & Bar, 2009), that is when 
feelings are called into question (how do I feel about it? Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 1983). It 
allows feelings that are experimentally manipulated to be integrate as information in processes 
like judgment and decision making (e.g., Cohen, et al., 2008; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). It is 
interesting to note that evidences around action-perception have also suggest that although 
dynamic properties of our action are always there it is only when they are called into question 
that they become informative (e.g., Constantini et al., 2010; Proffitt, 2013; Witt, Proffitt, & 
Epstein, 2005). So, the action boundaries of our hands are activated to grasp a ball, but not to 
kick a ball. 
Finally, unlike the evaluative judgment approached by social cognition when visual 
perception is intending for effective actions (and not only to appreciate and describe features) 
the physical properties of the context are relativizing in accordance with our action capabilities 
(Chapter 1). Therefore, we should not expect to see changes on affordances given that they 
feature of the actor’s mind or state, but rather emergent properties of the actor-and-environment 
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system Gibson (1979). Instead, we should look for changes in variables that informs about the 
perceived fit, as timing (“when”) or action pattern (“how”). 
 
****** 
 
We think that a new approach questioning whether feelings could be a functional 
information to our action boundaries could be able to bring new insights to the theoretical field 
of action-perception and expand the findings around the feeling-as-information approach. 
To our view, there is not way to dissociate the energy consuming, heart beating and 
muscles strength from subjective experiences of comfort and discomfort, a very similar 
proposition of researchers that investigate feelings associated to mental operations, as fluency 
and familiarity. Thus, in line with assumptions suggesting non-emotional feelings i.e., 
sensorimotor information) integrates evaluative judgments, in this thesis we establish as goal 
to investigate if feelings are functional information of our action boundaries when gauging 
dynamic properties of the environment.  
The evidence reviewed suggests that feelings in its own nature are rooted on the neuro-
physiological changes that underlyie the fit of the actor-environment system. 
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Capítulo IV 
Objectives and Description of the Empirical Session 
The idea of changes at visceral and physiologic levels feeding cognitive processes have 
been commonly pointed as a sophisticate upgrade of William James (1894) assumption that 
visceral changes were integrated in psychology experience. 
The empirical work presented in this thesis is focus on the experiential side of the body 
and how it affects the perceived fit our dynamic action boundaries to some relevant property of 
the environment when performing goal-direct behavior. To this end, we adopted an embodied 
perspective of action-perception in the sense that changes and permanence in the optical array 
are interconnect with a whole-body experience (i.e., muscles contractions and a 
cardiorespiratory system) and feeds cognitive process toward adaptive behaviors. 
Our approach is that feelings are a direct (thus not inferential) route for accessing the 
experience of our action boundaries, and along with our interaction with the surrounding they 
provide us with functional information captured at the psychologic dimension of comfort-
discomfort, cost and benefits and safety-unsafety. They do it because feelings are rooted in a 
principle of survival and energetic economy of the mind and behavior. Specifically, we aim to 
test and clarify the role of non-emotional feelings as modulating the processes of calibration of 
our action capabilities when facing dynamic events. Hence, the empirical work presented in 
this thesis is anchored by the feelings as information approach, and test if our subjective 
experiences (i.e., non-emotional feelings) interplayed with body constraints during the 
processes underlying affordance detection. The question pursuit by our empirical thesis can be 
translated by: “Are induced feelings able to affect the experience of our action capabilities and 
influence the perceive fit of the actor-environment system when performing a goal-direct 
behavior?” 
Strategically, we conduct different types of research to approach our theoretical 
hypothesis. In a first study, we framed the link between feelings-as-information and action 
capabilities within a field context, and we adopted surveys to approach our data. In the 
subsequent studies, we framed the link between feelings-as-information and action capabilities 
within the laboratory context, and we adopted two different approaches to gain evidence that 
inform us if feelings were interfering with the process by which participants access their action 
capabilities. Within the lab conditions, we adopted two experimental paradigms, one based on 
psychophysiological processes and other based on subliminal affective priming mechanism. 
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The studies developed to support this thesis were integrated in 3 different papers 
submitted to publication. 
 
Paper 1: Acting fast on feelings! Naïve theories of expert futsal players about feelings as 
information 
Our first empirical study aims to understand if the mechanism that we hypothesize may 
be represented by naive theories of action.  Anecdotal cases have associated athletes with 
reports of reliance of feelings when performing action-decisions.  However, no systematic 
research has clarified if this is the case or some isolated episodes.  Hence, in our first paper we 
address how athletes understand themselves accessing information about their action 
capabilities when facing action decisions that are imposed by the context. We have tree main 
objects with this paper: i) to confirmed the findings suggesting that actors acknowledge and 
rely on information about their action capabilities (e..g, Fajen, et al., 2011); ii) to explore if this 
information is conscious experienced as body own language (e.g., Clore 2001, 1992;  Massumi, 
2002; Pankseep 2011, 2010; Schwarz 2012, 1990); iii) and to gather evidences to our hypothesis 
of feelings as functional information of our dynamic actions boundaries. Therefore, in two 
studies (i.e., one pilot and one empirical) we address these points by asked elite athletes to 
indicate their reliance when in competitive context on three different sources of information: 
“visual looking” – as suggesting by information based models of visual perception (e.g., Lee, 
1980; McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995); “deliberative thinking” – as suggesting by Type 2 
process describe on dual-systems model of cognition (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013); and 
“bodily feelings” – as suggesting by the feeling-as-information approach (e.g., Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007; 1983). 
Sport context is a richness field for capture evidences of the link between feelings and 
action capabilities, given that athletes constantly need to coordinate their action capabilities 
with the information available in the context (see Fajen, Riley, & Turvey, 2009). However, 
because the experience reported by athletes may not represent alone a reliable source to validate 
our hypothesis. Due to that, the following two papers were grounded on experimental 
conditions that can inform us whether feelings are being used or not as functional information 
of action capabilities. 
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Paper 2: Relying on feelings as information to estimate action capabilities over dynamic 
events 
Our second paper presented two complementary studies elaborated to support evidences 
that feelings are integrated in the mechanism of action capabilities.  
Thus, in the first study of the present paper we adopted a psychophysiological paradigm 
to collect evidences that feelings are triggered in our body as a component of action estimation. 
Under the perspective of embodiment theories, it has been demonstrated that multimodal 
representations (i.e., neuronal patterns of activation) integrates lower-level of brain functions 
(i.e., somatic and sensorimotor representations) (e.g., Barsalou, 2008, 1999; Niedenthal, 2007). 
Thus, changes on the electrical activity of the facial muscles corrugator supercilii and 
zygomaticus major have been pointed as indicative of subjective experiences of positivity or 
negativity (e.g., e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal, 
2002), with these patterns of activation and deactivation reflecting a fast and very efficient 
adaptive response of our interaction with the target-situation. Due to that, we exposed 
participants to dynamic events (i.e., with changes in the optical array; Gibson 1979) and we 
tracked the activation of two facial muscles commonly used as indicative of positive feelings 
(i.e., zygomatic major) and negative feelings (i.e., corrugator supercillis) in two different 
conditions: only watched the events (i.e., without any association of perceptual-motor coupling) 
and watched-plus-estimate action capabilities. We did it with the intention to answer the 
question if feelings are triggered when performing online adjustments of our body with the 
environment, a pre-condition to its informational role. 
Subsequently, in the second study we followed the studies developed in the field of 
“feeling-as-information” which usually manipulated feelings prior to the task to bias the 
judgments of participants by misattribution process (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007; 1983).  We 
follow the approach applied by Graydon and collaborators (Graydon, et al., 2012) who induced 
changes on feelings immediately before participants estimate their action capabilities. 
However, rather than use a restricted breathing task to manipulate feelings of anxiety in a 
conscious level (Graydon et al., 2012) we adopted a sandwich masking affective priming 
paradigm (i.e., non-conscious visual perception of the emotional face to create changes on the 
feelings of participants; see for example Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010; Wiens & Öhman, 2007) 
by presenting neutral, happy and sad pre-tested facial expression of low-arousal in subliminal 
way (i.e., less than 30ms).  
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In this sense, embodied researchers have suggested a single mechanism where activation 
of feelings by reenactment of somatosensory and motor states mimicked from the facial 
expression can partially activate feelings of an emotional experience (e.g., Adolph, Damasio, 
Tranel, Cooper, Damasio, 2000; Barsalou, 2008; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; 
Niedenthal, 2007). Overall, we expect that feelings experimentally promoted at the baseline of 
participants can be carried as source of interference on feelings that are generated on-line in the 
perceptual-motor adjustment task (i.e., contextual setting). Thus, a neutral-priming condition is 
assumed as the control condition, with the positive-priming and negative-priming conditions 
being our manipulation of feelings.  
During a situated action the sensorimotor simulation triggered by the priming can 
interfere with the mechanism triggered by the current task by facilitating or inhibiting 
concurrent sensorimotor activation (Körner, Topolinsk & Strack, 2015).  This means that 
activation elicited by the priming can for example addition more or less comfort or confidence 
in the whole processes of the action estimation. Hence, if the participants took this felt 
information in account, we might capture changes in the perceived body-environment fit in the 
negative and positive priming relatively to the neutral one. If the feelings elicited by the priming 
are integrate in such way that drives the patterns of behavior of participant toward same 
significant changes, then these data may support our hypothesis that feelings indeed have a role 
(and likely an informative one) in our perceived action boundaries 
Finally, we also presented a variety of dynamics events in which participants had to 
estimate two different hands capabilities to reduce confound effects associated with anticipation 
and bias of the events. 
 
Paper 3: To touch or not to touch? Feelings as non-visual information for perceived reach-
ability 
Our last empirical paper applied the same affective subliminal priming paradigm and 
aiming to replicate the findings of our second study of Paper 2. To this end, in a first study we 
presented a different kind of dynamic event and captured the reach-ability estimation of the 
participants relatively of different spot of the computer display. Because the movement of 
reaching is constrained by the coordination of several motor degrees of freedom (Bernestein, 
1967), we delve into the mechanism supporting feelings coming from the sensorimotor systems 
(i.e., embodied) and manipulated the degrees of freedom of participants (e.g., Carello, et al., 
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1989; Fisher, 2000; Gabbard, Ammar & Lee, 2006; Rochat & Wraga, 1997). Specifically, in 
the first study we constrained the action experience of participants by prevented them from 
move their trunk and hips and asked (i.e., lean forward) and we asked them to estimate 
reachability only with their upper arms freely. We kept the condition of a dynamic event (i.e., 
temporal constraints) and the subliminal affective prime manipulation immediately before the 
task after. We believe that more uncertainty (or instability) could be created under this condition 
and the participants could integrate the   feelings triggered by the priming effects as alternative 
to lack of information. In a second study, and concluding the experimental session of this thesis, 
we release the temporal constraining of the event by adopting a static presentation. We also 
released the postural constraints of half of the participants to examine what happened with the 
reaching estimations. We assume that without both the constraining of body movements and 
time, other strong feelings could be made available and reduce the effects of feelings coming 
from our mild manipulation. 
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Section II 
Empirical Session 
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Acting fast on feelings! Naïve theories of expert futsal players about feelings as 
information* 
Cristina Fonseca11, Teresa Garcia-Marques1 
 
 
Abstract 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that during a course of action athletes rely on feelings as 
information. In this paper, we address whether players’ naïve theories about their dynamic 
course of action encompass reliance on feelings as a direct source of evaluative information to 
action capabilities. In a pilot study, we asked elite athletes from different sports modalities to 
identify typical changes of course of action performed during competition and subsequently to 
indicate how much they perceived themselves as relying on three sources of information to 
perform such changes: visual looking, body feelings and deliberative thinking. Next, in an 
experimental study, we controlled the features of game situations that involve action decisions 
performed in situ during a futsal match and asked expert players to rate their reliance on the 
same three sources of information when performing the target actions. The results from both 
studies clearly showed that athletes report relying on bodily feelings, although not exclusively, 
as a sensorial route of information when performing fast-paced actions. The data also indicate 
that reliance on feelings is highly informative and salient when athletes perceive game 
situations as uncontrollable, uncertain and dynamic. 
 
Keywords: action capabilities, interoception, heuristic, task constraint 
 
  
                                                 
* Paper submitted to the jornal Psychology of Sport and Exercise 
 
1 William James Center for Research, ISPA – Instituto Universitário de Ciências Psicológicas, Sociais e da Vida, 
Lisbon, Portugal 
 
1 Correspondence to: Cristina Fonseca, ISPA – William James Center for Research, Rua Jardim do Tabaco, 34, 
1149 -041, Lisbon, Portugal; E-mail: cfonseca.science@gmail.com 
48 
 
Acting fast on feelings! Naïve theories of expert futsal players about feelings as 
information 
Sports are filled with anecdotal cases documenting the fact that athletes rely on feelings 
as a source of information to guide action in dynamic and temporal terms. This fact is 
exemplified in the word of Tom Brady, the American quarterback: “I don’t know how I know 
where to pass. There are no firm rules. You just feel [our emphasis] like you’re going to the 
right place.… And that’s where I throw it” (as cited in Lehrer, 2009, p.08). The literature offers 
several reasons why athletes see themselves as relying on feelings as a source of information to 
guide action. Actions performed in a sports context are constrained by body morphology, 
physiology and affective systems. For instance, it has been demonstrated that athletes take into 
account both their body dimension (e.g., Warren, 1984) and the dynamic properties of their 
actions (i.e., the action boundaries in terms of agility, force and stamina) in order to act (e.g., 
Fajen, 2007, 2005). It is thus possible that actors’ awareness of these processes occurs by 
reporting them as feelings. 
Here, we address whether actors rely on a subjective experience of bodily feelings to 
support their actions when performing fast-paced actions in a dynamic context. To this end, we 
first review evidence that may sustain the belief that feelings are a source of fast information to 
guide action. Next, we present self-reported data that document (if this is in fact the case) how 
athletes perceive themselves as relying on bodily feelings for information when performing 
fast-paced actions. 
Feelings as a fast route to guide action 
Since Hebert Simon (1955) indicated that human rationality, rather than being an ideal 
information processor, is bounded by time pressure, psychologists studying judgment and 
decision making have searched for the fast and simplified mechanisms that support our goal-
directed behaviors (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). Within the context of sports, these fast mechanisms 
of cognition are crucial, given that action decisions are usually made under higher time pressure, 
in conditions of uncertainty, and with limited available information (Moran, 2012). Therefore, 
researchers have provided alternative models to account for action without the need to rely on 
a full rational analysis and complex algorithms. Rather, they assume fast routes exist to gather 
and analyze the environmental information. Some of these models are anchored by Simon’s 
heuristics perspective and its effort-reduction process of cognition (for a critical review point, 
see Shaw & Oppenheimer, 2008) and have been applied to sports as fast-and-frugal heuristic 
models (Raab, 2012; Raab & Gigerenzer, 2015). Thus, applying a video-based paradigm, 
researchers asked handball (Johnson & Raab, 2003; Raab & Johnson, 2007) and basketball 
49 
 
(Hepler & Feltz, 2012) players to watch courses of action in their respective sports performed 
in situ. The actions were stopped by the researchers at target moments, and the players’ tasks 
consisted of first indicating potential actions to be performed by the ball carrier and next judging 
the best action to be adopted. In both experiments, researchers found that the players adopted 
the first option generation they reported and so used the take-the-first heuristic strategy (i.e., 
60% of the time handball players and 70% of the time basketball players indicated the first 
option generation as the best solution). Researchers concluded that when facing divergent-
thinking situations in a familiar context, athletes acted on the first thought that came to mind as 
a cue (i.e., heuristic) rather than deliberately processing all options. 
Other models offer a much less brain-centered framework, for example, by rebalancing 
the weight of environmental information in supporting action. This is the case for the ecological 
dynamic approach of decision making offered by Araujo and collaborators (e.g., Araújo, 
Davids, & Hristovski, 2006). The eco-dynamic model assumes that action is directed by simple 
and fast decisions rather than being anchored in hard computation and choice dilemmas. These 
“action decisions” are, however, assumed to be guided by a confluence of situational constraints 
that emerge from the interaction of actors’ bodies with the current scenario and narrow the 
amount of possible actions to only a few possibilities that fit the actors’ systems. In line with 
this assumption, and adopting time-to-ball contact as a spatial-temporal variable, Travassos and 
collaborators (Travassos, et al., 2012) investigated the interceptive action of ball passing in 
futsal. These authors demonstrated successful trials in emerging from the dynamic regulation 
of the relation of the ball trajectory to the defender distance and speed relative to the ball. 
Although both heuristic and eco-dynamic models address fast routes to gather and make 
use of information, none of these models theorize and explore the feature of the actor’s 
experience in such a process or even whether athletes are aware of such feelings as a route of 
fast information that they rely on (or believe they rely on) to guide action (as Tom Brady’s 
statement at the beginning suggests). 
Several researchers have argued that feelings play an important role in judgment and 
decision making (e.g., Busemeyer, Dimperio, Ryan, & Jessup, 2007; Damásio, 1994; Schwarz 
& Clore, 2007; Seo & Barrett, 2007). Because feelings are pervasive in all phases of the 
decisional process (i.e., before, during, and after an outcome), it is likely that even when 
integrating emotions, they could support non-athletic goal-directed behavior (Zeelenberg, 
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008; Zeelenber & Pieters, 2006). If this is the case, then 
athletes’ naïve theories about how their actions are supported by feelings may reflect an 
awareness of a real process. 
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Feelings are also an inherent experience that arises in the sports context (e.g., Martinent, 
Campo, & Ferrand, 2012), and competition itself has been demonstrated to be enough to trigger 
a myriad of bodily processes (e.g., Harrison et al., 2001; Veldhuijzen van Zanten et al., 2002). 
This makes bodily sensory experiences a likely sensitive and functional route of immediate 
information that actors can rely on, consciously or not. The affect/feelings-as-information 
model (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 1983; Clore & Schnall, 2005) assumes that 
people rely on their bodily experiences as a direct source of evaluative information when facing 
demanding and complex situations by implicitly asking, “How do I feel about it?” (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1988). Therefore, it is experiential and sensorial information (rather than conceptual 
information or belief) that embodies values (i.e., positive and negative) and urgency (i.e., sleepy 
activation) (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). 
Taken together, these approaches suggest that feelings may in fact be a source of 
information integrated into the dynamic context of sports and that athletes may rely on bodily 
feelings because they are aware of such processes. However, in this paper, we propose to 
investigate only whether athletes believe themselves to rely on feelings as sensory and direct 
information regarding their action capabilities. Specifically, our goal is to question whether 
athletes perceive their action capabilities as being driven by deliberative thinking, feelings or 
simple visual perception (looking). To this end, we first ran a pilot study in which a sample of 
athletes from different sports modalities were questioned about the general experience of 
thinking, looking and feelings as sources of information. Next, we developed an experiential 
study in which the course of motor action performed was constrained to futsal game situations, 
and we asked expert futsal players to indicate how much they rely on thinking, simple looking 
(apprehending) and feelings as sources of information when performing the target actions. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was developed to test the feasibility of our goals. We thus first collected 
evidence regarding whether athletes report relying on feelings as information to guide action. 
Additionally, the pilot study also allowed us to determine whether our definition of the three 
sources of information (looking, feeling and thinking) was comprehensible to athletes. At the 
end of this initial step, we expected to collect evidence that feelings are consciously recognized 
by athletes as a source of information and to draw cues for our main experimental design. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 18 athletes (M = 20.17 age, SD = 3.34; 3 females) from the 
national squad of Portugal (time of practice: M = 8.89 years, SD = 3.96; training load: M = 
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17.83 hours/week, SD = 7.47) who came from 7 different sports modalities: 110m hurdles, judo, 
basketball, triathlon, skating, cycling, and modern pentathlon. 
Procedure 
The participants were received in a meeting room in their local training center, and the 
survey was administered daily before training sessions either in the morning or afternoon over 
a full week. After a brief exposition, the athletes were introduced to the first part of the survey 
and read some examples of actions performed in the sports context. Next, they were instructed 
to write at least 5 statements indicating changes of actions performed by them during their 
game, fight or competition. In the second part of the survey, the participants were introduced to 
the descriptions of three possible experiences of sources they could rely on as information: 
thinking (elaboration, calculation, and reflection); looking (direct and pure vision, no thinking 
and no feelings); and feeling (undefined body sensations and subjective experiences). 
Subsequently, the participants were instructed to indicate which source they rely on to 
perform the mentioned action changes (more than one source was possible). Next, they were 
instructed to rate how much they rely on each of the previously assigned sources based on a 5-
point scale, ranging from 1 – very weakly to 5 – very strongly. At the final stage, the athletes 
were instructed to provided information about their birth year, gender, time of practice, and 
hours of training per week. 
Dependent variables 
The total of 81 changes in course of action provided by the athletes (e.g., “start 
running” in athletics; “perform a skill” in judo; and “jump to the rebound” in basketball) was 
included in our analysis. The first dependent variable was the proportion of “yes” responses 
given by each participant to each source. The second dependent variable was the mean of the 
ratings that each participant provided for the different actions described. This process was done 
for each source. 
Results and Discussion 
To understand whether the participants had an awareness of relying equally or 
differently on each source provided, we compared the proportion of “yes” responses with a 
repeated ANOVA that had looking, thinking and feelings as repeated factors. The results 
revealed a non-significant difference among the three sources, F (2, 34) = 1.29, p =.289, p2 = 
.07. This meant that the participants showed no tendency to rely on one source over the others, 
so that the feelings source was indicated to be used as frequently (M = .59, SE = 0.08) as thinking 
(M = .51, SE = 0.06) and looking (M = .43, SE = 0.07). A similar conclusion was reached when 
the analysis was performed on the mean ratings of how much athletes rely on the same three 
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sources. In this sense, the repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant main effect, F (2, 
34) = 3.66, p =.037, p2 = .18, [thinking (M = 1.97, SE = 0.28); looking (M = 1.55, SE = 0.30); 
and feeling (M = 2.61, SE = 0.31)]. 
These results suggested that athletes are able not only to differentiate the experience of 
the three sources of information but indeed to report reliance on feelings as a source of 
information when performing action changes in general. In addition, these results noted the fact 
that feelings were perceived as the most informative source of information for the participants’ 
actions. 
Additional information was provided by correlational analysis, which revealed a 
significant negative correlation between the informational sources thinking and feeling (r = -
.25, n = 81, p = .022). This result suggested that when athletes rely on feelings as a source, it is 
less likely that they will rely on thinking. However, it is important to note that the small 
magnitude found for this correlation may suggest the simultaneous use of the three sources, 
with one becoming more salient than the others at a specific moment. No other correlations 
were found between thinking and looking (r = -.16, p = .148) and looking and feeling (r = -.19, 
p = .086). 
Finally, the most important information taken from this pilot study was that the 
participants were able to understand and to differentiate their responses regarding the different 
sources of bodily information. That is, athletes demonstrated awareness of experiencing simple 
apprehension of the situation (looking), general bodily feelings and the process of thinking. 
Moreover, this pilot study informed our goals by suggesting that a) athletes rely on the 
experience of the three sources of information provided; b) the use of the sources is not mutually 
exclusive because they can co-exist; and c) one source can be more salient and relatively more 
relevant than others in a given situation. Most importantly, this pilot study already revealed that 
athletes acknowledge the experience of feelings as a source of information to guide action. 
Main Study 
In the main study, we gained better control of the experimental conditions of the 
participants. Instead of several sports modalities, we decided to focus on only one that could 
provide us with the kind of fast-paced actions we were interested in investigating. We also 
determined the specific moments and action changes performed by players by selecting photos 
of in situ game actions. Thus, in the present study, we investigated whether futsal players rely 
on feelings as a conscious source of information by opposing action decisions made within a 
highly dynamic game context (e.g., 1 vs. 1) to action decisions made in less dynamic 
circumstances (e.g., a penalty kick). Given the feelings-as-information approach, we should 
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expect feelings to be a more relevant source of information when the context is more ambiguous 
and difficult. In our case, this means when players are in interaction in a game situation 
perceived as highly dynamic and with a short window of time to act. In turn, thinking is 
expected to be a more relevant source when players are in interaction in a less dynamic context 
and have more time to make their action decision. 
Method 
Participants  
Data were collected from 6 futsal teams of the urban area of Lisbon currently playing at 
the elite national level (for a recent categorization of expert samples in sports, see Swan, Moran, 
& Piggott, 2015). The sample analysis consisted of 63 futsal players (M = 26.70 years, SD = 
6.05; 26 female), with an average of 12.78 ± 5.14 years of time of practice and 4.75 ± 0.74 
hours/week of training load apart from official matches. All the participants participated in the 
study voluntarily and were informed that their identity would remain confidential. We provided 
a debrief about the study after the athletes completed the questionnaire. 
Materials and Apparatus 
To select the game situations for this experiment, we first pre-tested 21 photographs that 
illustrated 7 game situations performed in situ (i.e., a subset of 3 pictures per situation 
illustrating 1 vs. 1, 1 vs. 2, kicking-flying-ball, kicking-ground-ball, dribbling, feinting, and 
dead-ball). All photos were retrieved from the Internet and randomly presented to a sample of 
futsal coaches and players (N = 17, M = 26.53 years, SD = 9.23 years; M = 11.12 years of 
practice; SD = 7.58 years of practice). The participants were given a link to an online survey 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT), that was created by the authors and were instructed to evaluate each 
photograph (using a 5-point scale of agreement ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – 
strongly agree) based on 3 items: a) it is easy to identify the ball carrier in this action; b) this 
action is frequent during the course of a game; c) this photograph represents the game situation 
indicated. The registered scores were subject to a repeated measure ANOVA with 7 actions (1-
2-3-4-5-6-7) x 3 photos (f1-f2-f3) x 3 evaluations (E1-E2-E3). After we identified a significant 
interaction of the three factors, F (24,384) = 11.00, p < .001, p = 0.41, for each action we 
selected the two photos with the highest scores. A survey using the 14 pretested photographs 
(i.e., 2 photos per situation and all photos with dimensions of 400 x 300 pixels) representing 7 
in situ action decisions (1 vs. 1, 1 vs. 2, kicking-flying-ball, kicking-ground-ball, dribbling, 
feinting, and dead-ball) was created using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Data 
collection was made using Apple iPad Mini tablets with 7.9-inch retina color display. 
Procedure 
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After receiving authorization from the board of directors, we approached the athletes 
before training sessions and offered a tablet with the survey to be answered in approximately 
20 minutes. All instructions were provided on the tablet screen and informed the participants 
that they would first be presented with a set of photos performed in situ, and “After each photo, 
you will be asked to respond to how you perform this action during the game.” Three response 
options were then introduced: thinking was represented by words such as elaboration, 
calculation, and reflection and exemplified by the following statement: “By capturing the 
information with the eye (seeing), I use the knowledge regarding my action capabilities, and I 
calculate whether I am able to act”; looking was represented by words such as pure vision, not 
thinking anything, and not feeling anything and exemplified by the following statement: “By 
capturing the information with the eye (seeing), I directly access my action capabilities. I do it 
instantly without thinking or feeling”; and feeling was represented by words such as undefined 
body sensations, intuition, and instinct and exemplified by the following statement: “By 
capturing the information with the eye (seeing), I feel my action capabilities to perform in that 
moment.” Next, the 14 photos of futsal players performing action decisions in situ were 
randomly presented one by one (for two examples, see Figure 1). Above each photo, the 
participants received the following instruction: “In the next photograph, imagine yourself 
playing the action of the ball carrier.” Below each photo, the participants were instructed, “At 
this exact moment, you believe that your action will be triggered by…”. Next, the participants 
saw the three sources (i.e., thinking, looking, and feeling) followed by their respective 
associated words. Next to each source of information, we presented a 5-point scaling of 
intensity (ranging from 1 – very weakly to 5 – very strongly), and the participants scored the 
intensity of each source’s contribution. 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of ilustration used for in-situ game actions. (a) On the left side a 1x1 
situation; (b) on the right a high-kick situation. 
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In the second part of the survey, we collected data regarding how the futsal players 
experienced the context of action illustrated by each photo. Thus, the 14 photos were associated 
with a set of six semantic differentials, each one with 7 points (point 4 was “neutral) that 
assessed six different features of the game situation. These features were automatic-elaborate; 
uncontrollable-controllable; dynamic-static; complex-simple; unstable-stable; unpredictable-
predictable. In the last part of the survey, the participants were invited to provide personal data 
regarding their age, gender, time of practice, and training load per week. 
Results and Discussion 
A measure of reliance on each source was achieved by averaging the ratings of the two 
photos used to illustrate the same game action. To test the contribution of Source and Game 
Action in our dependent variable Reliance-Ratings, a restricted maximum likelihood linear 
mixed-model analysis was run using Source and Game Action as fixed effects and Player as a 
random effect to model individual differences. We tested the main effect of the Source 
(thinking, looking, feeling and the main effect of the Game Action (1 vs. 1, 1 vs. 2, kicking-
flying-ball, kicking-ground-ball, dribbling, feinting, and dead-ball) as well as the interaction 
effect between them. 
Acting on thinking, feelings, and looking 
The result of Wald Z test = 4.60, p < .001, 95% CI [.084, .196], attested that the variance 
among Players was significantly different from zero and correctly controlled as a random effect. 
Data also indicated that only thinking and feeling ratings established a relation between 
them (b = -.778, t = -5.83, p < .001), meaning that when players reported relying more on 
feeling, there was a significant trend to report relying less on thinking as a source of information. 
Significant main effects were detected for Source, F (2, 1240) = 5.343, p = .005, and 
Game Action, F (6, 1240) = 8.901, p < .001. This means that both Source and Game Action are 
potentially important predictors of our dependent variable. A more detailed analysis (see Table 
1) revealed that only the thinking and feeling sources were significantly different from each 
other and that from the seven Game Actions judged, the six performed “on-the-fly” (i.e., 
embedded in a dynamic course of action) were all significantly different from the static one 
(both at α = 0.05 after performing a Bonferroni adjustment for the multiple comparisons (Table 
1). 
Table 1 
Means (and standard deviation) of source, game-action, and the first order interaction 
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 Source  
 Feel Look Think  
Game-Action     
1x1 3.69 (.78) 3.61 (.91) 3.62 (.78) 3.64 (.82) a 
1x2 3.82 (.66) 3.46 (.81) 3.25 (.81) 3.51 (.80) a 
Dribbling 3.54 (.84) 3.72 (.69) 3.65 (.77) 3.64 (.77) a 
Feinting 3.91 (.91) 3.26 (.89) 3.32 (.94) 3.50 (.96) a 
Ground-Kick 3.52 (.76) 3.59 (.78) 3.34 (.77) 3.48 (.77) a 
High-Kick 3.92 (.92) 3.57 (.77) 3.30 (.87) 3.60 (.89) a 
Stop-Ball 3.44 (1.04) 4.19 (.84) 4.22 (.78) 3.95 (.96) b 
 3.69 (.87) a 3.63 (.85) a b 3.53 (.87) b  
Letters shared within each factor indicate no significant difference. The mean difference is significant 
at the .05 level 
The results also revealed that the effects of the Source differed by Game-Action, F (12, 
1240) = 8.986, p < .001 and that this interaction seemed to sustain the hypothesis that the use 
of feelings as a source of information is more likely to occur when performing game actions 
under specific conditions. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of data associated with this interaction.  
As Figure 2 suggests, the variations found for feeling and thinking as sources of 
information are associated with the degree of dynamism of those actions. Players rely more on 
feeling as a source of information when performing the dynamic game actions than when 
performing the static one (which has a higher reliance on thinking). 
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Figure 2. Reliance ratings indicated that futsal players’ awareness of thinking as source is 
intensify during stop-ball situations (i.e., penalty-kick, corner-kick and free-kick), whereas 
feeling as source is intensify when performing within the course of an action. 
Comparing in-situ game situations that rely more on feelings than thinking as sources 
In order to characterize the game situations where athletes report to rely more on 
feelings versus deliberative thinking to guide action, we identified the two game situations with 
higher average score in feeling as a source (i.e., feinting and high-kick), versus the two game 
situations with higher average score in thinking as a source (i.e., dribble and stop-ball) (see 
Table 1). 
We further compared the two game situations regarding the features measured by the 
six different semantic scales. We first averaged those ratings over the two photos of the same 
game situations and introduced them as measures in a repeated measures MANOVA defined 
by 2Types of Situation (high-feeling vs. high-thinking) x 6 Contextual Features (automatic-
elaborate; uncontrollable-controllable; dynamic-static; complex-simple; unstable-stable; 
unpredictable-predictable). The results indicated that the two situations differed in their 
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Contextual Features, F (1, 6) = 25.75; p <.001; p2 = 0.73; Wilks = .27, and a subsequent 
univariate analysis clarified that the differences were found across all features (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Mean, standard, and univariate analysis of high-feel versus high-thinking game actions 
 High Feel High Think 
 M (SE) M (SE) 
Contextual Feature   
automatic-elaborate 3.97 (1.54) 5.35 (1.15) *** 
uncontrollable-controllable 3.83 (1.24) 5.46 (0.99) *** 
dynamic-static 2.75 (1.12) 3.77 (0.96) *** 
complex-simple 2.79 (0.91) 4.68 (1.13) *** 
unstable-stable 3.32 (1.23) 4.88 (0.88) *** 
unpredictable-predictable 2.94 (1.09) 4.13 (1.16) *** 
*** p < .001 
Overall, these results suggested that players rely more on feelings as a source of 
information to guide action when the situational context is perceived to be more automatic, 
uncontrollable, dynamic, complex, unstable and unpredictable. In contrast, players rely more 
on thinking as a source of information to guide action when the situational context is perceived 
to be more elaborate, controllable, static, simple, stable, and predictable. 
General Discussion 
A pilot study and an experimental study investigated whether athletes believe 
themselves to rely on feelings as a source of information for perceiving their own action 
capabilities. The results of both studies indicate that they do. The results suggest that athletes 
believe themselves relying on three different sources of information that we provided for them: 
visual looking, bodily feelings and deliberative thinking. Thus, although not exclusively, the 
results clearly show that athletes believe to rely on feelings as a source of information for their 
action capabilities. Data from study 2 also indicates that athletes’ naïve theories report the use 
of feelings especially when actors are performing on the fly rather than in stationary situations 
(the latter being a game situation in which thinking seems to be a more salient source). 
Being clear in suggesting that athletes acknowledge that they rely on feelings, our data 
allow us to speculate that feelings may in fact be an informational route for immediate 
information regarding the dynamic properties of action. Indeed, the fact that reliance on feelings 
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increases in association with game conditions embedded in a context featured as complex, 
uncertain and with actions performed under time pressure suggests that athletes rely on feelings 
as a heuristic route to rapid evaluation (for instance, whether they are fast enough, too tired), 
which is similar to the feelings-as-information hypothesis (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007, 1983). However, this hypothesis needs more direct and robust research. 
Indeed, future research should acknowledge that authors, such as Zadra and Clore 
(2011), have argued that as a source of information, feelings are likely to be integrated into the 
perceptual mechanism and to inform costs and benefits, allowing action decisions that minimize 
negative and maximize positive outcomes. Thus, it is likely that under an invitation for action 
with a higher energetic demand versus an invitation with a lower energetic demand to solve a 
goal-directed behavior, actors will follow the second course of action. Evidence favoring this 
assumption comes from studies showing that feelings of comfort and discomfort moderate the 
choice to insert or remove degrees of freedom in a postural movement and that actors rely on a 
preferred critical boundary rather than a biomechanical critical boundary regarding their action 
capabilities (Mark, et al., 1997; Petrovic, Berg, Mark, & Hughes, 2015). Moreover, in his 
pioneer work of perceived climb-ability, Warren (1984) indicated that action could be guided 
by “optimal points,” described as preferred regions of minimum energy expenditure that may 
be translated into feelings. 
In this sense, future research should try to clarify and to understand the nature of the 
feelings that athletes report relying on. Most of the research linking feelings and motor action 
in the sports context have focused on the role of discrete emotions (e.g., anxiety) in relation to 
performance (e.g., Hanin, 2007) and choking under pressure (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001). 
However, not all experiential feelings are emotional. There is a wide range of non-emotional 
feelings working as the body’s own grammar, which signals suspension of the invariance (i.e., 
changes) (Massumi, 2002) and arises and disappears in a short period of time. Some of these 
feelings have been associated with mental operation as the feelings of familiarity (e.g.; Garcia-
Marques, Prada & Mackie, 2016; Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 
2004) and fluency of processing (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), which have been associated with subjective experiences of 
pleasure, positivity and easiness. Others have been claimed as the core of our body awareness 
and affective experience and described as signaling homeostasis and changes in our bodily 
systems (e.g., triggered by muscle contractions or an increase in heart rate) (e.g., Bechara & 
Naqvi, 2004; Cameron, 2001; Graig, 2009, 2002) – the so-called interoceptive feelings. 
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Therefore, rather than being discrete emotions (Ekman, 1999; Plutchik, 2001), “non-
emotional feelings” present dimensions that underlie specific emotions (i.e., pleasure-
displeasure and activation-deactivation). As such, they are supported by an online streaming 
“grounded in the somatovisceral, kinesthetic, proprioceptive, and neurochemical fluctuations 
that occur within the core of body” (Barrett & Bliss-Morreau, 2009, p.04). Although non-
emotional feelings work as bodily information without the need to constantly cross the 
threshold of our consciousness (and engage in the constructive process assembled by emotions, 
Lindquist, Wager, Kober,, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), during a flow of events, the 
homeostatic state of these feelings can quickly change in dynamic ways (see Duncan & Barrett, 
2007; Russell, 2009; Damásio, 1999) and become informative. If so, it is likely that actors 
would experience action based on those feelings. 
Data from our studies do not allow any conclusion or provide answers to several relevant 
questions regarding the underlying mechanism of how feelings can inform action capabilities 
and integrated action decisions. The aim of this paper is merely to open new perspectives based 
on evidence collected from the reports of expert athletes regarding their naïve theories of what 
guides their actions. Future research should clarify the exact role of the subjective experience 
of bodily feelings as a route of information for action capabilities and its inherent relation to 
affordance detection. In addition, the hypothesis that the athletes’ reports constitute only an 
illusory naïve theory should not be ruled out.  
Conclusion 
We concluded, based on the reports of expert athletes, that their naïve beliefs are that 
feelings can be an immediate and direct route of information to support perceived action 
capabilities and to guide fast-paced actions. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents evidence suggesting that people are informed about their action capabilities 
regarding dynamic events by the set of feelings that are activated when they are exploring the 
event. In a first experiment, correlational data showed that facial EMG measures that may be 
associated with affective experiences are also associated with perceived action capabilities. A 
second experiment revealed that the manipulation of affective experiences (subliminal affective 
priming) with a possible impact on EMG correlates had an impact on the visual scaling process. 
The results show that these manipulations postponed the estimation of the fit between the 
actor’s body and the properties of the environment. Overall, our data suggest greater relevance 
of the corrugator activity and thus possible negative affective reactions in modulating the 
assessment of our own action capabilities when reacting to a dynamic event under time 
pressure. 
 
Keywords: perception, embodiment, corrugator, arousal 
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1. Introduction 
Embodiment theories have addressed the perceptual system and sensorimotor and 
affective systems as being part of cognition rather than merely existing in its aftermath (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008; Clark 1999; Profitt, 2006; Shapiro 2011; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). Previous 
studies have shown that as actors, we constantly rely on our interoceptions as information. This 
means that even without awareness of its influence, we rely on the senses offered by our internal 
bodily changes as heuristics to support evaluative judgments (e.g., Ducan & Barrett, 2007; 
Pessoa, 2008; Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus & Trujillo, 2007).   
Evidence of these mechanisms is clearly stated by the mood/feeling-as-information 
theory, with data showing that when experiencing negative moods, people judge events as 
worse than when experiencing positive mood (e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 1983). 
Similarly, studies related to either processual or perceptual fluency have been linked to evidence 
showing that high perceptual fluency is experienced as a positive feeling (Garcia-Marques, 
Mackie, Claypool & Garcia-Marques, 2010; Garcia-Marques, Prada & Mackie, 2016; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Moreover, other evidence has shown that states of low levels 
of fluency are associated with negative judgments, while high levels are associated with positive 
judgments (Reber, Winkielman & Schwarz, 1998; Topolinsk & Strack, 2009). Importantly, 
subjective experiences (i.e., feelings), such as those described as mood and fluency, are subtle 
states that do not necessarily encompass the constructive process associated with emotion and 
language (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2016). Rather, these 
types of experiences are resonances of the constant streaming running in the background of the 
organism with transient alterations denoting the language of the body (see Massumi, 2002 for 
a discussion). Indeed, several authors have acknowledged the role of sensorimotor information 
in our affective and cognitive systems (e.g., Damasio, 1999; Pessoa, 2008; Russel, 2009), 
suggesting that these basic and psychologically primitive states are likely to be experienced at 
the level of hedonic valence (pleasure/displeasure) and arousal (activation/sleepy) (Russel, 
2009; 2003). 
By showing clearly that incidental affect informs evaluative judgments (for a review, 
see Schwarz, 2012), the literature suggests that feelings have a prominent role in our cognition. 
Here, we first relate this role to the judgments of action capabilities, and we hypothesize that 
feelings offer information about the perceptual fit of the actor’s action capabilities and the 
relevant environmental properties when performing goal-directed tasks under time pressure. 
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The actor-environment fit underpinned Gibson’s (1979) affordances theory, which has 
been investigated under the intrinsic metric assumption of visually scaling the physical 
properties of the world according to the actor’s phenotype and action boundaries (e.g., Fajen, 
2007, 2005; Proffit & Linkenauger, 2013; Warren, 1984; Witt, 2011). Rather than perceive the 
world in terms of meters, angles or retinal displacements, to guide themselves and detect 
opportunities for action, i.e., affordance (Gibson, 1979), the actors need to rescale size and time 
according to their own body dimensions and action capabilities. Evidence has shown that the 
relationship between the actor’s boundaries and the reciprocal properties of the environment 
constrains the visual perception of affordances. For example, the physical ratio of the actor’s 
leg length and the stair height determine whether a stair is climbable or unclimbable (Warren, 
1984). Similar relationships have been found when investigating the relationship between 
shoulder width and the pass-ability of apertures (Higuchi, Cinelli, Greig & Patla, 2006) or 
between hand-size and the grasp-ability of tools (Linkenauger, Witt, & Proffitt, 2011). 
Aside from the body-scale mechanism, evidence has also shown that actors quickly re-
scale affordances according to bodily changes. Thus, when the actors’ height was 
experimentally modified with the use of platform shoes, they quickly rescaled their new height 
and added it to the assessment of perceived sit-ability and climb-ability (Mark 1987; Warren & 
Whang, 1987). The same occurred when the actors wore hand-enlarging prostheses and judged 
the perceived pass-ability of their hands with different gaps (Ishak, Adolph, & Lin, 2008). 
Interestingly, this effect is detected both when the bodily change is caused by a natural source 
of change, such as pregnancy (Franchak & Adolph, 2014), and when it is caused by an induced 
illusory source (Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2013; Piryankova et al., 2014). 
Although no direct statement has been made regarding the roles that body sensations 
and subjective experiences have in perceptual fit, evidence has shown that affects (which rely 
on these subjective experiences) interfere with them. Induced states of fear (Geuss, McCardell 
& Stefanucci, 2016; Stefanucci, Gagnon, Tompkins & Bullock, 2012) and levels of anxiety 
(Graydon, Linkenauger, Teachman & Profitt, 2012; Pijpers, Oudejans, Bakker & Beek, 2006) 
are associated with the rescaling of action and action estimation.  
Taken together, the reviewed evidence appears to suggest that the (re)scaling 
mechanism is strongly associated with bodily subjective experiences. Actors do not appear to 
perceive the world in terms of meters and kilograms (i.e., physical measures) nor in terms of 
mathematical relations between these physical properties, such as in the ratio between leg length 
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and stair height.  However, this information needs to be present to inform the actors about their 
action capabilities. Therefore, knowing that these relations constrain and rule the fit, a relevant 
question is what tells the actors that the action category changed from impossible to possible 
and vice versa (see Heft, 2003). Thus, in the literature, some questions remain open: What really 
signals the fit? How do we as actors gather information about our own body dimensions and 
action capabilities? How does this information guide our actions quickly enough and with 
sufficient accuracy to perform the necessary movements and adjustments to fit the physical 
constraint of the current action? 
Here, we propose and offer relevant data to test an embodied cognition hypothesis that 
suggests that feelings and subjective experiences work as experiential and evaluative 
information upon which actors learn to rely when acting in dynamic environments. We address 
this hypothesis with correlational and experimental evidence: in the Experiment 1, we present 
dynamic events unfolding in time and capture changes in affective experiences at the level of 
physiological correlates (Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003) by recording the electrical activity 
of the facial muscles corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major as an indicator of 
spontaneous activation of valenced feelings (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Grunedal, 2002). To detect how these feelings are related to the action itself and 
not only to the perception of a dynamic event, we compared the EMG activity of participants 
in two different conditions: a control condition in which participants only watch the dynamic 
events and a goal-task condition in which they have to watch and estimate their own action 
capabilities. We expected that the participants’ facial EMG reactions would reflect the valence-
arousal dimensions that are activated at the affordance detection moment, which is supposed to 
support the actor-environment fit. 
In Experiment 2, we test whether we are able to interfere with the participants’ 
affordance detection process by promoting changes in how the participants felt. To do this, we 
relied on the affective subliminal masking priming paradigm to induce mimicry (see 
Niedenthal, 2007), activating either the corrugator or the zygomaticus. Here, the embodiment 
perspective hypothesis (Barsalou, 2010, 2008) leads us to believe that a sensorimotor 
reenactment in a situated action can trigger concurrent automatic simulations that can either 
interfere with (facilitating or inhibiting the action outcome through a match or mismatch) or 
block the simulation if the current task involves the same sensorimotor activation (Körner, 
Topolinsk & Strack, 2015). Thus, in this second experiment, we expected that the affective 
experiences induced by the primes would interfere with the perceived fit underlying the 
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affordance detection process. This likely occurs because these experiences inform the 
concomitant action capability. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Methods  
2.1.1 Participants and design. After giving informed consent, twenty-four graduates (23.83 ± 
4.54 years; 11 males and 4 left-handed) participated in this experiment and received monetary 
compensation. None of the participants suffered from attention disorders, and all showed 
normal-to-corrected visual acuity. 
All participants’ facial muscle activation was assessed in two conditions: watching the 
dynamic event (W-condition) versus watching the dynamic event and judging the action 
capabilities (WJ-condition). For both conditions, the participants had to interact with two 
dynamic visual events that were counterbalanced for order: a 3D baseball that was shrinking 
and a 2D square with an aperture opening. This reflects a 2 Task-Goal (W x WJ) x 2 Dynamic-
Visual-Events (shrinking x opening) and the respective Time-Windows (with a 100 ms interval) 
as within-subject factors. 
2.1.2 Dynamic visual events. A set of videos with dynamic visual events lasting 800 ms was 
pre-tested for perceived speed (1-very slow to 7-very fast). Two videos were selected as being 
dynamic fast events (i.e., M= 6). One dynamic event shows a 3D baseball image shrinking in 
size and supported judgments of perceived grasp-ability (Figure 1a). The other video shows a 
2D square with the aperture size growing, and it was used to estimate the actors perceived pass-
ability (Figure 1b). 
 
Figure. 1. The dynamic events. (A) The shrinking baseball to estimate grasp-ability; (B) 
The square opening aperture to estimate pass-ability. 
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Adobe Photoshop (Adobe Photoshop CC, Version 14.2 x64) was used to create a total 
of 20 images of decreasing size. A first image of a 3D baseball (150 pixels per inch and 252.5 
pixels in diameter) was centered on a black background (800x600 pixels), with a second image 
created by duplicating and reducing the original image by 10% (same proportions). A third 
image was created from the second one by applying the same procedure, and this process was 
repeated successively until a total of 20 images with the ball shrinking were obtained. 
Afterward, to create the motion event, each image was placed with 40 m/s of timing exposure 
and was rendered to a video file using Windows Movie Maker (Windows Movie Maker, 
Version 2012, 16.4.3528.0331). The same process was applied for the first 2D square image 
(150 pixels/inch of resolution and distance between outlines equal to 472 pixels) to create the 
second motion event of a square aperture size growing. 
2.1.3 Apparatus. The tasks were programmed in E-Prime 2.0 software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002) with the two dynamic events presented against a black background on a 23-
inch monitor (1024 x 768 resolution) that was positioned 50 cm away from the actors. All 
responses and key release times were recorded with a PST Serial Response Box with 1.0 ms of 
precision (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA). 
2.1.4 Facial EMG Recording. The electrical activity was measured over the zygomaticus and 
the corrugator on the right side of the face using bipolar placements of 4-mm Ag/AgCl surface-
electrodes (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986) and with 1.5 cm of distance between electrode centers. 
The skin surface was cleansed and gently abraded before placing the electrodes, which were 
filled with the appropriate conductive gel (i.e., saline paste). Raw EMG signals were collected 
with a Biopac MP100 system (Biopac Systems Inc., Goleta, CA), which was amplified by a 
factor of 5,000 and sampled at a 1,000 Hz frequency with an online 10 Hz low cutoff filter, a 
500 Hz high cutoff filter, and a 50 Hz notch filter. Other physiological measures were also 
collected (i.e., ECG and skin conductance). The ground electrode for the EMG measures was 
in the left hand (i.e., skin conductance electrodes, in accordance with the Biopac guidelines). 
2.1.5 Procedure. After the participants gave informed consent, they were seated in front of a 
computer screen on an individual room for electrode placement. The experimenter moved into 
an adjacent room, where she was able to control the physiological measurements. All 
instructions were presented on the computer screen. The participants were asked to use only 
their right hands to indicate their responses; the hand position was standardized by displaying 
a set of hand pictures. All participants performed two tasks with the dynamic events order 
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counterbalanced. One task (control condition) had 10 trials, in which the participants were 
asked to only watch the dynamic event at the display. The second task was performed with the 
same material by asking participants to release a key at the moment they estimate being able to 
perform an action (grasp or pass). Thus, for the 15 grasp-ability trials, the participants were 
instructed to “press this key and release it when you feel that your hand can grasp the ball”. In 
turn, for the 15 pass-ability trials, the participants were instructed to “press this key and release 
it when you feel that your hand can pass through the aperture”. Each trial started with a fixation 
cross that varied randomly and equally between 2,000 ms and 2,200 s. In the control condition, 
the participants watched the entire video (i.e., 800 ms), while in the experimental condition, 
video presentation stopped when the participants released the key box. At the end of each trial, 
a blank screen remained onscreen for 1,500 ms (inter-trial interval). 
2.1.6 Measures  
2.1.6.1 Release-key-moment (RKM). The time spent to release the key of available trials (94% 
of all possible trials) were all recorded and subjected to an outlier analysis when considering 
the responses of each participant at each dynamic event. A further 1.78% RKM, which was 
identified as 3 times the participant's average standard deviation, was removed, together with 
the respective EMG information. 
2.1.6.2 Psychophysiological measures. The electromyography activity of the valid RKM trials 
were visually inspected (noise, artifacts and anomalous waveforms) and were filtered offline 
with a bandpass range of 20-400 Hz and was rectified and smoothed over a 20 ms moving 
window. To control for the baseline activity, the EMG scores, including the activity in the given 
trial and a pre-stimulus level — i.e., the mean activity during the 500 ms before video onset — 
were calculated. The EMG scores were aggregated over the 2000 ms (i.e., from 500 ms before 
video onset until 1600 ms after video onset), and trials with EMG activity above 3 times the 
participant's average standard deviation were eliminated (9.13 ± 0.70 trials per participant in 
the W-condition and 12.63 ± 1.44 trials per participant in the WJ-condition). Because EMGc 
(corrugator supercilii) and EMGz (zygomaticus major) vary inversely as a function of valence 
(Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989; Larsen et al., 2003), a valence composite index was created 
to facilitate the data interpretation by subtracting the standardized values of the final time series 
of a muscle by the other (EMGv = EMGz - EMGc). A standardized value of activation of the 
valence composite index (EMGv), as well each independent facial muscle activity (i.e., EMGz 
and EMGc) was created to overcome the individual differences. 
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2.1.6.2.1 RKM-window: To analyze the muscle activity occurring with reference to the 
participants’ moment of judgement, we defined the 100 ms window within which the key 
release was recorded, and we named it the “RKM-window”. Because previous studies show a 
difference in the offset between the time a person decides to respond and the motor response 
being performed (electromechanical delay of approximately 22 to 100 ms; Cavanagh & Komi, 
1979; Hug, Gallot, Catheline, & Nordez, 2011; Zhou, Lawson, Morrison, & Fairweather, 1995) 
we assume that action capability estimation precedes the moment in which the participants press 
the key, and we defined the initial point of the first window of analysis as starting 200 ms before 
each individual RKM-window (-200 ms RKM). Because previous research suggests that facial 
EMG measurements may have a delay of 300-400 ms of measurement, sometimes with clear-
cut reactions 500-1000 ms after a stimulus onset (see Dimberg & Pettersson, 2000; Dimberg et 
al., 2002) we define the final point of the first window of analysis as 800 ms after the RKM-
window (+800 ms RKM). To align the W-condition (i.e., without RKM) with the WJ-condition, 
an RKM-index was created by averaging the participant’s RKM values of WJ-condition to 
extract the equivalent time-window (i.e., from the -200 ms RKM index until +800 ms RKM 
index) for the W-condition. Repeated measure ANOVA compared the facial activation under 
the eleven epochs of the time window for both conditions (W vs. WJ) and tested whether an 
affective reaction was promoted by the task goal providing information that signals the action-
fit moment. 
2.1.6.2.2 END-window: Because the actors watched the entire video (800 ms exposure) in the 
W-condition and the actors watched the video until they released the key in the WJ-condition, 
it is possible that differences in the electrical activity of facial muscles occurring before 800 ms 
was caused by one condition that easily indicated the end of the video and another that did not. 
To test whether the video endpoint promotes a facial reaction, we analyzed data with that 
moment as a reference point. Hence, we created data in a window that started 100 ms before 
the end-window (-100 ms END-window) and finished at 500 ms after the end-window end point 
(+500 ms END-window). For the W-condition, the endpoint window is equal to the video-END, 
whereas for the WJ-condition, the endpoint window is equal to the RKM-window. 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
An analysis of all the various measures was performed using repeated or mixed 
ANOVA models that were defined by the design in which a gender factor was associated 
whenever relevant to control for individual differences.  The analysis aimed to both characterize 
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participants’ reactions to our experimental conditions and identify whether there was any 
evidence of a relationship between the moment of feeling activation and the moment of the 
actor’s response, given that it would support the hypothesis that the feelings inform that 
response. 
2.2.1 Release-key-moment (RKM) analysis 
The RKM means of the WJ-condition were subject of a two-way mixed ANOVA with 
2 Gender (female x male) and 2 Dominant-Hand (right and left) components as between factors, 
and 2 Dynamic-Visual-Event (shrinking x opening) components as within-factors. A robust 
main effect of the Dynamic-Visual-Event was found, F(1,20) = 40.84, p < .001, 2 = 0.67, 
indicating that on average, faster responses are captured when judging their grasp-ability (M = 
432.18, SD = 36.52, 95% CI [356.00, 508.36]) than when judging their pass-ability (M = 620.39, 
SD = 31.56, 95% CI [554.56, 686.21]). It is possible that this occurs because the relationship 
between the hand size, material and tasks created different situational constraints, with the 
optimal time-window for judgement occurring before the grasp-ability (i.e., the participants had 
greater time pressure for withdrawing information when estimating grasp-ability). No other 
effects were found (all F<1). 
2.2.2 Psychophysiological measures 
Analysis were first run for the RKM-window, and second for the EMG analysis of END-
window. Both windows the analysis were first run with the valence composite index (EMGv) 
and then followed by analysis having the corrugator and the zygomaticus activity separately as 
dependent measures. Tests of all the ANOVA model assumptions were performed before each 
analysis. Greenhouse-Geisser correction of degrees of freedom were applied when Mauchly’s 
Test indicate violations of the sphericity assumption (see Supplement 1). 
2.2.2.1 RKM-window: Each dependent measure score (EMGv scores; Corrugator activity or 
Zygomaticus activity) was controlled for individual differences by considering the baseline 
activity. These measures supported three different repeated measure ANOVAs defined by 2 
Task-Goal (W x WJ) x 2 Dynamic-Visual-Events (shrinking x opening) and 11 Time-Windows 
(11 x 100 ms).  The time-windows of the two experimental conditions were aligned according 
to the RKM-index (W-condition) and RKM-window (WJ-condition) as described above. 
2.2.2.1.1 Valence composite index (EMGv). The main effect for Time-Window, F(4.031,92.729) 
= 4.20; p = .004, 2 = 0.15, suggests that the activation of the corrugator relative to the 
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zygomaticus increased with time. This effect is likely to be moderated by the task goal, as 
documented by a non-reliable interaction between Task-Goal and Time-Window, 
F(4.045,93.024) = 2.29; p =.065, 2 = 0.09 (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Activation behavior of the valenced composite index (EMGz-EMGc) controlling 
for the baseline and after having been aligned by the release-key moment (dashed line). 
To understand whether the increase of the corrugator relative to the zygomaticus activity 
was associated with the release of the key, we ran linear contrasts that were separated for each 
experimental condition. As hypothesized, the linear trend was significant for the WJ-condition, 
t(23) = 3.72, p < .01, d = 1.55, but not for the W-condition, t(23)=1.03, p = 0.341, d = 0.43. This 
suggests that the facial muscle contraction is signaling a valence response that is likely to be 
associated with the process activated when the actors establish their action capability estimation 
for the dynamic event. 
The ANOVA also shows two other possible effects.  One is a non-reliable main effect 
for Task-Goal, F(1,23) = 3.45; p = .076, 2 = 0.13, which documents the effect previously 
detected, whereas for the WJ-condition, the corrugator was more active than the zygomaticus 
(M = -0.16, SD = 0.40, 95% CI[-0.98, 0.66]); there was no difference in these muscle activations 
in the W-condition (M = 0.01, SD = 0.25, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.50]). The other effect is the main 
effect for Dynamic-Visual-Event, F(1,23) = 3.88; p = .061; 2 = 0.14, suggesting greater activity 
of the corrugator than the zygomaticus when analyzing pass-ability {M = -0.16, SD = 0.34, 95% 
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CI [-0.87, 0.55) than grasp-ability (M = -0.01, SD = 0.30, 95% CI[-0.63, 0.61]). No other effects 
were found (all F<1). 
2.2.2.1.2 Corrugator Supercillis (EMGc). In line with analyses of EMGv, the ANOVA revealed 
significantly higher activation of the corrugator in the WJ-condition (M = 0.26, SD = 0.29, 95% 
CI [-0.33, 0.85]) compared to the W-condition (M = 0.11, SD = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.51]), 
F(1,23) = 4.69; p < .05, 2 = 0.17 and in the pass-ability (M = 0.26, SD = 0.23, 95% CI  [-0.23, 
0.74]) compared to the grasp-ability (M = 0.11, SD =0.24, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.60]) task, F(1,23) 
= 5.34; p < .05, 2 = 0.19.  The activity of the corrugator changed significantly with time, 
F(3.843,88.383) = 8.51; p < .001, 2 = 0.27] (Figure 3a) in a very similar way in both 
experimental conditions (Task-Goal x Time-Window, F(3.278,75.395) = 1.91; p = .129; 2 = 
0.08] (Figure. 3b). 
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Figure. 3 Corrugator activation controlling for the baseline and after having been aligned 
by the release-key moment (dashed lines). (A) Corrugator activation across time. (B) 
Corrugator activation when watching (W) and watching and judging the fit moment (WJ). 
To directly test our hypothesis that a different pattern is underlying in these changes, we 
separately test the presence of a linear trend in both conditions (WJ vs. W).  Suggesting that the 
increase of the corrugator with time is more clear when a judgment of action capability was 
requested, we found a linear trend for the WJ-condition, t(23) = 3.58, p = .002, d = 1.50, but not 
for the W-condition, t(23) = -1.49, p = .151, d= 0.62. No interactions were found between Task-
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Goal and Dynamic-Visual-Event (F<1), between Dynamic-Visual-Event and Time-Window, 
[F(4.666,107.316) = 1.29; p =.278], or for the second order interaction between Task-Goal, 
Time-Window and Dynamic-Visual-Event [F(5.130, 117.998) = 1.56; p = .176]. 
2.2.2.1.3 Zygomaticus Major (EMGz). Documenting that the valence effects previously found 
were mainly due to the activity of the corrugator, no main effects were found with this 
dependent measure for Task-Goal (F<1), Dynamic-Visual-Event (F<1) or Time-Window, 
F(3.670, 84.410) = 1.46, p = .226. Equally, no first- or second-order interactions were found 
(all F<1). This suggests that zygomaticus activation is not relevant in the process for triggering 
the estimation of action capabilities. 
2.2.2.2 EMG analysis of END-window: The analysis of the END-window aims to guarantee that 
the differences detected between the two experimental conditions are not caused by the video-
end occurring in different moments in each experimental condition.  Each of the mean EMG 
scores (controlling for baseline activity) analyzed above were now subject to a repeated 
measure ANOVA 2 Task-Goal (W x WJ) x 2 Dynamic-Visual-Events (shrinking x opening) 
and 7 Time-Windows (7 x 100 ms) as within-subject factors and after having being aligned 
based on the END-window (i.e., video-ENDPOINT for W-condition, and RKM-window for WJ-
condition). 
2.2.2.2.1 Valence composite index (EMGv). No main effect reaches the conventional standards 
of significance. Task-Goal did not appear to generate any effect, F(1,23) = 2.09; p = .162, 2 = 
0.08. The analysis detected greater activity in the corrugator when facing pass-ability (M = -
0.17, SD = 0.30, 95% CI [-0.80, 0.46]) compared to grasp-ability (M = -0.02, SD = 0.27, 95% 
CI [-0.58, 0.55]); however, the effect was not reliable, F(1,23) = 3.52; p = .073, 2 = 0.13. 
Although the main effect of Time-Window does not reach significance, F(2.157,49.607) = 2.78; 
p = .068, 2 = 0.11, a more powerful contrast revealed the presence of the linear trend associated 
with the increase of the corrugator relative to the zygomaticus with time, t(23)= 2.08, p < .05, 
d = 0.87. As previously detected, Task-Goal moderates the effects of Time-Window, 
F(3.365,77.383) = 3.04, p = .029, 2 = 0.12. Thus, even when the two experimental conditions 
are calibrated for the end of the video, we can detect that the linear trend was significant for the 
WJ-condition, t(23) = 2.89, p = .008, d = 1.21 but not for the W-condition (t<1) (Figure 4).   
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Figure 4. Activation behavior of the valenced composite index (EMGz-EMGc) controlling 
for the baseline and after having been aligned by the end-point moment (dashed line). 
By replicating the effects previously observed, when controlling for the moment where 
the video ended, we can guarantee that the differences observed in the activation of the 
corrugator were not due to the different ends involved in the task conditions but were probably 
due to the task action itself. 
2.2.2.2.2 Corrugator Supercillis (EMGc). This analysis of the corrugator documents the effects 
previously detected, revealing a main effect for Dynamic-Visual-Event, F(1,23) = 4.99; p < .05, 
2 = 0.18, with increased activity of the corrugator for pass-ability (M = 0.28, SD = 0.21, 95% 
CI [-0.15, 0.71]) compared to grasp-ability (M = 0.12, SD = 0.23, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.61]) and the 
non-reliable effect of Time-Window, F(2.683,61.703) = 2.34, p = .089, 2 = 0.09. Time effects 
was again shown to be moderated by Task-Goal, F(3.561,81.898) = 6.48; p < .001, 2 = 0.22 
(Figure 5). A linear trend of corrugator activity (i.e., higher than the baseline) was found for 
WJ-condition, t(23)= -2.76, p =.011, d= 1.15, and not for W-condition (t<1). No other first-
order interactions were found (all F<1), and no second-order interactions were found, either, 
F(4.243, 97.580) = 1.85, p = .122. 
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Figure 5. Corrugator activation controlling for the baseline when watching (W) and 
watching and judging the fit moment (WJ) after having been aligned by the end-point 
moment (dashed line). 
2.2.2.2.3 Zygomaticus Major (EMGz). Contrary to what was found for the RKM-window, we 
found a non-reliable Time-Window effect, F(2.785,64.048) = 2.35; p = .085, 2 = 0.09, for 
zygomaticus activity. After a graphic analysis (Figure 6), we hypothesized that this occurred as 
the result of increased activity of this muscle after the end of the video. Corroborating this 
hypothesis, we found evidence of a significant cubic trend, t(23) = 2.34; p = .028, d = 0.98. The 
zygomaticus activity increased from the -100 ms END until END+200 ms time-windows and 
subsequently decreased to the baseline value. This suggests that the zygomaticus activity was 
sensitive enough to detect the completion of the task (responding to or watching a video). 
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Figure 6. Zygomaticus activation controlling for the baseline after having been aligned by 
the end-point moment (dashed line). 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the spontaneous affect measure 
through facial activation was specifically elicited when the participants judge their action 
capabilities over two dynamic events with time pressure. Indeed, the elicited activity of the 
corrugator relative to the actors’ baseline was detected more when the actors had to estimate 
their own action capabilities than when they were simply watching the dynamic events video. 
This pattern of the activation of feelings is likely to be translating interoception and informing 
the estimation of action capabilities through the activity occurring around the RKM-window 
(i.e., the moment when the participants were giving their responses). 
Clearly, all analyses suggest that the corrugator activity is related to the action capability 
estimation process. If it is sensitive to any feature of the task, the zygomaticus was only 
signaling that the task goal was achieved. The increase of positive affect associated with the 
finishing of a task was detected in many other studies (e.g., Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; 
Wyer & Srull, 1989) and may be reported as a “Zeigarnik effect” (Zeigarnik, 1967). This effect 
refers to a “tension” with unfinished tasks that promotes a sense of satisfaction with its closure.  
Before discussing our results in more detail, we experimentally tested the validity of this 
correlational data; thus, in Experiment 2, we manipulate the activation of the zygomaticus or 
the corrugator by priming participants with faces that either expressed sadness or happiness 
(see Niedenthal, 2007). 
3. Experiment 2 
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3.1 Methods  
3.1.1 Participants and design. Ninety-one graduate students recruited via local advertisement 
agreed to participate in the experiment for course credit compensation. All participants provided 
written consent and had normal-to-corrected visual acuity. After initial inspection of the data, 
7 participants showed values higher than 30% of missing values in both blocks and were 
removed. The total sample included 84 participants (20 males; 9 left-handed) aged 21.12 ± 5.30 
years. The participants were randomly distributed according to the design reflected an 
experiment with a 2 Task-Condition (order x random), 2 Action-Judgment (grasping vs. fitting), 
and 3 Valence (neutral, positive and negative) conditions as within-subject factors. 
3.1.2 Dynamic visual events. Given the difference previously found between the two videos, 
we increased the variability of the two types of dynamic events. Five videos with 3D images 
and the motions of shrinking, spinning in a 360° movement and increasing in quantity were 
created for the grasp-ability task and were added to those used in Experiment 1. Equally, another 
five videos with 2D images were created for the pass-ability estimation, with motions including 
openings with one side moving and the other static and both sides moving and the area growing 
in size. All new videos were created according to the methods described in Experiment 1, and 
the frame exposure remained at 40 ms. A small variation in the video’s total time was also 
applied, with the duration ranging from 800 ms to 1000 ms. 
3.1.3 Apparatus. The experimental tasks were programmed in E-Prime 2.0 software (Schneider 
et al., 2002), and the dynamic events were presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor (15.9-inch 
viewable image) with a black background of 800 x 600 pixels of resolution. The release-key 
moments were performed with a target key on the keyboard and were recorded for time analysis. 
The manipulation included a paradigm of affective subliminal masking priming and to this end, 
12 facial images (6 males and 6 females) with neutral, happy and sad expressions were selected 
from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). All pictures were 
previously gray-scaled and resized using a scale based upon a resolution of 100 pixels in Adobe 
Photoshop. Matching for exposure and luminance was also applied, and the faces were cropped 
to remove mostly of the hair and clothing information.  The final facial shape was overlaid on 
a black background of 500 x 650 pixels (final image size). 
3.1.4 Procedure. The hand position was the same as applied in Experiment 1, and the 
participants received all instructions on the computer screen, including the use of the right index 
finger to respond. Two perceptual training tasks were previously applied to improve the 
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participants’ accuracy in the release-the-key task. Next, the participants started the experimental 
task. In the first block, judgments were counterbalanced by action, and the participants knew 
whether they would estimate grasp-ability or pass-ability, replicating Experiment 1. To increase 
ambiguity and create a more demanding task, in the second block, we removed the 
counterbalance order, and all 12 objects randomly appeared, with participants having to assess 
online whether they should judge the grasp-ability or pass-ability. Immediately before the start 
of each video, the affective valence was manipulated with a neutral, happy or sad facial 
expression appearing in a subliminal masking paradigm. Each trial started with a fixation cross 
on the screen (800 ms), followed by a forward mask (500 ms), the subliminal facial expression 
(30 ms), a backward mask (50 ms) and the start of the video. Perceptually, the participants 
experienced the subliminal process as a flashing of the computer screen.  The cover-story 
offered for the flashing was that it was signaling the video loading process.  
Each dynamic event was randomly associated with one valence without repetition; thus, 
each participant judged the same dynamic event three times. A total of 18 trials for grasp-ability 
and 18 trials for pass-ability were presented in both the first and second blocks. The tasks were 
instructed as in Experiment 1, and the released-key-time of the valid judgments was recorded, 
with the video stopping immediately at this point. 
3.1.5 Measures. Release-Time-Index (RTI) for correct response were the main dependent 
variable. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
A first inspection detected 0.05% of the missing trials in the first block and 0.04% of 
the missing trials in the second block. A second inspection retained only the trials in which the 
object was judged with the three valences (0.06% of the valid trials were removed from the first 
block and 0.05% of the valid trials were removed from the second block). The release-key-
times of each participant and by the Action-Judgment were collapsed for valence condition, 
with 6 Release-Time-Indexes (RTIs) created, i.e., three combined judgments of grasp-ability 
with neutral, positive and negative valences and three combined judgments of pass-ability with 
neutral, positive and negative valences. A repeated measure ANOVA with 2 Task-Condition 
(order x random), 2 Action-Judgment (grasp-ability x pass-ability) and 3 Valence (neutral, 
positive and negative) components as within-subject factors were applied to the RTI values. 
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The main effect of Action-Judgment, F(1,83) = 8.67, p = .004, 2 = 0.10, reinforced the 
results of Experiment 1, suggesting differences between the two tasks. The actors moved more 
quickly when judging the visual dynamic events associated with the perceived grasp-ability (M 
= 526.70, SD = 16.55, 95% CI [493.80, 559.62]) compared to pass-ability (M = 567.15, SD = 
29.59, 95% CI [508.29, 626.00]).  A main effect of Task-Condition, F(1,83) = 12.62, p < .001, 
2 = 0.99, revealed that actors more quickly estimated their action capabilities when they knew 
the action capability a priori (M = 539.99, SD = 17.69, 95% CI [504.82, 575.17]) compared to 
when discovering it on-line (M = 553.86, SD = 17.79, 95% CI [518.47, 589.24]). Being relevant 
to our goals, Task-Condition did not interact with the Valence factor, F(1.742,144.585) = 1.22, 
p  = .296, 2 = 0.01. Being important for our hypothesis, the main effect of Valence, 
F(1.792,148.730) = 3.61, p = .034, 2 = 0.04, was found with the respective mean values of the 
release time in milliseconds: neutral (M = 543.30; SD = 10.90); negative (M = 550.33; SD = 
10.47); and positive (M = 547.14; SD = 10.56). To approach the role of the corrugator as 
suggested by Experiment 1, we directly compared the neutral with both the negative, t(83) = 
2.40, p = .019, d = 0.53, and positive, t(83) = -1.78, p = .079, d = 0.39, valence conditions. As 
hypothesized, through the activation of the corrugator, by priming with a sad face, we interfere 
with the estimation of action capabilities. However, the results of this study also suggest that a 
happy face prime may also interfere with task performance. 
4. General Discussion  
Two experiments give us convergent data suggesting that the corrugator is active when 
the participants estimate their action capabilities. In Experiment 1, we found elicited activity of 
the corrugator only in the condition in which the participants have to estimate their action 
capabilities and that, because of a known delay of facial activity measures (e.g., Dimberg et al., 
2002), this activation was likely occurring contingently to their response timing. In Experiment 
2, we directly investigated whether an induced reenactment by unconscious mimicry (Barsalou, 
2008; Niedenthal, 2007) of the facial muscle corrugator (negative affect) and zygomaticus 
(positive affect) at the actor’s baseline could embody information that facilitates or inhibits the 
actors’ fit moment. As shown by the analysis of the Experiment 1 results, only the negative 
prime (sad faces) condition significantly differs from the neutral condition. In this condition, 
the actors postponed their perceived fit. This suggests that our manipulation used the same 
sensorimotor involved in the task and that it may have interfered with both the simulation and 
the estimation (Körner, Topolinsk & Strack, 2015). However, it should be acknowledged that 
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although unreliable, there appears to be a tendency for the happy face prime to also interfere 
with the task. 
Two questions need to be answered to understand these data.  The first question is about 
why the corrugator was activated in an action capability estimation task and why its activation 
interfered with the participants’ perceived action capabilities. The second question is about the 
interference of the happy prime in the estimation of action capabilities in Experiment 2 given 
that no zygomaticus effects occurred in Experiment 1.  
Although we believe that a clear understanding of the role of the corrugator shown in 
our studies needs further investigation, some research exists regarding the meaning of the 
corrugator activity that should be taken into consideration in the future generation of a response. 
The literature has associated corrugator activity with immediate experiences of negative affect 
(Larsen, et al., 2003; Dimberg, 1997; Dimberg et al., 2002), a disfluency due to surprise effects 
(Topolinsk & Stracks, 2015), and an experience of increased attention and mental effort 
(Waterink & van Boxtel, 1994; van Boxtel & Jessurun, 1993). According to Gibson (1966), our 
perceptual system ceaselessly reveals the relevant properties of our surroundings to be guided 
by opportunities for action. Thus, when performing goal-directed behavior, this ongoing 
activity needs be different from the baseline to allow the organism-environment fit that 
accomplishes the goal. This idea mainly suggests that attentional effort is involved in visual 
exploration because it is possible that the corrugator activity is indexing such differential 
activity. However, if this were the case, why would the corrugator not be deactivated 
immediately after a response is available?  No specific attention demands are activated at that 
moment. Thus, even assuming that the measurement has a delay of approximately 300 ms, this 
explanation does not appear to completely explain our data. In addition to the attentional 
process, we propose that corrugator activity has an interoceptive role. The evidence that affect-
laden stimuli result in similarly patterned changes in the facial musculature is not sparse (e.g., 
Arndt, Allen & Greenberg, 2001), and even recently, Heller and collaborators (Heller, Lapate, 
Mayer & Davidson, 2014) demonstrated the plausibility of simultaneous activity between the 
corrugator and neural correlates of affect, such as in the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. However, these are empirical question that still need to be investigated. 
Another question we should address in the future is the role that dynamic events have 
in our results. The temporal feature of these tasks created a demand that made it possible to 
detect the corrugator activity associated with the perceived fit only in these conditions. For 
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instance, feelings of uncertainty could have been elicited. The research has shown that feelings 
of difficulty or uncertainty co-vary with the contraction of the corrugator muscle (Koriat & 
Nussinsson 2009). Thus, the corrugator can only signal that the goal associated with the task is 
being experienced as difficult. Although this is an alternative explanation for our data, it is still 
necessary to explain why the experience of difficulty is not overcome by a response that is 
provided by relaxing the same muscle. 
There would be a more of a global consensus if our data suggested that estimations were 
achieved in association with greater activation of the zygomaticus.  As Canon and collaborators 
(Canon, Hayes & Tipper, 2010) demonstrated, there is greater activity in the zygomaticus 
muscle when there is a fit between the actor’s hand-orientation and the object orientation. In 
addition, studies have suggested that a match can be experienced as fluent (Topolinski, 
Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009), which is experienced as a positive feeling (Garcia-
Marques, Mackie, Claypool & Garcia-Marques, 2004; Winkelman & Cacioppo, 2001). An 
expected result could thus be that activation of the zygomaticus occurred at the moment in 
which the participants generated a response. However, at least in a clear form, this did not occur 
with our data, given that the zygomaticus was shown to be activated only to signal the end of a 
task (even if it was one of simply watching the video) in the first experiment. One possible 
explanation for this occurrence is a lower sensibility of the zygomaticus when compared with 
the corrugator. In testing facial EMG activity, Van Boxtel and Jessurun (1993) found that the 
zygomaticus was not activated until the task load change from sub- to supramaximal capacity 
levels.  Thus, in Experiment 1, the activation of the zygomaticus could have not been properly 
detected by our procedures (e.g., type of task, temporal demanding, etc.) when explaining the 
different results for the zygomaticus between Experiment 1 and 2. However, and slightly 
contradictory to that hypothesis, we also found differences in the activation of the zygomaticus 
when signaling the end of the video.  
Another possible reason that primes of happy and sad faces had mirror effects in 
Experiment 2 in comparison with a neutral condition is that neither prime was clearly activating 
only one type of facial muscle. The research attempts to dissociate the activation of the two 
muscles, and the data analysis focuses on that. It is clear that the zygomaticus is the muscle 
associated with smiling, and it is the muscle that is more activated when we perceive a happy 
face compared to a sad face. The corrugator is the muscle that differentiates more reactions 
associated with a sad face. However, this does not mean that the zygomaticus is only activated 
when individuals perceive a happy face. It is even possible that the corrugator is more activated 
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when we perceive a happy face (e.g., Magnée, Stekelenburg, Kemner, & de Gelder, 2007). 
Thus, our results with the prime of a happy face may be indexing the activation of the 
corrugator. This is a hypothesis to be addressed in future studies. 
Another possible reason that happy primes interfered with the perceived action 
capabilities is that the nature of our task does not allow the pure deactivation of any muscle 
since faces are being presented in sequence to one another (inter-trial interval). However, this 
would not explain why these carryover effects would be less often detected in the neutral 
condition. 
A final explanation is that the effects are dependent upon what the two activations have 
in common; namely, an arousal state (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Kuppens and collaborators 
(Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russel, & Barrett, 2013) suggest that these mirror effects may be 
associated with a weak and consistently asymmetric V-shaped relationship that in some ways 
matches our data. Hajcak and collaborators (Hajcak, Molnar, George, Bolger, Koola, & Nahas, 
2007) found a similar pattern in the motor-evoked potential (MEP) that is promoted by the 
emotional nature of the stimuli. Usually, arousal is related to an energetic state and a 
mobilization of energy to face a task goal (Barry, Clarke, McCarthy, Selikowitz, & Rushby, 
2005). Thus, in our experiment, both the sad and happy face primes may have evoked motor 
potential differently from the neutral face prime.  
5. Conclusion  
Taken together, our results clearly suggest the activation of feelings concomitantly with 
the visual scaling process that underpins the fit between actor-environment properties, and they 
suggest that these feelings interfere with the estimation of action capabilities when facing 
dynamic events.  In addition, they suggest that these feelings are indexed by changes in 
corrugator activation. We propose that the role of corrugator activation in the visual scaling 
process is one of informing judgment, but this is a question that needs to be clarified in future 
studies.  
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Supplement 1 
Table 1 
Values of sphericity violation and respective Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for 
Experiment 1 
 
RKM-Window 
Analysis Mauchly’s Test p ε 
EMGv 
Time-Window 
2(54) = 
153.74 < .001 .403 
 
Task-Goal x Time-Window 
2(54) = 
139.82 < .001 .404 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 2(54) = 97.01 < .001 .467 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Task-Goal x 
Time-Window 
2(54) = 
120.20 < .001 .491 
EMGc Time-Window 
2(54) = 
137.20 < .001 .384 
 Task-Goal x Time-Window 
2(54) = 
173.57 < .001 .328 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 
2(54) = 
115.78 < .001 .467 
 
Dynamic-Visual-Event x Task-Goal x 
Time-Window 
2(54) = 
126.77 < .001 .513 
EMGz Time-Window 
2(54) = 
162.56 < .001 .367 
 Task-Goal x Time-Window 
2(54) = 
137.78 < .001 .391 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 
2(54) = 
140.76 < .001 .384 
 
Dynamic-Visual-Event x Task-Goal x 
Time-Window 
2(54) = 97.54 < .001 .554 
     
END-Window 
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EMGv 
Time-Window 
2(54) = 
103.75 < .001 .360 
 Task-Goal x Time-Window 2(20) = 58.01 < .001 .561 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 2(20) = 59.03 < .001 .499 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Task-Goal x 
Time-Window 
2(20) = 38.69 < .01 .671 
EMGc Time-Window 2 (20) = 82.50 < .001 .447 
 Task-Goal x Time-Window 2(20) = 61.92 < .001 .594 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 2(20) = 49.63 < .001 .597 
EMGz Time-Window 2(20) = 65.16 < .001 .464 
 Task-Goal x Time-Window 2(20) = 71.92 < .001 .487 
 Dynamic-Visual-Event x Time-Window 2(20) = 54.15 < .001 .478 
 
Dynamic-Visual-Event x Task-Goal x 
Time-Window 
2(20) = 57.33 < .001 .497 
 
 
Table 2 
Values of sphericity violation and respective Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for 
Experiment 2 
 
RTI 
Analysis Mauchly’s Test p ε 
Valence 2(2) = 10.12 < .01 .896 
Task-Condition x Valence 2(2) = 13.15 < .01 .817 
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To touch or not to touch? Feelings as non-visual information for perceived reach-ability* 
Cristina Fonseca13, Teresa Garcia-Marques1, & Pedro Figueira1 
 
Abstract 
In two studies, we artificially promote differences in the affective experiences of participants 
to investigate whether feelings embody non-visual information to perceived reach-ability. In 
Study 1, an affective prime was associated with a dynamic dot task, and the motor degrees of 
freedom of participants were constrained by a horizontal bar that secured them to a chair. 
Findings indicated that participants overestimated their perceived boundaries of action when 
subliminally primed with both positive and negative affective faces. In Study 2, we used a static 
dot task, and we replicated the affective prime effect on the group that had the same motor 
constraints of Study 1; but we did not replicate the effect when no postural constraint was 
created and multiple degrees of freedom were available. Taken together, our data revealed that 
changes in affective experiences interfere with the reach-ability estimation process and suggest 
that feelings are likely to be incorporated as non-visual information in perceived action 
capabilities when a possible action is latent. The results also demonstrated the integration 
between the sensorimotor and perceptual systems, and that gauging affordances encompasses 
body features. Specifically, the data show that when multiple degrees of freedom are made 
available, the sensorimotor system is a more reliable source of information regarding the 
accuracy of anticipated action. 
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To touch or not to touch? Feelings as non-visual information for perceived reach-ability 
Recently, it was suggested that feelings could be integrated as non-optical information 
when visually scaling spatial layouts and detecting affordances (e.g., Fonseca, Garcia-Marques, 
& Fernandes, 2016; Witt & Riley, 2014; Zadra & Clore, 2011). Affordances (Gibson, 1979, 
1966) are environmental properties that invite action and resonate with the capabilities of the 
organism. Although evidence has shown that actors rely on their own body dimensions as an 
intrinsic metric to rescale spatial layouts, the mechanism that underlies the organism-
environment fit is still unclear. In this paper, we address whether feelings that arise from a 
myriad of bodily processes when actors interact with their current scenario are also integrated 
as non-visual information when visually scaling and perceiving reach-ability. To this end, in 
two studies, we applied subliminally affective primes to artificially induce feelings in the 
participants’ baseline, and we investigated whether these feelings interfered with reach-ability 
estimates. In this way, we expected to find evidence that feelings serve as non-visual 
information when detecting affordances. 
Resizing the world on intrinsic action units 
The concept of affordances (Gibson, 1979) defines the set of action possibilities that are 
offered by the environment to the actor and resonate with the actor system. The detection of 
affordances denotes a latent match between the target features (e.g., size, shape, time) and the 
actor’s body (Mace, 1977). This process constrains what could be an infinite space of possible 
actions to only a few opportunities, establishing a functional relationship between the organism 
and its surroundings and categorizing the performance of motor actions as possible and not 
possible (Fajen, Riley & Turvey, 2008). However, to detect affordances, actors need to become 
sensitive to the properties of the environment that fits their system. This means that, instead of 
perceiving the physical world in terms of an absolute metric (e.g., space, time, meters and units) 
and subsequently transforming it through internal process, actors directly perceive the physical 
dimensions of their surroundings relativized to some intrinsic metric (Turvey, 2004, 1992). This 
has been studied by Warren (1984), who shows how geometrical relations govern the organism-
environment fit in a study of participants using their leg length to scale the maximum stair 
height perceived as climbable. Specifically, the data revealed that the taller group of participants 
could estimate higher heights as climbable compared to the smaller group. However, when the 
dimensional ratios of both groups of participants were analyzed (i.e., the ratio between the 
actor’s leg length and the stair height), the results revealed that taller and smaller participants 
presented the same ratio constraining their perceived action category. This evidence was 
reinforced by a series of studies showing, for example, that actors used information regarding 
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their height and leg lengths to estimate the perceived pass-ability of barriers (van der Meer, 
1997), that arm length was used to estimate an actor’s perceived reach-ability (Carello, 
Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon & Turvey, 1989) and that hand-size was used as an intrinsic 
metric to estimate the perceived grasp-ability of objects (Linkenauger, Witt, & Proffitt, 2011) 
or hand pass-ability through different gap sizes (Ishak, Adolph, & Lin, 2008). 
Another set of studies revealed that the detection of affordances is not ruled only by 
geometric relations but also by temporal properties. Therefore, it was demonstrated that actors 
not only body-scale the physical surroundings, but they also action-scale the properties of the 
environment by relying on information about their action capabilities. This means that actors 
acknowledge their action boundaries (i.e., the range over which action is possible) and use this 
information to control and estimate proper movements (Fajen, 2007, 2005). For example, Fajen 
(2005) demonstrated this through a series of simulation braking tasks in which the braking 
varies in hardness level. The findings revealed that actors initiated deceleration later when the 
brake resistance was shifted from a middle-to-weak level, whereas when the brake resistance 
was shifted from a middle-to-strong level, the actors initiated deceleration early. Similarly, in a 
study involving the perceptual motor performance of goalkeepers in penalty-kick situations, 
researchers found that when attempting to save the ball, goalkeepers action-scaled the dive 
moment relying on their action-capabilities. Specifically, the data revealed that compared to 
their slower peers, the faster goalkeepers took longer to initiate their diving (Dicks, Davis & 
Button, 2010). 
Based on these and other pieces of experimental evidence (see Proffitt, 2013, 2006; and 
Witt, 2011), Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) recently proposed an “embodied perception” 
based on the assumption that visual information (e.g., visual angles, ocular-motor adjustments 
and retinal disparities) were directly scaled by nonvisual metrics derived from the body 
phenotype. They propose that the task demands constrain which features of the body are 
relevant to the intended action, with this feature being directly involved as the ruler embodied 
in the visual scaling of the spatial layout (e.g., arm’s length for reaching and hand-size for 
grasping). Data provided from different body categories, such as the physiologic and 
morphologic, demonstrate, for example, that bio-energetic costs are integrated in the visual 
scaling mechanism. Thus, when actors were in a fatigued state, in a state of low fitness, carrying 
an extra load, in declining health, or in old age, the presented geographical slants were 
overestimated and perceived as steeper than reality (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, 
Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). Importantly, this evidence was replicated by direct manipulation 
of the physiologic states of participants. Thus, when participants’ blood glucose levels were 
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depleted to trigger a fatigued state, the findings showed that actors estimated hills to be steeper 
(Schnall, Zadra, Proffitt, 2010). Similarly, when the blood level of carbohydrate of the 
participants was raised to increase energy, the data revealed that they perceived distances to be 
shorter, even after vigorous exercise (Zadra, Weltman & Proffitt, 2016). 
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that when actors’ body dimensions are modified 
by natural or experimental sources, they are able to quickly recalibrate their perceived 
boundaries of action and embody the new body dimensions in their visual scaling of the spatial 
layout. Franchak and Adolph (2014) performed a bodily longitudinal observation of pregnant 
women and found that as body size increased, previously passable doorways were perceived as 
non-passable. However, the women’s accuracy remained the same as that of the non-pregnant 
group, indicating that tracking and recalibration were compatible with the bodily changes of 
pregnancy. In another experiment, when participants had their visual perception of their own 
hand size manipulated in an immersive virtual-environment, the data revealed that objects 
within hand-reaching distance were perceived as smaller when the participants experienced 
illusions of large hands relative to the experience of real hand size or the illusion of a smaller 
hand (Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2013). Similarly, when participants 
experienced illusions of smaller and larger virtual bodies, they rescaled their body size in 
agreement with the size of the virtual body (Piryankova et al., 2014). Finally, a robust body of 
evidence has indicated that when the height of actors is modified with the use of platform shoes, 
they quickly rescale their new height and increase their perceived sit-ability (Mark, 1987) and 
climb-ability (Warren & Whang, 1987). When the weights of participants were changed by 
adding ankle loads, it was found that they quickly embodied the extra load and overestimated 
gap distances (Lessard, Linkenauger, & Proffitt, 2009). Questioning whether these action-
specific effects were due to the unique contributions of beliefs about the actor’s own body size, 
or due to experiential changes in the physical characteristics of body size, Sugovic and 
collaborators (Sugovic, Turk & Witt, 2016) found a direct influence of physical body weight. 
Thus, instead of distances being estimated based on the participants’ beliefs about their own 
bodies weight, the findings demonstrated that heavier participants estimated distances to be 
farther. 
Feelings as non-optical information integrating the visual scaling mechanism 
In addition to the integration of morphologic and physiologic categories in the visual 
scaling of spatial layouts, a set of studies has suggested that feelings can also integrate the 
action-perception mechanism and that perhaps feelings are the level at which information is 
used to moderate the visual scaling accuracy of action-capabilities. 
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In line with this view, there is evidence suggesting that as the grasp orientation of a tool 
is perceived as more difficult, the farther away participants estimate their reach-ability, 
indicating that a type of subjective experience of easiness might also govern the perception of 
spatial layouts (Linkenauger, Witt, Stefanucci, Bakdash & Proffitt, 2009). Similarly, 
investigating whether these embodied effects in visual scaling were confined to explicit-
judgments or could be extended to the implicit action-base, researchers found that when a task 
was adjusted to an easy level (i.e., relative to a difficult level), participants perceived a target 
moving at a constant speed as slower, and they also adjusted their performance accordingly 
(Witt & Sugovic, 2013). 
In addition, elicited states of fear and anxiety were shown to interfere with the action-
perception mechanism because they are embodied in the dynamic action-decision. This was 
shown by Bootsma and collaborators (Bootsma, Bakker, van Snippenberg & Tdlohreg, 1992), 
who investigated the impact of anxiety levels on affordances and found that anxiety increases 
judgment variability, probably due to a decline in accuracy. The elicited levels of anxiety were 
also shown to diminish the accuracy of handgun shooting performance (Nieuwenhuys & 
Oudejans, 2010) and to reduce climbers’ perceptions of their maximal reaching height when 
they had to estimate or perform a real climb (Pijpers, Oudejans, Bakker & Beek, 2006). 
Additionally, Graydon and collaborators (Graydon, Linkenauger, Teachman & Proffit, 2012), 
investigated whether induced anxiety immediately prior to perceptual tasks could change the 
actor’s action capabilities (i.e., grasp-ability, passing-ability and reach-ability), and found a 
linear association between the level of anxiety an underestimation of the range over which an 
action is possible. 
Like anxiety, elicited fear also influences the perception of spatial layouts. This has been 
demonstrated, for example, by studies showing that participants overestimate height when fear 
is elicited by standing at actual higher altitudes (Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009), by seeing images 
of falling (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Teachman, 2009), or by imagining a dangerous 
outcome (Stefanucci, Gagnon, Tompkins & Bullock, 2012). Geuss and collaborators (Geuss, 
McCardell & Stefanucci, 2016) showed that such changes in conscious perception due to fear-
inducing experiences have a direct impact on actions. Their findings revealed that fearful 
participants not only overestimated gap width but also changed their motor pattern by stepping 
farther over gap widths. 
Finally, an interesting body of evidence regarding distorted perception of the body has 
also indicated that non-visual information is integrated into the action-perception mechanism. 
Adopting a body-scaled paradigm, researchers investigated the anticipated action of anorexic 
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patients and found that, relative to the control group, the anorexic group not only estimated that 
they would not fit through apertures that were wide enough, but they also presented a 
significantly higher ratio of shoulder width to gap size (Guardia, Lafargue, Thomas, Dodin, 
Cottencin & Luyat, 2010). Without the awareness of the participants, the researchers recorded 
the actions of people diagnosed and not diagnosed with anorexia as they walked through door-
like openings that changed in width, and they found that while the control group rotated their 
shoulders for apertures 25% wider than their shoulders, the anorexic group rotated their 
shoulders for apertures 40% wider than their shoulders (Keizer, Smeets, Dijkerman, 
Uzunbajakau, van Elburg & Postma, 2013). 
Perceiving the maximum reaching 
As a goal-directed behavior, the task of “reaching” encompasses a type of space 
perception that necessarily integrates the visual scaling of target distance information with the 
initial position of the body. In addition, the movement of reaching is itself constrained by the 
coordination of several motor degrees of freedom (Bernestein, 1967). 
There is vast evidence of constraints over reaching being promoted by body degrees of 
freedom (e.g., Carello, et al., 1989; Fisher, 2000; Gabbard, Ammar & Lee, 2006; Rochat & 
Wraga, 1997), with reaching paradigms investigating actors’ perceptions of maximum reaching 
when the body is constrained to one skeletal degree of freedom (i.e., a functional link of hand, 
forearm and upper arm in which the actor can extend the arm from the shoulder) versus having 
multiple degrees of freedom available (i.e., several functional links, such as coupling from the 
shoulder and bending from the hip). For instance, Carello and collaborators (Carello, et al., 
1989) manipulated actors’ reaching (extending arm from the shoulder or bending from the hip) 
and asked participants to both anticipate and perform their maximum reach. Actors were shown 
to be sensitive to the functional variety of restriction applied, having higher accuracy in 
perceived reaching when more degrees of freedom were involved. Similarly, Robinovitch 
(1998) asked participants to estimate and perform their maximum reach and found that actors 
overestimated their perceived maximum reach when in a standing postural position but 
underestimated it when in a bending postural position. Taken together, this evidence suggests 
that beyond body dimensions (e.g., height and arm’s length), perceived maximum reaching also 
encompasses bodily sensations associated with the limited range of action, or what Robinovitch 
called a “safety mechanism” that prevents the actors from attempting what is beyond their own 
limits. Gabbard and collaborators (Gabbard, Cordova & Lee, 2007; Gabbard et al., 2006) 
directly addressed this by asking participants to “kinesthetically feel” themselves when facing 
targets in different locations. Thus, studying the effects of postural constraints on perceived 
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maximum reaching, the data revealed that although participants overestimated more when their 
reaching estimate was associated with multiple degrees of freedom, this trend shifted in the 
opposite direction when participants had only one degree of freedom available. 
More evidence is provided by Rochat and Wraga (1997), who developed six studies 
with variations in postural conditions and asked participants to estimate their maximum reach 
when facing static and dynamic objects. The data confirmed the systematic error of reach-ability 
judgments promoted by different degrees of freedom (i.e., whole-body engagement 
information) and that, independent of the postural constraint dictated by the task, the perceived 
multiple degrees of freedom were integrated into the mechanism of perceived maximum 
reaching. 
Finally, evidence suggests that the body sensations that actors use to change their 
patterns of action come from a preferred critical boundary that is based on feelings of comfort 
instead of the biomechanical critical boundary and that these feelings of comfort and discomfort 
moderate the choice to insert or remove degrees of freedom in a postural movement (Mark, et 
al., 1997; Petrovic, Berg, Mark, & Hughes, 2015). 
Taken together, the above studies provide evidence that feelings coming from bodily 
subjective experiences, and not only from ocular information, might integrate the mechanism 
behind perceived reach-ability. 
Current Study 
Taking perception as an integrative process based on a global array (Stoffregen & Bardy, 
2001) that includes information about the ability of actors to act, Witt and Riley (2014) stress 
the need to extend this global array to interoception.  Interoception has been defined as the 
body-to-brain axis of sensation, a sensing of internal bodily changes and subjective feelings 
that come from physiological conditions (e.g., energy, stress levels, mood, dispositions) and are 
integrated as information (Cameron, 2001; Graig 2002). Thus, individual affordances must 
include both higher-order patterns defined across not only exteroceptive but also interoceptive 
stimulus arrays. 
Within the literature, these internal bodily changes and subjective feelings have been 
defined by two psychological properties: valence (pleasure/displeasure) and arousal 
(activation/calm) (Russel, 2009, 2003), and they have been strongly associated with measures 
of affective experiences (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Grunedal, 2002). However, some of these subjective experiences are not clearly recognized as 
emotions; rather, they are described as an online stream that is constantly running in our 
background, resulting from the myriad of neurophysiological and neurobiological changes we 
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experience when facing the flow of events. Moreover, this “core-affect” has also been defined 
as a primitive barometer that informs the feeler’s interaction with the environment (Duncan & 
Barrett, 2007; Russell, 2009), and it is likely to be integrated in the extended global array that 
underlies affordance detection. 
Convergent evidence from different scientific fields indicates that these subjective 
feelings are embodied information that can regulate cognitive tuning (e.g., Garcia-Marques & 
Mackie, 2001; Schwarz, 2002) to influence attentional process (e.g., Adolphs & Damasio, 2001; 
Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006) and be used as an heuristic to inform several types of evaluative 
judgments (e.g., Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001). When associated with an anticipated 
action, these feelings, summarized in the perceptual array, can inform costs and benefits, 
allowing action decisions that minimize negative and maximize positive outcomes (Zadra & 
Clore, 2011). An example of the integration of feelings in our perceptual array is provided by 
Riener and collaborators (Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2011), who demonstrated that 
participants in a negative mood visually estimated hills to be steeper compared to those in a 
positive mood. 
The hypothesis that interception is available as non-visual information was directly 
tested by Fonseca and collaborators (Fonseca, et al., 2016), who tracked the facial muscle 
activity (a direct measure of affective experience) of participants interacting with dynamic 
events. The results revealed an elicited activity of the corrugator (which is associated with 
negative affect and attentional process) when actors had to watch events and estimate their 
action capabilities, but not when the actors only had to watch the same events. To better 
understand if the corrugator was activated as a signal of affect or attention, in a second 
experiment the researchers applied subliminal priming to induce changes at the levels of 
valence and arousal immediately before the task onset and found that participants postponed 
the perceived fit moment under the negative priming (i.e., sad faces). These findings led to the 
conclusion that feelings were not only activated concomitantly with the visual scaling process, 
they also seemed to be integrated into perceived action capabilities. 
Thus, here we aimed to test the direct interference of feelings in reach-ability estimates. 
We hypothesized that the perceptual fit underlying affordance detection integrates visual and 
non-visual information with bodily feelings and is thus able to compose an extended global 
array (i.e., a higher order variable of multimodal perception). Thus, we expected that both 
feelings and postural constraints would be able to moderate the perceptual accuracy of the actor-
environment fit. To this end, we manipulated mild levels of affective changes before the task 
onset and without the awareness of participants (Ducan & Barrett, 2007; Pessoa, 2008; 
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Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus & Trujillo, 2007), and we expected that our affective 
manipulations could interfere with the ability of the actors to gauge reachability in two studies. 
Specifically, in Study 1 we constrained the participants’ motor degrees of freedom and asked 
them to estimate when a dynamic dot, initially within reaching boundaries, become non-
touchable. Based on our initial findings, in Study 2 we released the postural constraints on half 
of the participants and investigated whether the perceived reachability of dots located in areas 
affording possible and impossible reaching was hampered. 
Ethics 
All participants provided prior informed consent and agreed to participate in the studies 
for course credit. The ethics principles expressed by the APA were followed, and experimental 
protocols were previously approved by the internal Ethics Committee of ISPA – Instituto 
Universitário de Ciências Psicológicas, Socias e da Vida. 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we directly investigated the impact that affective primes exert over the reach-ability 
of a dynamic dot moving across the computer screen and when participants are not able to draw 
bodily information from multiple degrees of freedom. Specifically, we displayed movies of a 
dot initially located near the center of a touchable area of the screen, which moved toward a 
non-touchable area of the screen. The participants’ task was to release a computer key to 
indicate when the reachable dot become unreachable. Before each trial, participants were 
subliminally primed with a neutral (non-emotional), happy, or sad face. We predicted that if 
actors rely on feelings as non-visual information when estimating reach-ability, then when they 
lack bodily sensations coming from multiple degrees of freedom, actors will make use of the 
affective information created by our manipulation (by a process of misattribution) and change 
their perceived reach under the negative and positive affective primes, relative to the neutral 
prime (i.e., our control prime) (Fonseca et al., 2016). 
Method 
Participants and design. All participants signed the informed consent and received 
course credit compensation. No participant had any form of attention disorder, and all of them 
showed normal-to-correct vision acuity. Prior to statistical analysis, one participant was 
removed from the data due to presenting values higher than 2.5 standard deviations of the 
median. Analysis was performed using a sample of 23 undergraduate females (M = 21.65, SD 
= 5.85 years), all right-handed, and complying with an estimated power in the range of 0.70 to 
0.80, assuming a moderate effect size (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). The design was a 
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within-factor analysis with 3 Blocks (block1, block2, block3) and 3 Primes (neutral, positive 
and negative).  
Stimulus and Apparatus. After pre-testing the reachability of different locations on 
the computer screen with the participants seated in a chair and performing real touches both 
with maximum bending and without any bending, we used 17 images of a dot (30x30 pixel and 
96 dpi resolution) overlaid by a black background (800x600 pixel and 96 dpi resolution) and 
created a total of 10 dynamic events with a dot moving from an area with high probability of 
touch (more than 90% of real touch in the pre-test regardless of participants’ height and posture) 
to an area of low probability of touch (less than 10% real touch in the pre-test regardless of the 
participants’ height and posture) on the computer screen. Each video started with an image of 
a dot located at the center of the touchable area (frame 1) and finished with an image of a half-
dot at the edge of the computer screen (frame 16), followed by an image of a black screen 
(frame 17). The dots’ displacements were non-linear trajectories, and the transition from a 
touchable area to non-touchable area happened in different time-windows to prevent 
anticipation bias (see Figure 1). All 17 image-frames were set with 150 m/s of timing exposure 
and subsequently rendered to a video file using Windows Movie Maker (Windows Movie 
Maker, Version 2012, 16.4.3528.0331) with 2s60ms of total time. For the subliminal masking 
priming we used 10 facial pictures (equally representing male and female models) with neutral, 
happy and sad expressions selected from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions (Tottenham et 
al., 2009). All pictures were previously gray-scaled and resized using a scale based upon a 
resolution of 100 pixels in Adobe Photoshop. Matching for exposure and luminance was also 
applied, and faces were cropped to remove most of the hair and clothing information.  The final 
facial shape was overlaid in a black background of 500 x 650 pixels (final image size). The 
experimental tasks were programmed in E-Prime 2.0 software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002) and the stimulus was presented in a 17-inch CRT monitor (15.9-inch 
viewable image) with a black background of 800 x 600 pixels of resolution. The key-release 
moments were captured through a target key on the keyboard and were recorded for time 
analysis. 
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Figure 1. Dot dynamic event. Example of a whole trajectory applied in order to estimate reach-
ability. 
Procedures. To ensure the reliability of the pre-tested areas, each participant was first 
seated in a chair centered in front of the computer screen, at a distance that was calibrated by 
their arm length. At the end of the calibration process, each participant could touch – with the 
tip of the right index finger and without losing upper-back contact with the chair – the targets 
positioned at the center of the screen and the extreme right side, but they could not touch the 
target positioned at the extreme left side of the screen. After the calibration process, all 
participants were required to rest their left hand on the upper left-tight. Next, participants 
performed fast movements with the index finger of their right hand stretched (i.e., left-to-right, 
right-to-left, up-to-down, down-to-up) to interact with the computer screen at the calibrated 
distance, and subsequently they were instructed to place their index finger on the keyboard. 
Each participant seated in the chair, was then tied with a vertical bar positioned at the inferior 
level of the external bone. The use of the bar prevents participants from bending forward at the 
hip, and thus the degrees of freedom could not vary freely. Subsequently, instructions were 
transmitted via computer screen, reminding the participants to maintain their initial position 
and never attempt to touch the screen during the whole session. A training task was applied to 
improve the participants’ ability to perform the release of the computer key to judge fast-paced 
movements. The training stimulus comprised five films of 800 ms that showed a small car 
moving (40 ms per frame) in the direction of a wall. Participants had to start the task by pressing 
and holding the key, and then they had to release it to stop the car as close as possible to the 
wall without crashing it into the wall. Next, the experimental task started, and the task of the 
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participants was to indicate when they could no longer reach the initially reachable dot. To this 
end, the participants were instructed to “press this key and release it when you feel that your 
right index finger cannot touch the dot”. To induce changes based on arousal and valence, 
participants were subliminally primed by a neutral, happy or sad facial expression that appeared 
immediately before the onset of the trial. Each video trial started with an instruction screen 
stating “press the key now and release it when you feel you cannot reach the dot anymore.” 
Next, a fixation cross appeared on the screen (300 ms), followed by a checkerboard screen of a 
forward mask (150 ms), the subliminal facial expression (30 ms), a checkerboard screen of a 
backward mask (30 ms), and the movie file. Perceptually, participants experienced the 
subliminal process as a flashing of the computer screen. A cover-story mentioning video load 
processing was applied for the visual flashing. All videos randomly appeared in three blocks, 
and participants had to judge the same video three times; each video was associated with a 
valence condition (e.g., video1-neutral; video1-positive; video1-negative), ensuring no 
repetition. A total of 90 trials were recorded (30 trials for each affective prime condition), and 
the released-key-time of the valid trials was recorded, with the video stopping immediately at 
this point. 
Data Analysis. A total of 96.25% of trials were performed, and the release-key-time of 
each one was collapsed by averaging the valid trials within each block and per the affective 
priming condition. The six Release-Time-Indexes (RTI) created were analyzed as the main 
dependent variables. 
Results and Discussion 
The RTI values were subject to a repeated ANOVA with 3 Blocks (block1, block2, 
block3) and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factors. The results revealed a 
non-significant influence of Block F(2,44) = 1.04, p =.36 in the participants’ perceived 
reaching, eliminating any confounding effects that may have occurred due to repetition and 
learning. The main effect of Prime was significant, F(2,44) = 5.05, p =.010, p2 = .19 (see 
Figure 2), and as demonstrated by the planned contrast effect (1, 1, -2; t(22) = 3.06, p = .006, d 
= 1.31), participants postponed the perceived transition of a touchable to a non-touchable area 
under the effect of negative (M = 1865.44, SD = 85.27, 95% CI [1688.59, 2042.28]) and positive 
primes (M = 1855.91, SD = 88.06, 95% CI [1673.28, 2038.53]) compared to the control prime 
(M = 1830.31, SD = 87.29, 95% CI [1649.29, 2011.38]). No significant interaction was found 
for Block and Prime, F < 1. 
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Figure 2. Release-key-time index. Affective prime effect on the release-key time, indicating 
how long participants take to estimate the dynamic dot as not-reachable. 
As expected, these findings indicate that participants’ actions were sensitive to our 
affective manipulation, which indicates that feelings were likely integrated as a source of non-
visual information when estimating reach-ability. Under both the negative and positive 
affective primes, participants postponed the transition of the action boundary. This evidence 
replicates data from Fonseca and collaborators (Fonseca, et al., 2016), who demonstrated that 
participants postponed their fit estimates of hand grasp-ability and fit-through ability under the 
same affective primes. However, our data do not replicate the valence effect found by other 
researchers (e.g., Riener et al., 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). That is, our findings did not 
demonstrate that a positive valence leads to action facilitation or that a negative valence leads 
to an inhibition of action. 
In the current design, participants had to estimate reaching with a body posture that 
restricted their movement to extending the arm from the shoulder (one degree of freedom). Our 
intention was to promote a better isolation of the effect, ensuring that participants used the 
affective information provided by our manipulation (guaranteeing a lack of feelings coming 
from the sensorimotor system). However, it is relevant to know whether the same effects will 
be able to be detect under conditions in which such restrictions are not imposed. Thus, to better 
understand if that was the case, in Study 2 we made multiple degrees of freedom available for 
half of the participants. In addition, we also created an experimental setting that allowed us to 
understand how our manipulations of affect interacted with participants’ accuracy. 
 
 
Study 2 
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In Study 2, we released participants’ postural constraints by making multiple degrees of 
freedom available to half of the participants, and we also removed the temporal constraint of 
the task by showing a static dot. Through these changes, we were able to investigate the role of 
the sensorimotor system in embodying non-visual information for perceived reach-ability. To 
this end, we asked the participants to estimate whether a dot – displayed along one of two 
opposite areas of the computer screen that afforded touch and no-touch – was perceived as 
reachable or not reachable. Immediately before each dot appearance, participants were 
subliminally primed with a neutral (non-emotional), happy, or sad face. We predicted that if, 
during affordance detection, the participants’ accuracy when fitting their action capabilities to 
the current task relied on feelings, then the actors would score differently under the effects of 
negative and positive affective primes, relative to the control prime (Fonseca et al., 2016). 
Namely, because our manipulations interfere artificially with the natural mechanisms of 
affordance detection, we expect performance to be disturbed by them. In addition, we tested 
whether the affective priming effect is moderated by postural degrees of freedom, and we 
hypothesized that if actors use bodily feelings as non-visual information when estimating 
reaching, the induced effect of primes should be strong under the lack of other bodily sources 
of information (i.e., the constraint group). 
Method 
Participants and Design. All participants signed the informed consent and received 
course credit compensation. No participant had an attention disorder, and all showed normal-
to-correct vision acuity. Two participants (one per condition) were removed from the data 
because they presented values higher than 2.5 standard deviations of the median. The final 
sample analysis was performed with 42 undergraduate females (M = 21.31, SD = 5.48 years), 
all right-handed, randomly distributed for the between conditions of the mixed design: 2 (free 
vs. constraint condition) x 3 (prime: positive, neutral, negative). There were 21 females for each 
condition, complying with the effects associated with a design calculated with an estimated 
power in the range of 0.70 to 0.90, assuming a moderate effect size (Erdfelder, et al., 1996). 
Stimulus and apparatus. Thirty-six images of a dot (30x30 pixel and 96 dpi resolution) 
overlaid by a black background (800x600 pixel and 96 dpi resolution) were used after dots were 
pre-tested for reachability by participants who were seated in a chair and performed real touches 
either in maximum bending or non-bending conditions. The dots corresponded to three subset 
areas with 12 dots aggregated in each area (see Figure 3) and were distributed on the computer 
screen as follows: high probability of touch (more than 90% real touch in the pre-test regardless 
of participants’ height and posture), low probability of touch (less than 10% real touch in the 
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pre-test regardless of participants’ height and posture), and undifferentiated probability of touch 
(ranging from 40% to 60% real touch in the pre-test according to participants’ height and 
posture).  
 
Figure 3. Disposition of dots on the computer screen and by the three areas of touch. Dots 
located in “High” and “Low” areas were subject to signal detection theory analysis. 
Subliminal masking priming used 36 facial pictures (equally representing male and 
female models) with neutral, happy and sad expressions selected from the NimStim Set of 
Facial Expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). Treatment and apparatus of pictures were the same 
as described in Study 1. 
Procedure. Reliability of the pre-tested areas followed the calibration process of Study 
1. Next, each participant was required to place their left-hand and limb on the upper tight and 
to position both the index and middle fingers on the keyboards. The participants assigned to the 
free-condition were instructed via computer screen to keep the initial position and to never 
attempt to touch the screen throughout the whole session. In turn, the participants assigned to 
the constrain-condition were secured at the chair with a vertical bar positioned at the inferior 
level of the external bone. Subsequently, these participants were also instructed via computer 
screen to keep the initial position and to never attempt to touch the screen during the whole 
session.  
To train the experimental response mode, all participants performed a training task in 
which they had to indicate as fast as possible whether the appearances of geometric objects 
were congruent with the indicated side of the screen (left or right) by pressing the “yes-green-
key” and the “no-red-key” with the index and middle fingers of the right-hand. Next, the 
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experimental task started, and participants were instructed to judge as fast as possible whether 
they could touch the tip of their right index finger to the spot on the screen that was signaled by 
the dot. When the dot was perceived as “touchable,” participants had to press the “yes-green-
key”; when the dot was perceived as “untouchable,” participants had to press the “no-red-key”. 
Participants were subliminally primed by a neutral, happy or sad facial expression that appeared 
immediately before the trial onset. Each trial started with a fixation cross on the screen (800 
ms), followed by a forward mask (300 ms), the subliminal facial expression (30 ms), a backward 
mask (50 ms) and the dot. Perceptually, participants experienced the subliminal process as a 
flashing of the computer screen. A cover-story for that flashing mentioning video load 
processing was applied. All dots randomly appeared along three blocks and participants judged 
the same dot three times, with each one associated with a valence condition (e.g., dot1-neutral; 
dot1-positive; dot1-negative), ensuring no repetition. A total of 108 trials were recorded, with 
the dots randomly appearing across three areas of touch (i.e., high, low and undifferentiated). 
Dependent variables. Each estimation provided by the participants was recorded and 
used to compute the total number of “yes” and “no” responses relative to the high and low areas 
of touch, which clearly afforded the two categories of action, reaching and non-reaching, 
respectively. The undifferentiated area was removed from analysis given that the pre-test 
indicated that reaching this area is dependent on both participants’ height and arm length and 
is also affected by postural conditions, which does not allow clear control of the experimental 
conditions. Thus, SDT analysis (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004) was performed, considering the 
action estimations of high and low areas of touch, and when a dot within a high touch area was 
estimated as reachable, a “hit” was registered in the score, whereas when a dot within a low 
touch area was estimated as reachable, a “false-alarm” was registered in the score. Sensitivity 
(d´) and bias (c´) were then calculated. 
Results and Discussion 
Data analysis was guided by the replication of the prime effects found within the 
constraint condition of Study 1, with an empirical question regarding the presence of a weaker 
effect of primes on the free condition. We also expected a general impact from the postural 
condition (between effects). To directly address these hypotheses, we ran three planned 
contrasts (within the omnibus ANOVA model) on the four dependent variables (Hit, False-
alarm, and the SDT indexes). The first contrast represents the replication of the Prime effect 
found in Study 1 on the constraint condition (i.e., neutral prime vs. positive + negative primes). 
The second contrast tests the same prime effect in the free condition. The third contrast directly 
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compares performance in the constraint and free conditions to understand how these conditions 
alone impact performance indexes. 
Hits, reaching within a reachable area 
Hit values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x constraint) as 
between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factor. The first contrast 
(2, -1, -1) represents the replication of the Prime main effect found in Study 1 for the constraint 
group, and as we expected, it was significant (t(40) = 2.35, p=.024, d = 0.74), with the control 
prime (M = 0.94, SD = 0.01, 95% CI [0.92, 0.97]) differing significantly from the positive (M 
= 0.90 SD = 0.02, 95% CI [0.86, 0.94]) and negative (M = 0.90 SD = 0.02, 95% CI [0.88, 0.94]) 
primes (see Figure 4a). However, the same effect (2, -1, -1) was not significant for the free 
group, t(40) = 1.06, p = 0.30. Additionally, Conditions (1, -1) did not impact performance, t < 
1, such that hit values were similar in the free (M = 0.92, SD = 0.02, 95% CI [0.88, 0.96]) and 
constraint (M = 0.91, SD = 0.02, 95% CI [0.87, 0.95]) conditions (see Figure 4b). 
 
Figure 4. (A) Affective prime effect on hits; (B) The affective prime effect across conditions. 
Error bars denote standard error. 
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False-Alarms, reaching within a non-reachable area 
False-alarm values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x 
constraint) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factor. The 
first contrast (2, -1, -1) suggests that there is no effect of Prime for the constrain condition. 
Additionally, we found no prime effect for the free condition (2, -1, -1; all t < 1). Condition 
promoted different levels of false-alarm (1, -1); t(40) = -2.21, p = .033, with the constraint group 
scoring more false-alarms (M = 0.17, SD = 0.03, 95% CI [0.12, 0.22]) relative to the free group 
(M = 0.09, SD = 0.03, 95% CI [0.04, 0.14]). 
Sensitiveness (d’) 
Sensitiveness values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x 
constrain) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factor. The 
higher the d’ value, the more sensitive the participants were in discriminating between a 
reachable and non-reachable dot. Overall, d’ average values were higher than two, indicating 
that the task allowed participants to effectively discriminate between the touchable and non-
touchable areas. The first contrast in Prime values for the constraints condition (2, -1, -1) 
indicates that relative to the control prime (M = 2.64, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [2.30, 2.97]), the 
participants were worse at discriminating between the boundaries of a touchable from a not-
touchable dot under both positive (M = 2.34, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [1.99, 2.69]) or negative (M = 
2.38, SD = 0.13, 95% CI [2.12, 2.63]) effects of affective primes, ( t(40) = 2.11, p = .041). The 
same contrast (2, -1, -1) was not significant for the free group, t < 1 (see Figure 5a). The 
difference between Condition (1, -1) was marginal, t(40) = 1.77, p =.08, d = 0.56, with the free 
condition group (M = 2.78, SD = 0.13, 95% CI [2.51, 3.04]) discriminating better between the 
two distinct areas of touch compared to the constraint condition group (M = 2.45, SD = 0.13, 
95% CI [2.19, 2.71]). 
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Figure 5. (A) Sensitiveness (d´) across conditions. Effects of affective prime for participants 
with one-degree of freedom (Constraint), and multiple-degrees of freedom (Free) available. (B) 
Bias (c’) main-effect. Under the effect of affective primes the bias for overestimating reaching 
was reduced. 
Bias on estimate reach-ability (c’) 
The values of the criterion (c’) adopted by the participants when estimating a dot as 
touchable or not touchable were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x 
constraint) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factor. 
Negative values of c’ revealed that participants adopted a liberal strategy (i.e., they said “yes” 
more than the ideal observer). Positive values of c’ revealed that participants adopted a 
conservative strategy (i.e., they said “no” more than the ideal observer). The negative values of 
c´ indicate that, overall, participants presented a slight bias to estimate a dot as reachable. Once 
more, we replicated the findings of study 1 with a significant effect for Prime (2, -1, -1; see 
Figure 5b), indicating that within the constraint group the control prime differs (M = -0.60, SD 
= 0.05, 95% CI [-0.70, -0.50]) from the positive (M = -0.45, SD = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.32] 
and negative (M = -0.43, SD = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.29]) primes, as signaled by the significant 
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contrast, (t(40) = -2.37, p = .02, d = 0.75). The same effect (2, -1, -1) was not presented for the 
free group (t(40) = -1.09, p = .28). No significant differences were found for Condition (1, -1; 
t < 1). 
The findings of study 1 were replicated only for the constraint condition. However, in 
addition to data from study 1, data from study 2 revealed that the impact of the affective primes 
on reducing the number of hits is due to both a reduction in the bias to respond “yes, I can 
touch” (c’) and a decrease in accuracy (d’). Taken together, these findings suggest that feelings 
are non-visual information that can integrate affordance. Because in our study the activated 
affect was induced artificially, it is understandable that the impact promoted hampers the 
participants’ accuracy. In the present study, we also made clear that the effect of prime is 
paramount when participants are under postural limitations, indicating that the sensorimotor 
system embodied non-visual information when estimating reach-ability, as well as that we are 
not able to “trick” the system with our artificial manipulations when relevant information is 
incorporated in the affordance. 
Moreover, and in agreement with previous literature (e.g., Carello et al., 1989; Gabbard 
et al., 2007, 2006; Rochat & Wraga, 1997), data from study 2 indicate that when multiple 
degrees of freedom are available, performance is changed in such a way that it calibrates 
participants’ accuracy. 
General Discussion 
In two studies, we found evidence that by subliminally manipulating feelings we are 
able to interfere with the estimation of action capabilities. This is what we would expect if 
feelings are integrated as non-visual information during the process of visual exploration that 
underlies affordance detection. These findings replicate previous results suggesting that 
feelings are part of affordance detection (Fonseca, et al., 2016) and are at odds with similar 
empirical accounts that suggest non-visual information is directly involved with visual 
information (e.g., Proffit & Linkenauger, 2013; Proffitt, 2013, 2006; Witt & Riley, 2014; Zadra 
& Clore, 2011) when visually scaling a spatial layout and anticipated action. 
The two studies demonstrated that participants’ knowledge of their action boundaries 
(Fajen, Diaz & Cramer, 2011) is not fixed but rather sensible to external and internal changes 
in the body, such as subjective experiences or feelings. 
In addition, the two studies also clarify the role of degrees of freedom presented in reach-
ability studies, in the sense that the data allow us to infer that participants withdraw embodied 
information from their sensorimotor systems, namely from multiple degrees of freedom, to 
access their action capabilities. If they have this embodied information, they will be more 
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accurate and less sensitive to interferences of the environment, such as those we created by 
priming different emotions. 
Below we discuss the limits of our designs, and to fully support our data we provide 
detailed information that is likely to be useful in future studies of similar effects. 
Our affective manipulation clearly interfered with the way that participants relied on 
their action capabilities. That is, because of our manipulation, it seems that relevant 
environmental features were obfuscated in their capacity to offer accurate information 
regarding triggered feelings. The fact that these feelings indeed interfered with the process 
suggests that participants were attending to this source of information. However, the data also 
suggest that the prime manipulation can only be effective when less sensorimotor information 
is available (constraint conditions) and when action capabilities are being used as information 
for a possible action (i.e., within the action range). This is what the data from Study 2 revealed 
by showing replicate effects only when a dot was within a possible range of action. In turn, 
when a dot was located outside of a possible range of action for humans, our mild manipulation 
of feelings did not impact the reach-ability estimations (i.e., no more false alarms were 
promoted). One possible explanation for this is that our manipulation was not enough to change 
the actor’s baseline (i.e., their sense of homeostasis).  Another possible explanation may be that 
embodied information for an impossible action is different from an affordance that encompasses 
a calibration of the action itself. Otherwise, it is possible that the perceptual system would not 
be functional, leading to misjudgments that could be dangerous. 
Therefore, changes in feelings would be expected to only moderate the accuracy of the 
perceived fit (i.e., increased variability), rather than to be engaged in the functional nature of 
the affordance (Boostman, et al., 1992).  
One focus for future studies should be on trying to understand why a simple accidental 
affective state is not enough to interfere with an impossible action? That is, whether these 
feelings are less likely to be misunderstood as part of the decision process? Or, whether these 
feelings are never able to constrain actions to a unique pattern and only able to interfere with 
the calibratory mechanism that underlies the organism-environment fit. 
Future studies should also address other features of our data, given that we found no 
difference between positive and affective states. Within the literature of affect-as-information, 
the two dimensions of affect have different informative roles. Whereas valence is embodied 
information of value (good vs. bad), arousal signals the urgency of an action (Clore & 
Hutsinger, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2008; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Therefore, the null 
distinction of positive and negative prime effects seems to indicate that, at least regarding 
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estimates of action capabilities, the arousal dimension is more informative than the valence 
dimension. If this is the case, it is possible that it was arousal that disturbed the perceptual 
mechanism creating variability in the perception of the action estimation. In this case, arousal 
is not understood only as a mobilizer of energy (Barry, Clarke, McCarthy, Selikowitz, & 
Rushby, 2005) but rather as embodied information that intensifies the role of interoception in 
visual scaling mechanisms. 
Future studies should try to compare groups with opposite sensibilities to interoception 
information (e.g., Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) and to better understand 
what features of affect exert effects when gauging affordance, and manipulate valence and 
arousal orthogonally. 
The second main body of evidence across our studies is that effects were only detected 
when multiple degrees of freedom were constrained and our affective information isolated from 
other sources of information. This clearly suggests that the kinesthetic source of information 
prevents us from being vulnerable to incidental variations present in the environment, such as 
those created by our primes, and strongly indicates that postural information interacts with 
visual information. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, our results suggest that feelings embody non-visual information and 
interfere with the estimation of action capabilities when a possible action is latent. In addition, 
the data also suggest that the sensorimotor system is integrated in the perceptual system, with 
actors relying on information coming from multiple degrees of freedom. 
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General Discussion 
 
The present thesis aimed to contribute to advancing research on psychology by 
integrating the feeling-as-information approach and the calibration of our action capabilities 
under the embodied perspective. We first address evidence regarding the anecdotal cases where 
athletes report this to occur, by inquire about the phenomenological experience associated with 
it.  That support the goal of the thesis of investigating whether the subjective experiences of 
feelings that arise as counterpart of perceptual processing influences the perception of our 
dynamic action boundaries. Evidence offer us clear suggestions of how physical lawful 
relations of the actor’s body and the environment properties constraining affordance-based 
estimations. Evidence also indicates that actors do not rely on the values of these boundaries, 
but instead searching for a window of action that seems to be modulate by feelings (likely 
comfort and safety). Within this line of reasoning we developed an approach centered in the 
perceptual processes of gauging spatial-temporal relations according to our action capabilities. 
Specifically, we investigated whether concomitantly with the visual exploration of the context, 
feelings embodied non-visual information that constraining our perceived action boundaries 
when performing perceptual-motor estimation. 
 
Overview of the empirical findings 
Study1. This study aimed to test if the anecdotal cases suggesting athletes’ decision 
based on feelings had phenomenological support. This assumption sustained our main 
hypothesis. So, we firstly tested the functional role of feelings regards our dynamic action 
boundaries via reports of previous experience of expert athletes in a field study. To this end, we 
investigated if athletes acknowledge themselves as rely on feelings as source of information 
when performing action choices in real game context. We presented feelings in contraposition 
with deliberative thinking (cognitive inferential routes) and visual perception (changes in the 
optical array). The result indicates that expert futsal players recognize feelings and thinking as 
different subjective experiences coupling with changes in the optical array (i.e., we found a 
reliable difference between feeling vs thinking; but not between feelings vs looking; and 
thinking vs. looking). We also find that a higher reliance on feelings reduces reliance on 
thinking (and vice-versa). Thus, according to our data it seems that subjective feelings are 
experiencing as being sources of information, with the reliance of athletes on feelings being 
134 
 
constrained by spatial-temporal relations of the game situations. Specifically, reliance in 
feelings as source of information is higher when associate to actions embedded in a chain of 
movements than in stationary game situations as for example penalty-kick and corner-kicks. 
Having support in both experiential and theoretical data, we approach our hypothesis in 
lab controlled conditions.  
Study2. Our first lab study aimed to understand whether action capabilities can be 
informed by feelings through assessing evidence of feelings activation in conditions that 
participants are asked to do action-based estimations of their action capabilities. In the 
experimental condition, we presented two dynamic events that created changes in optical flow 
and we tracked the electrical activity of two facial muscles that index subjective experiences of 
positivity and negativity. The tracking was performed with participants anticipated the 
perceptual-motor coupling of their hands with the spatial-temporal relations of the events (i.e., 
changes in optical flow), in contraposition with the condition in which the participants only 
experienced optical flow (i.e., without perceptual-motor coupling estimation). Results indicate 
that feelings were experienced only when the participants had to estimate perceptual-motor 
coupling. The detection of these feelings is supported by a higher activation of corrugator 
supercillis, a spontaneous index of negativity. We also observed feelings being activated at the 
end of the task associated to the zygomaticus major (spontaneous index of positivity) which 
may suggest that some discomfort was relief after the estimation be done. Importantly to our 
hypothesis, when changes in the optical flow was uncoupled from the need of the motor action 
participants experience both facial muscles demonstrated a stable activity relatively to the 
baseline. 
Study3. This study aimed to understand if the effects found in the activity of the 
corrugator was due to a subjective experience of discomfort or due to attentional mechanisms 
(i.e., more cognitive demand may be also indexed by the corrugator). We wanted to confirm 
that the corrugator activity detected at Study2 embodied information by the own nature of the 
process of making action-based estimation. Here we subliminally primed emotional faces with 
opposite valences (neutral, positive and negative) to promote feelings at the baseline of 
participants and tested the effects of the resulting feeling in biased the perceptual-motor 
coupling estimation. Results revealed that time elapsed (i.e., the indication of when the 
perceptual-motor coupling was possible) under the effects of negative priming was higher than 
neutral priming. Although not reliable, results also revealed a trend to positive valence postpone 
the perceived fit when compared with the neutral priming. This experiment made clear that by 
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interfering with natural feelings involving in the processing of action-based estimation we 
interfere with participants ability to estimate their action capabilities (i.e., the estimation of the 
perceptual-motor fit). 
Study4. In the study 4, we aimed to replicate the finding of our study 3 and increases 
the ecological validity of our dynamic event by adopting a task in which the target object was 
real (i.e., touch areas of the computer screen). Besides the temporal constraining, we also 
included a postural constraining by limit the movements of participants. The two main aims of 
the postural constraining were gather a higher experimental control via blocking moto-cognitive 
strategies for reaching far away (e.g., imagine leaning the trunk forward), but also to understand 
if under sensorimotor constraining the reliance on feelings activated by our manipulations could 
be strong. Results indicated that under the effects of negative priming the participants once 
more elicited the time to perceived when a touchable dot become untouchable relatively to the 
neutral priming. The effect of positive prime was also significant in postpone the perceived 
transition relatively to the neutral priming. Again, this is clear evidence that by interfering with 
the affective experience of participants we disrupt their ability to infer action capabilities. 
Study5. Finally, and keeping the same subliminal affective priming manipulation, in 
our last study we aimed to investigated if conditions that provide less cues to participants to 
evaluate their action capabilities favors the detection of the use of feelings as source of 
information. Using a static event that did not provided changes in the optical array during the 
perceptual-motor estimation (less temporal constraint), and additionally releasing the postural 
constraining of the half of participants, we found that the group with postural constraining have 
more difficult to perceive an impossible location as non-touchable. Results also indicated that 
this same group was more susceptive to the effects of negative and positive priming when 
comparing their results with the neutral priming condition. Specifically, in this situation we 
found that participants with postural constraining had difficult to distinguish the boundaries of 
a touchable from a not-touchable location and they had also underestimated touchable points in 
reliable ways. The same patterns were not found in the group without postural constraining. 
This pattern of results suggests that our manipulations that were shown to interfere with how 
feelings naturally inform action capabilities are more powerful when no other source of 
information is available to participants. 
 
What this set of findings reveals? 
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Firstly, taken together the results of the correlational study, the psychophysiological 
measures, as well as behavioral measures in the experimental settings, support our hypothesis 
that feelings embodied functional information regards our own action capabilities and have 
direct impact in the estimation of the perceptual-motor coupling. Secondly, studies suggest that 
this latent information of our body language seems to be more prominent when the temporal 
window does not allow the overlap of other higher cognitive processes. That is, when action 
estimations are highly constraining by dynamic and unstable spatial-temporal relations of the 
environment (i.e., shorter than 1s). 
Taken together, these findings corroborate to the body of research demonstrating that 
immediate feelings of easy or difficulty that people experience associated every cognitive 
process as perceiving, thinking and memory retrieving can also influence action capabilities 
(e.g., Clore, et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 2007, 2003, 1983). Therefore, our data extends a 
body of evidence that is mostly anchored in evaluative judgments that decouple perception from 
motor actions, and highlight the importance to investigate the nature and mechanism of feelings 
as information also when perception is intended to guide action (Zadra & Clore, 2011). In 
addition, and because our investigation is also related to action capabilities, our data parallel 
with findings of the embodied perception account (e.g., Proffitt, 2013; 2006) and the 
assumption that perception for guide action is not sustaining by unimodal information (i.e., one 
unique array), but rather cross-modal information that integrates a myriad of neuro-physiologic 
processes of the body (e.g., Stoffregen & Bardy, 2001; Witt & Riley, 2014). Indeed, we think 
that it is the felt experience that turns possible access information regards a myriad of bodily 
processes underlying our active interaction with the surrounding in terms of action possibilities. 
We address the main singular contributions of our findings in the light of evidences of the 
relevant literature. 
 Increasingly, different fields of the literature have shown that sensorial information that 
arises as counterpart of neurophysiological and neurobiological changes when in interaction 
with the surrounding is able to index positive and negative information regards survival and the 
energetic economy of the mind and behavior (e.g., Barrett, et al., 2007; Clore, 1992; Damasio, 
1996; Panksepp, 2010b; Russel, 2009). All our five studies indicate that feelings indeed can 
support actions. The idea of visual information scale by nonvisual information grounded on our 
body physiology and shaped by intentions (Proffitt & Linkenauger,2013) is in line with 
propositions that ocular heuristics are not enough to guide action prospectively but must 
considering, for instance, the dynamics of our action boundaries (Fajen, 2007a; 2005a). 
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Findings from Study 1 indicate that if optical flow has a role it is not perceived by athletes to 
be taken apart of other phenomena of the body. When performing in game context expert futsal 
athletes acknowledge feelings as source of information regards their own action potential. If 
relevant to inform about the role of feelings in action-based estimation, it is worthwhile to 
acknowledge that awareness would not be necessary for feelings to have an informative role 
(e.g., see for example Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Pankseep, 2010). The ebbs and flow of 
subjective experience can be direct informative even without introspection and higher 
constructive processes associated to basic emotional episodes. In this sense, feelings can direct 
specify information just like retinal transformations translated by changes on tau variable can 
specify collision without the awareness of actors (e.g., Savelsberg, et al., 1991).  
 In this sense, our data indicates that the reliance of athletes on experiential feelings 
arises in contraposition to the experience of thinking (with both being concomitantly to visual 
information). Also, feelings become more salient as source when actors perform within a chain 
of actions and the access to their action capabilities is constrain by a decisional context featured 
to very short time windows and higher unpredictability. 
Over the literature the idea of expert athletes using a non-reflective and immediate route 
of information in a course of action has not rarely being related to intuitions, in the sense of 
some “automatized entity” that expert acquired and taking control of their decisions (e.g., 
Dreyfus, 1997). However, this idea of “not-thinking” has been criticizing by researchers who 
have argue that athletes might shift attentional focus from a reflexive body awareness to a more 
pre-reflexive (e.g., Montero, 2010; Toner, Montero, Moran, 2015). Data from Study1 indeed 
indicates that different sources of information regarding body movement awareness can co-
exist. From the perspective that feelings are a route of cognition (e.g., Duncan & Barrett, 2007; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2007), this may be understood as all bodily processes having cognitive 
informative value. Evidences have indicated that there is more in cognition that the content of 
thoughts influencing our behavior (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For instance, the subjective 
experience of positivity due increasing sensorimotor fluency can support action by constrain 
actors to fast action-perception couplings (e.g., Canon, Hayes, & Tipper, 2010; Regenberg, et 
al., 2012). It is only under the perspective of a disembodied mind (e.g. Frazier & Fodor, 1978). 
where information is abstract, amodal and functionally independent from the sensorimotor 
system, that feelings (subjective) can be envisage as split from cognition (objective). There is 
no such a thing as “purely feeling” and “purely thinking” routes. Simply, one aspect of the 
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processing can become more relevant than other because that is what the situational constraints 
requires. 
In this sense, the literature has provided several models sustaining informational routes 
for judgment and decision making that are more slowly or faster (for a critical review see Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). It has also been pointed that in time, feelings overcoming higher cognitive 
processes (e.g., inferences) because they are anchored in minimum cognitive processes (e.g., 
Zajonc, 1981; Pham, et al., 2001). Therefore, feelings can be much more usable for online than 
future decisions (e.g., Chang & Pham, 2013) and become more relevant when the situational 
constrain make processing conditions more difficult. For example, regards the role of feelings 
in consumer behavior, Avnet and collaborators (Avnet, et al., 2012) indicate that influence of 
feelings increases under lower process of information, time pressure or cognitive load (i.e., lack 
of resources). Thus, the higher reliance on feelings as functional information indicated by 
athletes, can merely reflect a suitable route to the contextual circumstances that athletes by their 
own choice and expertise classified as fast, complex, uncontrollable and uncertainty. 
 Results from our Study3, Study4 and Study5 demonstrated that our affective priming 
manipulation interferes with the natural process of estimation of action capabilities. This 
finding corroborates the evidence demonstrating embodied effects in action-perception (e.g., 
Proffitt, 2006; Stefanucci, Gagnon, & Lessard, 2011; White et al., 2013), and specifically 
associating direct effects of feelings and emotional states in action capabilities (e.g., Geuss, et 
al., 2016; Graydon, et al., 2012; Pijpers, et al., 2006). 
However, it is worthwhile to knowledge that although our manipulations interfered with 
the natural process of action scaling, our effects did not follow evidence on affective priming 
showing congruence (match) to be associated with facilitation, and incongruence (mismatch) 
to inhibition (e.g., Fazio, 2001). our data revealed a higher activation of corrugator when 
estimating dynamic events, which is pointed as a index of a negativitivity (e.g., Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Hellera, Greischara, Honora, Anderlea, & Davidson, 2011; 
Larsen et al., 2003) and that might be underlying the action-based estimation. Being so, 
relatively to the control priming condition in Study 3 and Study4 it should be expected the 
facilitation of the process at the negative priming (less elapsed time to the perceived fit), and 
an inhibition of the process at the positive priming (higher elapsed time to the perceived fit). 
Instead we found that not only the negative condition interfered in the action estimation 
postponing the perceptual-motor coupling in a reliable way, as well as the positive condition 
also presents the trend to follow the same direction of the negative priming. According to the 
139 
 
sensorimotor simulation the pattern of delay found in our data might have occurred because the 
same sensorimotor resources were involved in the process (Körner, et al., 2015) and so priming 
manipulation might have simulated the embodied information trigger by the estimation 
processing. However, this explanation only makes sense if we consider the negative prime 
condition (see results of Study2) and does not fit with the results of the positive prime condition. 
Although future studies are needed to explain the positive priming effect some 
speculation can be provided about our data. In a singular study linking feeling-as-information 
and visually estimation, Riener and collaborators (Riener, et al.,  2011) found a mood congruent 
effect on visual estimation of fixed spatial relations (i.e., sad mood leads hills to be perceived 
stepper). This paradigm differs from ours that applied action-based judgments over dynamic 
events (i.e., facing changes on spatial-temporal relations). That could be a first possible 
explanation to our divergent results. 
Another possible explanation for our findings may occur it is because of the nature of 
our dependent measure. Unlike mostly findings from socio cognitive literature that investigate 
processual feelings associating to mental operations as memory retrieval or fluency (e.g., 
Garcia-Marques, et al., 2004; Schwarz, 2004; Winkelman & Cacioppo, 2001), our findings are 
underlying by a body-mind unit in which sensorimotor information exerts a real and direct 
constraining into the perceptual processes. Changes on our action potential can direct change 
our perception of a same physical dimension (see Turvey, 2004). Thus, our judgments are not 
about preferences and attitudes in which visual perception is concerning with structural features 
of the layout in terms of beauty, liking and other kind of preferences (for a review see Schwarz 
& Clore, 2003). Instead, we have action-based judgments in a context that perception is 
intended (and interplay) to action in online basis, and it is likely that another pattern of 
information become more relevant (for differences between visual cues for perception intend 
to action and non-action see for example Araújo, Davids, & Passos, 2005; Dicks, Button & 
Davis, 2010). 
Data from Study2 indicate that action-based estimation of dynamic events seems to be 
underlying by a high activity of the corrugator supercilli, whereas purely changes on optical 
flow (decoupling from action estimation) does not. Also, graphic inspection illustrated that 
activity of corrugator started from the baseline and our Study3 indicated that it seems to occur 
because participants have anticipated knowledge of the task on demand. The higher activity of 
corrugator seems to embodiment information of discomfort, disfluency and increased mental 
effort (e.g., Larsen, et al., 2003; Dimberg et al., 2002; Topolinsk & Stracks, 2015; Waterink & 
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van Boxtel, 1994). Thus, our data might indicate that action-based judgment of dynamic events 
was underlying by a negative index, and generate higher energetic demands (i.e., activation) 
into the system (e.g., Hajcak, et al., 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Thus, we speculate that our 
positive and negative priming might interplayed with the negativity index elicited by the 
experimental task (Cohen et al., 2008) and increased the energetic demand in the system.  
Panksepp (2010b) states that in its roots feelings are intrinsic values in which the various 
positive affects indicate returning to “comfort zones” that support survival, whereas negative 
affect reflects “discomfort zones” that may impair survival (and both sustain secondary and 
tertiary process in terms of cognition). According to Eleanor Gibson (2000) “economical pickup 
and use of information can be described as a kind of minimum principle (p.299)” in which a 
principle of reduction of uncertainty “is achieved by discovery of unit, order, and economy (our 
emphasis)” (p.301). Thus, it is likely that feelings of discomfort arise and constraining the 
system to compensate and adopt a more economic/comfortable pattern of perceptual-motor 
coupling. 
Translated to our designs it means a preference for grasping small ball (shrinking in 
size) and fit-through large openings (increasing in size) in Study3, and a trend to the remaining 
on a more comfortable zone in Study4. Indeed, we found a higher elapsed time for estimations 
of perceptual-motor fit under the negative and positive priming in Study3, and a higher elapsed 
time to perceive transition from a touchable to a non-touchable location of the scree in Study 4. 
To note, the effect size associated to the negative priming was always higher (d=0.53 in Study3 
and d=0.41 in Study4) than the positive priming (d=0.39 in Study3 and d=0.29 in Study4). Over 
the literature there is indications that corrugator is able to be higher activate at the low arousal 
condition of our priming faces than zygomaticus (Fujimura, Sato & Suzuki, 2010). It has also 
been founding faster (Mavratzakis, Herbert &Walla, 2016) and large (Lu, Zhang, Hu & Luo, 
2011) amplitudes of activation associated to the negative priming. So, overall it is likely that 
negative priming induced higher noise in the system that positive, explaining the pattern of 
results found in our Study3 and Study4. Finally, data from Study5 also fits in this line of 
thinking, although we cannot guarantee the same baseline conditions of Study3 and Study4 
given that we applied a static event and partially remove postural constraining. Results of 
Study5 indicates that participants were more conservative at the positive and negative priming 
than at neutral condition, and priming effects were only reliable at the conditions associated to 
postural constraining (discomfort). 
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If that is what really happened to our findings, our data corroborate with propositions 
that energetic expenditure captured at the psychological dimension of comfort-discomfort 
embodied information to perceived action (e.g., Mark et al., 1997; Warren, 1984; Zadra & 
Clore, 2011) and also to visual estimations of the spatial-layout (e.g., Proffitt, 2006). Because 
participants are not aware of priming manipulation and the time window available to estimate 
the fit with the dynamic events was short (i.e., less than 1s) we think be difficult that our effects 
are sub-product of supplementary cognitive process as bias and artifacts applied to verbal 
judgments (Durgin, et al., 2009; Heft, 1993).  
Over the action-perception literature researchers have investigated the assumption of 
perception grounded in multimodal arrays rather than unimodal, with actors learning to become 
sensitive to a higher order variable that is supporting by cross-modal information at low level 
(e.g., Stoffregen & Bardy, 2001; Witt & Riley, 2014). This proposition is not too distant of what 
have also been suggested for feelings. For instance, to Barrett et al. (2007) feelings emerge from 
the dynamic interplay of multimodal changes on neurophysiological and neurobiological level 
(i.e., interoceptive level) in interaction with information of the surrounding (exteroceptive 
level), and it is functionally designed for the immediate action. 
Along of the literature on action-perception is not rarely to find terms as “confidence”, 
“comfort”, “sensibility” and “felt” in the interpretation of results of different experiments. All 
them suggest the experiential nature of the information underlying the process. Likely the latent 
variable associated with those concepts is their representation on a valence dimensional space 
of feeling good or bad. Not having conscious accesses to the metabolic processes at the level 
of cells regarding, for example our respiratory processes, we can develop sensitive to the felt 
experience that arises as functional information associated to different states of our respiratory 
processes (see for example Barrett, 2009), and make a constructive process above it. In this 
sense, the grounded perspective of cognition (e.g., Barsalou 2008) have defend the idea that 
concepts as “easy” and “hard” are rooted in sensorimotor experiences acquired in real 
interactions with the world, just as language (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). As, White and 
collaborators (White, et al., 2013) found, rather than have a main effect of low-order parameter 
as walking rate, grade inclination and optical change, it was the felt experiencing of energetic 
expenditure capture by the multimodal ration (i.e.,  energy expenditure by optical information) 
that directly impacted in the perceived distance of their participants. That is in line with findings 
demonstrating that feelings of comfort or discomfort underlying action (Mark et al., 1997; 
Petrovic, et al., 2015). 
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In line with Proffitt (2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013) who propose the body as the 
scale metric embodied non-visual information to perception, we add that this sensibility is 
feelings, and feelings are the intrinsic metric. Thus, supporting by this literature we reinforce 
the idea that is not so much the valence of our manipulation per se that was effective in the 
priming manipulation (Study3, Study4, Study5), but rather how our priming information 
interplay to the diagnostic feeling of comfort or discomfort of our action capabilities relatively 
to the task in hand. In adopting this perspective, we could interpret that our priming 
manipulation was interfered with the high-order variable that emerge from the interplay of other 
low-order variables as the optical flow and the time constraint. Thus, and like we see in our data 
(Study3, Study4 and Study 5), the felt experience could be intensify by the priming rather than 
guided by the priming). In addition, in our Study5 our design might be changed some low-order 
variables that could be feeding the felt experience, namely time pressure and optical flow 
information. Thus, as already mention previously, it is likely that we facilitated the task demand 
in such a way that priming information (i.e., another low order variable) just had effect when 
the postural movement of participants was freeze. Mantel et al. (2015) found that confidence of 
participants about their action judgments are associated to stable relations in the actor-
environment system. That is, when for example the target is very far or very near regards our 
action capabilities. In turn, confidence decrease when the relation is ambiguous and both 
conditions co-exist. Thus, under ambiguous situation the vulnerability of the system to noise 
(as those induced by our priming manipulation) can be higher (Kelso, 1995), which could be a 
possible explanation to our findings.  
Thus, in Study3 and Study4 our design was grounded in more unstable/uncertainty 
condition given the features of our fast-dynamic event. The same could be extend to Study5 
when participants had their postural constraining frozen, and loss of stability happening because 
information anchoring in the usual body condition was remove. At these conditions, our 
priming activation seems to be more informative (as low-order variable) to the general felt 
experience underlying the perceived fit. In turn, when participants had both constraining 
remove (i.e., static event plus free postural condition in Study5), our priming seems not be 
enough to induce noise and disturb perceive fit. We speculated that it might be happened 
because the felt experience was grounded in other low order variables that we did not control. 
To better understand if that is what really happened more work is needed.  
 
Limitations of our findings 
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A first limitation to generalization of our study it is the fact the we did not approach an 
effective action, but only anticipate actions. We are aware that in real life a different 
combination of results could be found, either because other variables could become more 
significant in the processes or because the feelings experienced in real life context are not the 
same elicited in laboratory or training sessions. However, because data generating in both, the 
feeling-as-information approach and the action-based estimations have largely adopted similar 
experimental designs, we consider that our data reveals important contributions to the literature 
given that we adopted the strategy of provide different measures around the phenomena 
investigate, and adopted dynamic events that change in online basis to provide the necessary 
optical information (e.g., changes in the edges with a fixed background, depth, colors). Also, 
although in Study1, Study2 and Study3 our events lack on ecological validity in terms of real 
action (i.e., 3D images and 2D images), in Study 4 and Study 5 action estimation were made 
through a more realistic scenario and participants have available information to perform real 
touches at the target areas of the computer screen if the experimental protocol allow them to do 
it and as indeed they perform in the calibration phase. Thus, a good path of new research could 
be to follow paradigms that have measure not only action-based estimation regards an action 
capabilities, but also real action (e.g., Geuss, et al., 2016). 
Another important limitation to our data is that only at Study1 and Study2 we have better 
control of the participants baseline. In the Study 1 this control was made by statistical proceeds 
by control random effects at the mix-model, whereas in the Study2 the facial muscles activation 
starting to be tracking before the onset point and all calculations were made relatively to this 
phase. Our findings suggest that baseline conditions might be crucial to understand how feelings 
interplay with action capabilities in functional terms.  
Therefore, a traditional approach to investigate action capabilities has been determine 
the actors baseline in terms of distinct body morphology as for example “taller” vs “short” 
group in absolute heights (Warren, 1984), or in terms of maximum action boundaries, as for 
example the group “near” vs “far” when considering maximum reaching (Mantel et al., 2015). 
Another classical procedure that has been adopted to equate participants of different body scales 
it is identify a threshold point between the target action capability and the total number of 
attempts (e.g., 50% ratio of successful; Ishak et al., 2008) or the absolute critical boundary of 
each participants (e.g., Mark et al., 1997). We lack on this precisely control, and we also lack 
in understanding how feelings associated to the participants action capabilities and induced by 
the task could interplay with the estimation of the perceptual-motor adjustment. 
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A third main point is that we only know how our priming might be interfered with 
feelings by an indirect route. That is, only with supporting of evidences coming from other 
literatures. Although we have an affective measure of the task in the Study2 (i.e., EMG), we 
did not have the same measure for the interplay of the priming and the task.  This remove some 
power of our discussion and indicates the need of studies with a better control of the effects of 
affective priming in fast action-based estimation processes as well measuring feelings 
underlying the processes. 
Finally, a last important issue that our priming was not informative at the valence level, 
and positive and negative presented a similar trend. So, we did not understand what the priming 
manipulation was adding to the processes in terms of feelings. Our data only allow us to 
demonstrate that feelings interfere, but have not evidences of how? For example, whether 
priming really increased activation a triggered a higher energetic demand as we speculated or 
not? Or if or positive and negative priming had the effect expect, that is sad face induce 
negativity and happy face induced positivity? For instance, manipulating energetic states 
through other neurophysiological sources grounded in interoceptive feelings that supports 
hedonic experiences of positivity and negativity, as blood sugar (Schnall, et al., 2010) or blood 
oxygen (e.g., White et al., 2013). 
 
Future avenues   
Based on our findings and relatively to what the literature offers to us as evidence, we 
envisage two main open questions and how future studies could be set to provided evidences 
that support answering them. 
Feelings as online information (not before and not after). Evidences of feelings as 
embodied effects on perception intend to action (e.g., visual scaling of the spatial layout or 
action-based estimation) have been support by two kinds of experimental designs: asking 
participants to recall their felt experiencing after each estimation or action performance (e.g., 
Mark et al. 1997; Mantel et al., 2015; Pijpers et al., 2006); or manipulating the felt experience 
on participants baseline before the task as we did in our priming studies (e.g., Graydon et al., 
2012). For example, Mark et al. (1997) instructed participants to rate 3 point-felt comfort after 
each reaching (i.e., a post-effect) being completed (i.e., 1-felt very natural or comfortable; 2- 
felt slightly unnatural or uncomfortable, and 3-reach felt awkward or the block was 
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unreachable. In turn, Graydon et al (2012) used both a breath tasking a rating scaling to induce 
and control anxiety states just before estimation of action capabilities.  
Therefore, there is a lack of understanding feelings as functional information that 
underlying the process of action capabilities in on-line basis and by its own nature. A good 
alternative to solve it could be step-back and simply measuring feelings during different action-
based estimations conditions, which means turning the feelings our dependent variable and the 
action capabilities our independent variable. In this sense, we avoid manipulating feelings at 
the baseline and stop to tracking its effects, as well as the interference of post-perceptual 
cognitive processes more susceptible with post-effect measures (see Philbeck & Witt, 2015).  
 Our designs could replicate tasks that constraining body postural (Mark, et al., 1997) 
or creates effective changes on action boundaries via the addition of tool in reaching estimations 
(e.g., Witt, et al., 2005), as well as wearing large-hand prosthesis to manipulated hand size (e.g., 
Ishak, et al., 2008) for grasping or fit-through estimation. Concomitantly to the action-based 
estimation we could measure facial activity muscles that index feelings of positivity and 
negativity in on-line basis (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986). Additionally, we could 
also measure feelings elicited at the action-based estimation indirectly via an affective priming 
paradigm (e.g., Fazio, 2001) immediately after the action-based estimation to capture the 
positivity or negativity of estimations pre-test as clearly possible and impossible, as well as 
unstable (i.e., where possible-impossible co-exist). 
Feelings as macro-order or latent variable. The idea of feelings as non-visual 
information embodied information that constraining our perceived action boundaries fits with 
evidences indicating that actors are not sensitive to changes at specific low-order variables (i.e., 
amodal or grounded in unique pattern of sensorial information), but rather a macro or high-
order variable that extend across multiple and redundant forms of information (e.g., Mantel, et 
al., 2015; Stroffregen & Bardy, 2001; White, et al., 2013; Witt & Riley, 2014). Not rarely, 
researchers have use the “felt experience” to both instruct participants or explaining findings 
(e.g., White et al., 2013; Mark et al, 1997). Thus, because metabolic cost has been associated 
as embodied information when anticipated action  (e.g., Proffitt, 2006; Warren, 1984) or 
choosing affordances (Whitagen, et al., 2012), and interoceptive awareness being associated 
with feelings (e.g. Craig, 2011; Herbert, Pollatos & Schandry, 2007) it could valuable explore 
the linking between sensibility to feelings as a latent or high-order variable, physiologic changes 
in terms of energetic expenditure and the perceived action capabilities (i.e., perceptual-motor 
coupling). 
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This latent variable could be isolated if the several measures that have been reported are 
directly assessed at the same time. Methodologically, overcoming this differences in scale of 
measurement of each variable, a confirmatory hierarchical factorial analysis could directly test 
our assumption.  But an alternative avenue to investigate it could be to assess participants 
sensitivity regards their felt experience (e.g., Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; 
Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) and expecting that 
it be related with the physiological indexes that have been addressed as related at the action-
perception features. For instance, by replicating the breathing task of Greydon et al. (2012) and 
manipulating reach-ability of static and dynamic events, we could concomitantly have the 
measuring of the action-based estimation and the measuring of such sensibility to feelings. We 
should expect the last variable to moderate the expected effects, in such that only the high 
sensible individuals will completely replicate previous results. Another alternative study could 
be achieved by manipulating the breathing task to induce higher energetic demands (e.g., 
Greydon, et al., 2012) or less energetic demands (e.g., Goldin & Gross, 2010) and see how high 
and low sensible participants will react regarding action-based estimation when facing static 
and dynamic-events (low and high temporal pressure). 
In sum, the approach followed in this dissertation, can be understood as a first approach 
to relate the social cognitive literature regarding feelings as information with the literature being 
developed with regard action-perception abilities. From this relationship, we bring more 
questions to the literature than answers, but expect to turn clear both the fact that feelings have 
a role in action capability estimations and that the different literature will gain with establishing 
new bridges between them.
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Appendix A 
Acting fast on feelings! Naïve theories of expert futsal players about feelings as 
information 
 
Material 
 
Pilot Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1ª Parte: Lista de acções 
 
Durante o desempenho no desporto existe uma regulação da acção com base na informação do ambiente, isto é, o atleta em 
função do ambiente muda a sua decisão de agir e acção. Alguns exemplos: para o atirador uma mudança da  acção é premir 
o gatilho; para o jogador de futebol,  uma mudança da acção é rematar à baliza ou fazer um passe; para um surfista uma 
mudança da acção é ficar em pé na prancha ou arriscar uma manobra na onda; para um nadador uma mudança da acção é 
acelerar aos metros finais ou sair do bloco. 
Por favor, analise o seu desempenho no desporto como praticante e identifique 5 (cinco) mudanças de acção que realiza 
habitualmente numa competição da sua modalidade. 
 
 
 [Acção 1] :   
 [Acção 2] :   
 [Acção 3] :   
 [Acção 4] :   
 [Acção 5] :   
Obrigada pela sua participação!  Por favor, prossiga para a segunda parte deste questionário. 
 
 
2ª Parte: Capacidade de agir no dia-a-dia 
 
 
Caro(a) participante:  
As suas respostas são confidenciais e anónimas. A sua participação é voluntária, não envolve riscos e é 
indispensável para o sucesso desta investigação. Agradecemos a sua colaboração. 
Este questionário é constituído por três partes e demora cerca de 15 minutos a ser respondido:  1ª parte:  
lista de acções; 2ª parte:  capacidade de agir no dia-a-dia; 3ª parte:  capacidade de agir no desporto. 
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Nesta parte do questionário pense na acção que lhe fornecemos e avalie de que modo acede à sua capacidade de agir em 
cada uma das situações.  
Queremos que reflita sobre o momento exato da mudança da acção. Ao reflectir considere apenas que nesse momento a 
informação sobre a sua própria capacidade de agir pode ocorrer por três vias distintas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COM BASE NO PENSAR COM BASE NO PURO OLHAR COM BASE NO SENTIR 
(elaboração, cálculo, reflexão) (puramente visão) (sensações corporais indefinidas, intuição, instinto) 
Capto a informação com o olhar 
(vejo), uso o conhecimento das 
minhas capacidades de acção 
gerais e calculo se consigo agir. 
 
Ao captar a informação com o 
olhar (ver), já acesso directamente 
à minha capacidade de agir. Faço-
o instantaneamente sem pensar 
ou sentir. 
 
Capto a informação com o olhar 
(vejo) e sinto que consigo agir 
naquele momento. 
 
 
 
Exemplo de acção: ATRAVESSAR A RUA. 
 
 
Se for com base no pensar: 
estimo o espaço entre os 
carros; conheço a minha 
velocidade de deslocação 
habitual; faço um cálculo 
mental de forma a chegar a 
uma resposta adequada de 
acção e de agir. 
 
 
Se for com base no puro 
olhar: ao perceber o espaço 
instantaneamente percebo 
que consigo atravessar. 
 
Se for com base no sentir: 
ao perceber o espaço sinto 
que é naquele momento que 
devo atravessar. 
 
Agora use as três definições apresentadas e considere cada uma das acções que estão no quadro abaixo. Caracterize aquilo 
que habitualmente  se passa consigo no exato momento descrito.. Para o efeito, em primeiro lugar, seleccione com um “X” a 
via, ou as vias (pensar, puro olhar, sentir), pela qual no exato momento da acção acede ao conhecimento da sua capacidade 
de agir. A seguir, refira a intensidade da(s) via(s) escolhida fazendo um círculo “O” em torno do número seleccionado da 
escala. 
 
 
CENÁRIO 1:  IMAGINE QUE VAI ATRAVESSAR UMA RUA COM MUITOS CARROS. 
 
 
*Acção 1: Estou parado e começo a atravessar a rua.  (Com que base agiu?) 
 
  Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 Com base no puro olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
 
*Acção 2: Estou a atravessar a rua a uma dada velocidade e acelero ao ver um carro.  (Com que base agiu?) 
 
  Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
  Com base no puro olhar  Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
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  Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
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CENÁRIO 2:  IMAGINE QUE VAI PASSAR POR UMA PORTA QUE SE ESTÁ A FECHAR. 
 
 
*Acção 1: Vejo o espaço e concluo que não tenho tempo para passar.  (Com que base agiu?) 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
 
*Acção 2: Ao aproximar-me da porta necessito de virar o corpo para passar.  (Com que base agiu?) 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
 
3ª Parte: Capacidade-de-agir no desporto 
 
 
Pense agora no seu desempenho como praticante relativamente às actividades que descreveu na TAREFA 1.  
No momento exato de realizar a mudança da acção descrita, como acede à sua capacidade de agir? 
Para responder, pedimos-lhe que escreva cada uma das mudanças de acção que listou na 1ª parte na ordem 
correspondente e depois execute a mesma tarefa que realizou na 2ª parte deste questionário. 
 
01.  
(liste aqui a sua acção): 
                                     
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . 
No exato momento em que desempenha esta acção com que base age e qual a intensidade desta via? 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro-olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
02.  
(liste aqui a sua acção): 
                                     
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . 
No exato momento em que desempenha esta acção com que base age e qual a intensidade desta via? 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro-olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
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03.  
(liste aqui a sua acção):                 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ . 
No exato momento em que desempenha esta acção com que base age e qual a intensidade desta via? 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro-olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
04.  
(liste aqui a sua acção):                                    
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . 
No exato momento em que desempenha esta acção com que base age e qual a intensidade desta via? 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro-olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
05.  
(liste aqui a sua acção):                                 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . 
    No exato momento em que desempenha esta acção com que base age e qual a intensidade desta via? 
 
   Com base no pensar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no puro-olhar   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
   Com base no sentir   
Pouco 1 2 3 4 5 Muito 
 
 
 
Para finalizar a sua participação informe por favor: 
 
 
1. É praticante federado?   SIM    NÃO          
 
2. Indique o seu desporto: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
3. Tempo de prática? _ _ _ _  (anos).                    
 
4. Horas de treino por semana (valor médio)? _ _ _ _  
 
5. Data de Nascimento (dd/mm/aa):  _ _ _ _ /_ _ _ _ /_ _ _ _ _ _ _                        
 
6. Sexo:   M   F 
 
 
OBRIGADA PELA SUA PARTICIPAÇÃO! 
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Main Study 
Survey Part 1. 
Imagine-se em jogo a realizar a ação do jogador(a) em posse de bola na fotografia: 
 
Neste exacto momento o quanto acha que durante o jogo esta sua acção é desencadeada por: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey Part 2. 
Sinta-se a realizar a ação que está apresentada na fotografia: 
 Esta é uma acção: 
Automática 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pensada 
Controlável 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Incontrolável 
Dinâmica 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Estática 
Simples 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complexa 
Instável 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Estável 
Previsível 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Imprevisível 
Via Pouco Muito 
Pensar  
(elaboração, cálculo, reflexão) 1 2 3 4 5 
Olhar 
(visão pura) 1 2 3 4 5 
Sentir 
(sensações corporais indefinidas, intuição, instinto) 1 2 3 4 5 
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Survey Part 3 
Para finalizar responda as próximas quatro questões a respeito de suas características pessoais e atléticas: 
Qual o seu género? 
 Feminino  Masculino 
 
Qual o seu ano de nascimento? (4 dígitos)  
 
 
Há quantos anos é atleta de futsal? (2 dígitos)  
 
 
Qual é a sua carga horária total de treino no futsal em uma semana (7 dias)? 
 1 a 2 horas 
 2 a 3 horas 
 3 a 4 horas 
 4 a 5 horas 
 Superior a 5 horas 
 
 
 
Images presented as Game-Situations. 
1x1. 
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1x2. 
  
High-Kick. 
   
Ground-Kick. 
   
Dribling. 
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Feiting. 
  
Dead-Ball. 
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Statistical Analysis 
 
 
Pilot Study 
 
Athlete Statement. The score of each source was subjected of a Repeated Measure 
ANOVA with 3 Intensity-of-Sources (thinking, looking, feeling) as within factor. A Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient was also computed to assess the relationship of 
Intensity-of-Sources between the three variables: thinking, looking, and feeling. Next, we 
counted how many times each participant indicated rely and not rely on thinking and feeling 
as an informational source, and the total score of “yes” and “no” of these sources was subject 
of a Chi-Square test of independence to examine relationship between thinking and feeling. 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
SOURCE_POS 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Pensar 
2 Puro_Olhar 
3 Sentir 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N
Pensar 1,90 2,101 81
Puro_Olhar 1,41 1,973 81
Sentir 2,52 2,080 81
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchl
y's W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse
-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
SOURCE_POS ,993 ,530 2 ,767 ,993 1,000 ,500
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized 
transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: SOURCE_POS 
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b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. 
Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
SOURCE_POS Sphericity 
Assumed 
50,206 2 25,103 4,952 ,008 
Greenhouse
-Geisser 
50,206 1,987 25,271 4,952 ,008 
Huynh-
Feldt 
50,206 2,000 25,103 4,952 ,008 
Lower-
bound 
50,206 1,000 50,206 4,952 ,029 
Error(SOURCE_POS) Sphericity 
Assumed 
811,128 160 5,070   
Greenhouse
-Geisser 
811,128 158,9
36
5,103   
Huynh-
Feldt 
811,128 160,0
00
5,070   
Lower-
bound 
811,128 80,00
0
10,139   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 916,807 1 916,807 366,979 ,000 
Error 199,860 80 2,498   
 
Estimates
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
SOURCE_POS Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 1,901 ,233 1,437 2,366
2 1,407 ,219 ,971 1,844
3 2,519 ,231 2,059 2,979
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Pairwise Comparisons
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) 
SOURCE_POS 
(J) 
SOURCE_POS 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b
95% Confidence Interval for 
Differenceb
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 ,494 ,345 ,469 -,350 1,338 
3 -,617 ,368 ,292 -1,517 ,282 
2 1 -,494 ,345 ,469 -1,338 ,350 
3 -1,111* ,348 ,006 -1,962 -,261 
3 1 ,617 ,368 ,292 -,282 1,517 
2 1,111* ,348 ,006 ,261 1,962 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
 
Case Processing Summary
 
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Pensar * Puro_Olhar 81 100,0% 0 0,0% 81 100,0% 
Pensar * Sentir 81 100,0% 0 0,0% 81 100,0% 
 
Pensar * Puro_Olhar 
Symmetric Measures
 Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. Exact Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -,162 ,109 -1,459 ,148c ,150 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman 
Correlation 
-,164 ,109 -1,474 ,144c .d 
N of Valid Cases 81     
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation. 
d. Cannot be computed because there is insufficient memory.
 
Pensar * Sentir 
Symmetric Measures
 Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. Exact Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -,254 ,110 -2,335 ,022c ,023 
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Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman 
Correlation 
-,220 ,113 -2,006 ,048c .d 
N of Valid Cases 81     
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation. 
d. Cannot be computed because there is insufficient memory.
 
Case Processing Summary
 
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
condition * source 162 100,0% 0 0,0% 162 100,0%
 
condition * source Crosstabulation
Count   
 
source
Totalfeel think
condition no 30 42 72
yes 51 39 90
Total 81 81 162
 
Chi-Square Tests
 Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. (1-
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3,600a 1 ,058 ,082 ,041
Continuity Correctionb 3,025 1 ,082   
Likelihood Ratio 3,614 1 ,057 ,082 ,041
Fisher's Exact Test    ,082 ,041
N of Valid Cases 162     
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 36,00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Main Study 
 
 
Acting on thinking, feelings, and looking. A restricted maximum likelihood linear mixed-
model analysis was run on the average-index values of how much athletes rely on each source 
when acting, using Source and Game-Action as fixed effects. Player was included in the 
model as a random effect to model individual differences. We tested the main effect of the 
Source (thinking, looking, feelings), the main effect of the Game-Action (1vs1, 1vs2, kicking-
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flying-ball, kicking-ground-ball, dribbling, feinting, and dead-ball), as well the interaction 
effect between them. 
 
Model. Fixed effects: Source (Via) and Actions (Action); Random effects: Players (N) 
 
 
Model Dimensiona
 
Number of 
Levels 
Covariance 
Structure
Number of 
Parameters
Subject 
Variables
Fixed Effects Intercept 1  1  
VIA 3  2  
Actions 7  6  
VIA * 
Actions 
21  12  
Random 
Effects 
Interceptb 1 Variance 
Components
1 N 
Residual   1  
Total 33  23  
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
b. As of version 11.5, the syntax rules for the RANDOM subcommand have changed. 
Your command syntax may yield results that differ from those produced by prior 
versions. If you are using version 11 syntax, please consult the current syntax reference 
guide for more information. 
 
Information Criteriaa 
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood 3136,392
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 
3140,392
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion 
(AICC) 
3140,401
Bozdogan's Criterion (CAIC) 3152,735
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion 
(BIC) 
3150,735
The information criteria are displayed in 
smaller-is-better form. 
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effectsa
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig.
Intercept 1 62 5335,178 ,000
VIA 2 1240 5,343 ,005
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Actions 6 1240 8,901 ,000
VIA * Actions 12 1240,000 8,986 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
Estimates of Fixed Effectsa
Parameter Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept 4,222222 ,104501 770,561 40,404 ,000 4,017083 4,427362 
[VIA=Feel] -,777778 ,133360 1240 -5,832 ,000 -1,039414 -,516141 
[VIA=Look] -,031746 ,133360 1240 -,238 ,812 -,293383 ,229891 
[VIA=Think] 0b 0 . . . . . 
[Actions=1x1] -,603175 ,133360 1240 -4,523 ,000 -,864811 -,341538 
[Actions=1x2] -,976190 ,133360 1240 -7,320 ,000 -1,237827 -,714554 
[Actions=Drible] -,571429 ,133360 1240 -4,285 ,000 -,833065 -,309792 
[Actions=Feint] -,904762 ,133360 1240 -6,784 ,000 -1,166398 -,643125 
[Actions=GroundK
ick] 
-,880952 ,133360 1240 -6,606 ,000 -1,142589 -,619316 
[Actions=HighKick
] 
-,920635 ,133360 1240 -6,903 ,000 -1,182271 -,658998 
[Actions=StopBall] 0b 0 . . . . . 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=1x1] 
,849206 ,188600 1240 4,503 ,000 ,479196 1,219216 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=1x2] 
1,349206 ,188600 1240 7,154 ,000 ,979196 1,719216 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=Drible] 
,666667 ,188600 1240 3,535 ,000 ,296657 1,036677 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=Feint] 
1,365079 ,188600 1240 7,238 ,000 ,995069 1,735089 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=GroundK
ick] 
,960317 ,188600 1240 5,092 ,000 ,590307 1,330327 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=HighKick
] 
1,396825 ,188600 1240 7,406 ,000 1,026815 1,766835 
[VIA=Feel] * 
[Actions=StopBall] 
0b 0 . . . . . 
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=1x1] 
,023810 ,188600 1240 ,126 ,900 -,346200 ,393820 
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=1x2] 
,246032 ,188600 1240 1,305 ,192 -,123978 ,616042 
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[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=Drible] 
,103175 ,188600 1240 ,547 ,584 -,266835 ,473185
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=Feint] 
-,023810 ,188600 1240 -,126 ,900 -,393820 ,346200
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=GroundK
ick] 
,277778 ,188600 1240 1,473 ,141 -,092232 ,647788
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=HighKick
] 
,301587 ,188600 1240 1,599 ,110 -,068423 ,671597
[VIA=Look] * 
[Actions=StopBall] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=1x1] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=1x2] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=Drible] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=Feint] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=GroundK
ick] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=HighKick
] 
0b 0 . . . . .
[VIA=Think] * 
[Actions=StopBall] 
0b 0 . . . . .
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
 
Estimates of Covariance Parametersa
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Wald Z Sig.
95% Confidence 
Interval
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Residual ,560226 ,022499 24,900 ,000 ,517819 ,606105 
Intercept [subject = N] Variance ,127757 ,027758 4,603 ,000 ,083453 ,195581 
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
Estimatesa
VIA Mean Std. Error df 95% Confidence Interval
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Lower Bound Upper Bound
Feel 3,692 ,057 111,575 3,578 3,805
Look 3,629 ,057 111,575 3,515 3,743
Think 3,528 ,057 111,575 3,415 3,642
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
Pairwise Comparisonsa
(I) VIA (J) VIA 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. 
Error df Sig.c
95% Confidence Interval 
for Differencec
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Feel Look ,062 ,050 1240 ,649 -,058 ,183
Think ,163* ,050 1240 ,004 ,042 ,284
Look Feel -,062 ,050 1240 ,649 -,183 ,058
Think ,101 ,050 1240 ,137 -,020 ,222
Think Feel -,163* ,050 1240 ,004 -,284 -,042
Look -,101 ,050 1240 ,137 -,222 ,020
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level.
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
c. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
 
Univariate Testsa
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig.
2 1240 5,343 ,005
The F tests the effect of VIA. This test is based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal 
means. 
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
Estimatesa
Actions Mean Std. Error df
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1x1 3,640 ,071 244,016 3,501 3,779 
1x2 3,508 ,071 244,016 3,369 3,647 
Drible 3,638 ,071 244,016 3,498 3,777 
Feint 3,495 ,071 244,016 3,356 3,634 
GroundKick 3,484 ,071 244,016 3,345 3,623 
HighKick 3,598 ,071 244,016 3,459 3,737 
StopBall 3,952 ,071 244,016 3,813 4,092 
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a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
 
Pairwise Comparisonsa
(I) Actions (J) Actions 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. 
Error df Sig.c
95% Confidence 
Interval for Differencec 
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
1x1 1x2 ,132 ,077 1240 1,000 -,102 ,367 
Drible ,003 ,077 1240 1,000 -,232 ,237 
Feint ,146 ,077 1240 1,000 -,089 ,380 
GroundKick ,156 ,077 1240 ,900 -,078 ,390 
HighKick ,042 ,077 1240 1,000 -,192 ,277 
StopBall -,312* ,077 1240 ,001 -,547 -,078 
1x2 1x1 -,132 ,077 1240 1,000 -,367 ,102 
Drible -,130 ,077 1240 1,000 -,364 ,105 
Feint ,013 ,077 1240 1,000 -,221 ,248 
GroundKick ,024 ,077 1240 1,000 -,211 ,258 
HighKick -,090 ,077 1240 1,000 -,324 ,144 
StopBall -,444* ,077 1240 ,000 -,679 -,210 
Drible 1x1 -,003 ,077 1240 1,000 -,237 ,232 
1x2 ,130 ,077 1240 1,000 -,105 ,364 
Feint ,143 ,077 1240 1,000 -,092 ,377 
GroundKick ,153 ,077 1240 ,976 -,081 ,388 
HighKick ,040 ,077 1240 1,000 -,195 ,274 
StopBall -,315* ,077 1240 ,001 -,549 -,080 
Feint 1x1 -,146 ,077 1240 1,000 -,380 ,089 
1x2 -,013 ,077 1240 1,000 -,248 ,221 
Drible -,143 ,077 1240 1,000 -,377 ,092 
GroundKick ,011 ,077 1240 1,000 -,224 ,245 
HighKick -,103 ,077 1240 1,000 -,338 ,131 
StopBall -,458* ,077 1240 ,000 -,692 -,223 
GroundKick 1x1 -,156 ,077 1240 ,900 -,390 ,078 
1x2 -,024 ,077 1240 1,000 -,258 ,211 
Drible -,153 ,077 1240 ,976 -,388 ,081 
Feint -,011 ,077 1240 1,000 -,245 ,224 
HighKick -,114 ,077 1240 1,000 -,348 ,121 
StopBall -,468* ,077 1240 ,000 -,703 -,234 
HighKick 1x1 -,042 ,077 1240 1,000 -,277 ,192 
1x2 ,090 ,077 1240 1,000 -,144 ,324 
Drible -,040 ,077 1240 1,000 -,274 ,195 
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Feint ,103 ,077 1240 1,000 -,131 ,338 
GroundKick ,114 ,077 1240 1,000 -,121 ,348 
StopBall -,354* ,077 1240 ,000 -,589 -,120 
StopBall 1x1 ,312* ,077 1240 ,001 ,078 ,547 
1x2 ,444* ,077 1240 ,000 ,210 ,679 
Drible ,315* ,077 1240 ,001 ,080 ,549 
Feint ,458* ,077 1240 ,000 ,223 ,692 
GroundKick ,468* ,077 1240 ,000 ,234 ,703 
HighKick ,354* ,077 1240 ,000 ,120 ,589 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level.
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
c. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
 
Univariate Testsa
Numerator df Denominator df F Sig.
6 1240 8,901 ,000
The F tests the effect of Actions. This test is based on the linearly 
independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal 
means. 
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
3. VIA * Actionsa
VIA Actions Mean Std. Error df
95% Confidence Interval
Lower 
Bound
Upper 
Bound
Feel 1x1 3,690 ,105 770,561 3,485 3,896
1x2 3,817 ,105 770,561 3,612 4,023
Drible 3,540 ,105 770,561 3,335 3,745
Feint 3,905 ,105 770,561 3,700 4,110
GroundKic
k 
3,524 ,105 770,561 3,319 3,729
HighKick 3,921 ,105 770,561 3,715 4,126
StopBall 3,444 ,105 770,561 3,239 3,650
Look 1x1 3,611 ,105 770,561 3,406 3,816
1x2 3,460 ,105 770,561 3,255 3,665
Drible 3,722 ,105 770,561 3,517 3,927
Feint 3,262 ,105 770,561 3,057 3,467
GroundKic
k 
3,587 ,105 770,561 3,382 3,792
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HighKick 3,571 ,105 770,561 3,366 3,777
StopBall 4,190 ,105 770,561 3,985 4,396
Think 1x1 3,619 ,105 770,561 3,414 3,824
1x2 3,246 ,105 770,561 3,041 3,451
Drible 3,651 ,105 770,561 3,446 3,856
Feint 3,317 ,105 770,561 3,112 3,523
GroundKic
k 
3,341 ,105 770,561 3,136 3,546
HighKick 3,302 ,105 770,561 3,096 3,507
StopBall 4,222 ,105 770,561 4,017 4,427
a. Dependent Variable: VIA_SCORE. 
 
 
Comparing in-situ game situations that rely more on feelings than thinking as sources 
 
Manova and Univariate Analysis 
 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
Intercept
HFE-HTHI
Wilks 0.014963 625.4011 6 57 0.000000
Wilks 0.269539 25.7453 6 57 0.000000   
Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_1 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.630898 36.27270 1 62 0.000000   
Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_2 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.394528 95.14970 1 62 0.000000   
Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_3 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.630976 36.26045 1 62 0.000000   
Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_4 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.336173 122.4291 1 62 0.000000  
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Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_5 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.441243 78.51221 1 62 0.000000   
Multivariate tests for repeated measure: DV_6 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
Test Value F Effect
df
Error
df
p
HFE-HTHI Wilks 0.520749 57.05938 1 62 0.000000   
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_1 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
60.0714 1 60.07143 36.27270 0.000000
102.6786 62 1.65611   
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_2 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
84.19841 1 84.19841 95.14970 0.000000
54.86409 62 0.88490   
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_3 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
32.76240 1 32.76240 36.26045 0.000000
56.01885 62 0.90353  
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_4 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
111.9172 1 111.9172 122.4291 0.000000
56.6766 62 0.9141  
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_5 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
75.83383 1 75.83383 78.51221 0.000000
59.88492 62 0.96589  
Univariate tests for repeated measure: DV_6 (semantic_High_FeelThink.sta)
Sigma-restricted parameterization
Effective hypothesis decomposition
Effect
SS Degr. of
Freedom
MS F p
HFE-HTHI
Error
44.34573 1 44.34573 57.05938 0.000000
48.18552 62 0.77719  
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Appendix B 
Relying on feelings as information to estimate action capabilities over dynamic events 
 
Material 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Screen1 Screen2 
Screen3 Screen4 
Screen5 Screen6 
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Screen7 Screen8 
 
Screen9 Screen10 
  
Screen11 Screen12
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Screen13 Screen14 
  
Screen15 Screen16 
  
Screen17 Screen18
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Experiment 2 
Screen 1 Screen 2
  
Screen 3 Screen 4
  
Screen 5 Screen 6
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Screen 7 Screen 8
  
Screen 9 Screen 10
  
Screen 11 Screen 12
Video File 
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Screen 13 Screen 14
  
Screen 15 Screen 16
  
Screen 17 Screen 18
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Screen 19 Screen 20 
 
Prime Face 
Screen 21 Screen 22 
 
Video File 
Screen 23 Screen 24 
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Screen 25 Screen 26 
  
Screen 27 Screen 28
Screen 29 Screen 30
Prime Face 
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Screen 31 Screen 32
Video File 
 
Screen 33 Screen 34
  
Screen 35 Screen 36
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Screen 37 Screen 38
Prime Face 
Screen 39 Screen 40
Video File 
Screen 41  
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Images used to create the dynamic events on Experiment 2 
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Happy faces applied on subliminal positive prime in Experiment 2 
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No-emotional faces applied on subliminal neutral prime in Experiment 2 
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Sad faces applied on subliminal negative prime in Experiment 2 
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Statistical Analysis 
 
Experiment 1 
Release-key-moment (RKM) analysis. Two-way mixed ANOVA with 2 Gender 
(female x male) and 2 Dominant-Hand (right and left) components as between factors, and 2 
Dynamic-Visual-Event (shrinking x opening) components as within-factors. 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
RT Dependent Variable 
1 ball_total 
2 square_total 
 
Between-Subjects Factors  
 N 
Hand Direita 20 
Esquerda 4 
Gender Feminino 13 
Masculino 11 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Hand Gender Mean Std. Deviation N
ball_total Direita Feminino 422,6393 115,15064 10
Masculino 408,5280 129,22076 10
Total 415,5836 119,34354 20
Esquerda Feminino 395,9778 65,90958 3
Masculino 501,5833 . 1
Total 422,3792 75,39351 4
Total Feminino 416,4866 103,94934 13
Masculino 416,9876 125,75934 11
Total 416,7162 111,86583 24
square_total Direita Feminino 574,0164 76,18851 10
Masculino 584,4293 126,32496 10
Total 579,2228 101,67189 20
Esquerda Feminino 630,7634 77,37544 3
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Masculino 692,3333 . 1 
Total 646,1559 70,27817 4 
Total Feminino 587,1119 77,26976 13 
Masculino 594,2387 124,18002 11 
Total 590,3783 99,16100 24 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
RT Sphericity 
Assumed 
184802,904 1 184802,904 40,840 ,000 ,671 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
184802,904 1,000 184802,904 40,840 ,000 ,671 
Huynh-Feldt 184802,904 1,000 184802,904 40,840 ,000 ,671 
Lower-bound 184802,904 1,000 184802,904 40,840 ,000 ,671 
RT * Hand Sphericity 
Assumed 
3148,199 1 3148,199 ,696 ,414 ,034 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3148,199 1,000 3148,199 ,696 ,414 ,034 
Huynh-Feldt 3148,199 1,000 3148,199 ,696 ,414 ,034 
Lower-bound 3148,199 1,000 3148,199 ,696 ,414 ,034 
RT * Gender Sphericity 
Assumed 
124,141 1 124,141 ,027 ,870 ,001 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
124,141 1,000 124,141 ,027 ,870 ,001 
Huynh-Feldt 124,141 1,000 124,141 ,027 ,870 ,001 
Lower-bound 124,141 1,000 124,141 ,027 ,870 ,001 
RT * Hand * 
Gender 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1532,750 1 1532,750 ,339 ,567 ,017 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1532,750 1,000 1532,750 ,339 ,567 ,017 
Huynh-Feldt 1532,750 1,000 1532,750 ,339 ,567 ,017 
Lower-bound 1532,750 1,000 1532,750 ,339 ,567 ,017 
Error(RT) Sphericity 
Assumed 
90501,145 20 4525,057    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
90501,145 20,000 4525,057    
Huynh-Feldt 90501,145 20,000 4525,057    
Lower-bound 90501,145 20,000 4525,057    
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 5780341,354 1 5780341,354 292,199 ,000 ,936 
Hand 17407,081 1 17407,081 ,880 ,359 ,042 
Gender 8714,593 1 8714,593 ,441 ,514 ,022 
Hand * Gender 9521,059 1 9521,059 ,481 ,496 ,023 
Error 395644,159 20 19782,208    
 
 
RKM-window. Repeated measure ANOVAs defined by 2 Task-Goal (W x WJ) x 2 
Dynamic-Visual-Events (shrinking x opening) and 11 Time-Windows (11 x 100 ms). 
 
Valence composite index (EMGv) 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
RT-200_JDBZy ,1326 ,34873 24
RT-100_JDBZy ,1325 ,40023 24
RT_JDBZy ,0628 ,55482 24
RT+100_JDBZy ,0373 ,52606 24
RT+200_JDBZy -,0985 ,60953 24
RT+300_JDBZy -,1175 ,66501 24
RT+400_JDBZy -,3399 ,52573 24
RT+500_JDBZy -,2156 ,52422 24
RT+600_JDBZy -,2565 ,63513 24
RT+700_JDBZy -,2100 ,59541 24
RT+800_JDBZy -,2481 ,70535 24
RT-200_JDQZy ,1278 ,51100 24
RT-100_JDQZy -,0257 ,53020 24
RT_JDQZy -,1463 ,51037 24
RT+100_JDQZy -,1681 ,62767 24
RT+200_JDQZy -,1871 ,81430 24
RT+300_JDQZy -,3303 ,95233 24
RT+400_JDQZy -,3674 ,92906 24
RT+500_JDQZy -,2659 ,78341 24
RT+600_JDQZy -,2563 ,73112 24
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RT+700_JDQZy -,3970 ,81901 24
RT+800_JDQZy -,3862 ,73914 24
RT-200_LKBZy ,1824 ,45439 24
RT-100_LKBZy ,0941 ,39377 24
RT_LKBZy ,0932 ,40229 24
RT+100_LKBZy ,0203 ,56897 24
RT+200_LKBZy ,1126 ,49715 24
RT+300_LKBZy ,0952 ,51462 24
RT+400_LKBZy -,0051 ,50828 24
RT+500_LKBZy -,0041 ,57558 24
RT+600_LKBZy ,0341 ,58181 24
RT+700_LKBZy ,1419 ,49950 24
RT+800_LKBZy ,1050 ,49023 24
RT-200_LKQZy -,0987 ,28918 24
RT-100_LKQZy -,0119 ,38967 24
RT_LKQZy -,0146 ,40425 24
RT+100_LKQZy -,0698 ,48888 24
RT+200_LKQZy -,1128 ,41052 24
RT+300_LKQZy -,0561 ,43099 24
RT+400_LKQZy -,1314 ,44890 24
RT+500_LKQZy -,0684 ,48381 24
RT+600_LKQZy -,0919 ,38753 24
RT+700_LKQZy -,1969 ,55125 24
RT+800_LKQZy -,2122 ,56304 24
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly'
s W 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse-
Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
Task 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
TWin ,000 153,736 54 ,000 ,403 ,500 ,100 
Task * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Task * TWin ,001 139,824 54 ,000 ,404 ,502 ,100 
Event * TWin ,007 97,010 54 ,000 ,467 ,601 ,100 
Task * Event * 
TWin 
,002 120,202 54 ,000 ,491 ,640 ,100 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
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a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Task + Event + TWin + Task * Event + Task * TWin + Event * TWin + Task * 
Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Task Sphericity 
Assumed 
6,043 1 6,043 3,452 ,076 ,131 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6,043 1,000 6,043 3,452 ,076 ,131 
Huynh-Feldt 6,043 1,000 6,043 3,452 ,076 ,131 
Lower-bound 6,043 1,000 6,043 3,452 ,076 ,131 
Error(Task) Sphericity 
Assumed 
40,257 23 1,750    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
40,257 23,000 1,750    
Huynh-Feldt 40,257 23,000 1,750    
Lower-bound 40,257 23,000 1,750    
Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,641 1 5,641 3,876 ,061 ,144 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,641 1,000 5,641 3,876 ,061 ,144 
Huynh-Feldt 5,641 1,000 5,641 3,876 ,061 ,144 
Lower-bound 5,641 1,000 5,641 3,876 ,061 ,144 
Error(Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
33,467 23 1,455    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
33,467 23,000 1,455    
Huynh-Feldt 33,467 23,000 1,455    
Lower-bound 33,467 23,000 1,455    
TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
9,066 10 ,907 4,198 ,000 ,154 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9,066 4,031 2,249 4,198 ,004 ,154 
Huynh-Feldt 9,066 4,995 1,815 4,198 ,002 ,154 
Lower-bound 9,066 1,000 9,066 4,198 ,052 ,154 
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Error(TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
49,670 230 ,216    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
49,670 92,724 ,536    
Huynh-Feldt 49,670 114,89
4
,432    
Lower-bound 49,670 23,000 2,160    
Task * Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,232 1 ,232 ,155 ,697 ,007 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,232 1,000 ,232 ,155 ,697 ,007 
Huynh-Feldt ,232 1,000 ,232 ,155 ,697 ,007 
Lower-bound ,232 1,000 ,232 ,155 ,697 ,007 
Error(Task*Event
) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
34,429 23 1,497    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
34,429 23,000 1,497    
Huynh-Feldt 34,429 23,000 1,497    
Lower-bound 34,429 23,000 1,497    
Task * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,953 10 ,395 2,292 ,014 ,091 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,953 4,045 ,977 2,292 ,065 ,091 
Huynh-Feldt 3,953 5,015 ,788 2,292 ,050 ,091 
Lower-bound 3,953 1,000 3,953 2,292 ,144 ,091 
Error(Task*TWin
) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
39,663 230 ,172    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
39,663 93,024 ,426    
Huynh-Feldt 39,663 115,35
3
,344    
Lower-bound 39,663 23,000 1,724    
Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,000 10 ,100 ,834 ,596 ,035 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,000 4,670 ,214 ,834 ,522 ,035 
Huynh-Feldt 1,000 6,006 ,166 ,834 ,546 ,035 
Lower-bound 1,000 1,000 1,000 ,834 ,371 ,035 
Error(Event*TWi
n) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
27,560 230 ,120    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
27,560 107,41
3
,257    
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Huynh-Feldt 27,560 138,13
0
,200    
Lower-bound 27,560 23,000 1,198    
Task * Event * 
TWin 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,004 10 ,100 ,879 ,553 ,037 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,004 4,907 ,205 ,879 ,496 ,037 
Huynh-Feldt 1,004 6,399 ,157 ,879 ,517 ,037 
Lower-bound 1,004 1,000 1,004 ,879 ,358 ,037 
Error(Task*Event
*TWin) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
26,264 230 ,114    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
26,264 112,86
9
,233    
Huynh-Feldt 26,264 147,17
9
,178    
Lower-bound 26,264 23,000 1,142    
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta 
Squared
Intercept 7,543 1 7,543 2,136 ,157 ,085 
Error 81,221 23 3,531    
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Corrugator Supercillis (EMGc) 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N
RT-200_JDBCo -,1369 ,29077 24
RT-100_JDBCo -,0419 ,27269 24
RT_JDBCo ,0451 ,41201 24
RT+100_JDBCo ,1798 ,53074 24
RT+200_JDBCo ,2642 ,50052 24
RT+300_JDBCo ,2236 ,54288 24
RT+400_JDBCo ,3460 ,47612 24
RT+500_JDBCo ,2995 ,53917 24
RT+600_JDBCo ,3900 ,49499 24
RT+700_JDBCo ,3068 ,41967 24
RT+800_JDBCo ,2747 ,48918 24
RT-200_JDQCo ,0767 ,31854 24
RT-100_JDQCo ,1120 ,31296 24
RT_JDQCo ,2852 ,34791 24
RT+100_JDQCo ,3855 ,40672 24
RT+200_JDQCo ,3945 ,49881 24
RT+300_JDQCo ,4390 ,57946 24
RT+400_JDQCo ,3899 ,64576 24
RT+500_JDQCo ,3172 ,50930 24
RT+600_JDQCo ,3297 ,48773 24
RT+700_JDQCo ,4295 ,51018 24
RT+800_JDQCo ,3759 ,52911 24
RT-200_LKBCo -,1346 ,29455 24
RT-100_LKBCo -,0165 ,28711 24
RT_LKBCo ,0604 ,32774 24
RT+100_LKBCo ,1159 ,34660 24
RT+200_LKBCo ,0188 ,34527 24
RT+300_LKBCo ,0298 ,32673 24
RT+400_LKBCo ,1034 ,36724 24
RT+500_LKBCo ,0682 ,45099 24
RT+600_LKBCo ,0397 ,49749 24
RT+700_LKBCo -,0003 ,52231 24
RT+800_LKBCo -,0193 ,51564 24
RT-200_LKQCo ,1346 ,31038 24
RT-100_LKQCo ,0802 ,28559 24
RT_LKQCo ,0891 ,29931 24
RT+100_LKQCo ,1726 ,40612 24
RT+200_LKQCo ,2563 ,41688 24
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RT+300_LKQCo ,2294 ,40098 24
RT+400_LKQCo ,2587 ,33495 24
RT+500_LKQCo ,1864 ,40469 24
RT+600_LKQCo ,1922 ,32217 24
RT+700_LKQCo ,2257 ,49141 24
RT+800_LKQCo ,3061 ,51312 24
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb 
Greenhous
e-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound 
Task 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
TWin ,001 137,201 54 ,000 ,384 ,471 ,100 
Task * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Task * TWin ,000 173,565 54 ,000 ,328 ,389 ,100 
Event * TWin ,003 115,776 54 ,000 ,467 ,600 ,100 
Task * Event * 
TWin 
,001 126,766 54 ,000 ,513 ,678 ,100 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Task + Event + TWin + Task * Event + Task * TWin + Event * TWin + Task * 
Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Task Sphericity Assumed 5,901 1 5,901 4,687 ,041 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5,901 1,000 5,901 4,687 ,041 
Huynh-Feldt 5,901 1,000 5,901 4,687 ,041 
Lower-bound 5,901 1,000 5,901 4,687 ,041 
Error(Task) Sphericity Assumed 28,957 23 1,259   
Greenhouse-Geisser 28,957 23,000 1,259   
Huynh-Feldt 28,957 23,000 1,259   
Lower-bound 28,957 23,000 1,259   
Event Sphericity Assumed 5,762 1 5,762 5,341 ,030 
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Greenhouse-Geisser 5,762 1,000 5,762 5,341 ,030
Huynh-Feldt 5,762 1,000 5,762 5,341 ,030
Lower-bound 5,762 1,000 5,762 5,341 ,030
Error(Event) Sphericity Assumed 24,813 23 1,079   
Greenhouse-Geisser 24,813 23,000 1,079   
Huynh-Feldt 24,813 23,000 1,079   
Lower-bound 24,813 23,000 1,079   
TWin Sphericity Assumed 8,622 10 ,862 8,505 ,000
Greenhouse-Geisser 8,622 3,843 2,244 8,505 ,000
Huynh-Feldt 8,622 4,710 1,831 8,505 ,000
Lower-bound 8,622 1,000 8,622 8,505 ,008
Error(TWin) Sphericity Assumed 23,317 230 ,101   
Greenhouse-Geisser 23,317 88,383 ,264   
Huynh-Feldt 23,317 108,324 ,215   
Lower-bound 23,317 23,000 1,014   
Task * Event Sphericity Assumed ,127 1 ,127 ,155 ,697
Greenhouse-Geisser ,127 1,000 ,127 ,155 ,697
Huynh-Feldt ,127 1,000 ,127 ,155 ,697
Lower-bound ,127 1,000 ,127 ,155 ,697
Error(Task*Ev
ent) 
Sphericity Assumed 18,760 23 ,816   
Greenhouse-Geisser 18,760 23,000 ,816   
Huynh-Feldt 18,760 23,000 ,816   
Lower-bound 18,760 23,000 ,816   
Task * TWin Sphericity Assumed 2,049 10 ,205 1,914 ,044
Greenhouse-Geisser 2,049 3,278 ,625 1,914 ,129
Huynh-Feldt 2,049 3,888 ,527 1,914 ,117
Lower-bound 2,049 1,000 2,049 1,914 ,180
Error(Task*T
Win) 
Sphericity Assumed 24,626 230 ,107   
Greenhouse-Geisser 24,626 75,395 ,327   
Huynh-Feldt 24,626 89,417 ,275   
Lower-bound 24,626 23,000 1,071   
Event * TWin Sphericity Assumed ,927 10 ,093 1,285 ,240
Greenhouse-Geisser ,927 4,666 ,199 1,285 ,277
Huynh-Feldt ,927 5,999 ,155 1,285 ,268
Lower-bound ,927 1,000 ,927 1,285 ,269
Error(Event*T
Win) 
Sphericity Assumed 16,598 230 ,072   
Greenhouse-Geisser 16,598 107,316 ,155   
Huynh-Feldt 16,598 137,971 ,120   
Lower-bound 16,598 23,000 ,722   
Task * Event * 
TWin 
Sphericity Assumed 1,156 10 ,116 1,558 ,120
Greenhouse-Geisser 1,156 5,130 ,225 1,558 ,176
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Huynh-Feldt 1,156 6,778 ,171 1,558 ,154 
Lower-bound 1,156 1,000 1,156 1,558 ,224 
Error(Task*Ev
ent*TWin) 
Sphericity Assumed 17,058 230 ,074   
Greenhouse-Geisser 17,058 117,988 ,145   
Huynh-Feldt 17,058 155,886 ,109   
Lower-bound 17,058 23,000 ,742   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 35,636 1 35,636 22,905 ,000 
Error 35,784 23 1,556   
 
 
Zygomaticus Major (EMGz) 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
RT-200_JDBZy -,0044 ,18640 24
RT-100_JDBZy ,0905 ,28943 24
RT_JDBZy ,1080 ,37651 24
RT+100_JDBZy ,2171 ,45749 24
RT+200_JDBZy ,1657 ,50804 24
RT+300_JDBZy ,1061 ,47182 24
RT+400_JDBZy ,0062 ,46255 24
RT+500_JDBZy ,0840 ,38102 24
RT+600_JDBZy ,1335 ,38978 24
RT+700_JDBZy ,0968 ,33863 24
RT+800_JDBZy ,0265 ,42980 24
RT-200_JDQZy ,2045 ,47752 24
RT-100_JDQZy ,0863 ,41204 24
RT_JDQZy ,1390 ,37538 24
RT+100_JDQZy ,2174 ,48687 24
RT+200_JDQZy ,2074 ,56870 24
RT+300_JDQZy ,1086 ,61882 24
RT+400_JDQZy ,0225 ,65073 24
RT+500_JDQZy ,0512 ,57820 24
RT+600_JDQZy ,0734 ,50738 24
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RT+700_JDQZy ,0325 ,58384 24
RT+800_JDQZy -,0103 ,60233 24
RT-200_LKBZy ,0478 ,30302 24
RT-100_LKBZy ,0776 ,29668 24
RT_LKBZy ,1536 ,31864 24
RT+100_LKBZy ,1361 ,34544 24
RT+200_LKBZy ,1314 ,28273 24
RT+300_LKBZy ,1249 ,32060 24
RT+400_LKBZy ,0983 ,38919 24
RT+500_LKBZy ,0641 ,38011 24
RT+600_LKBZy ,0737 ,36987 24
RT+700_LKBZy ,1415 ,33645 24
RT+800_LKBZy ,0857 ,34977 24
RT-200_LKQZy ,0359 ,32667 24
RT-100_LKQZy ,0684 ,35372 24
RT_LKQZy ,0744 ,37091 24
RT+100_LKQZy ,1028 ,35864 24
RT+200_LKQZy ,1436 ,37114 24
RT+300_LKQZy ,1733 ,33952 24
RT+400_LKQZy ,1272 ,33627 24
RT+500_LKQZy ,1179 ,29393 24
RT+600_LKQZy ,1004 ,29982 24
RT+700_LKQZy ,0288 ,32300 24
RT+800_LKQZy ,0939 ,32261 24
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchl
y's W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhous
e-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
Task 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
TWin ,000 162,566 54 ,000 ,367 ,445 ,100
Task * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
Task * TWin ,001 137,786 54 ,000 ,391 ,481 ,100
Event * TWin ,001 140,764 54 ,000 ,384 ,470 ,100
Task * Event * 
TWin 
,007 97,545 54 ,000 ,554 ,750 ,100
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
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a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Task + Event + TWin + Task * Event + Task * TWin + Event * TWin + 
Task * Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected 
tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Task Sphericity 
Assumed 
,001 1 ,001 ,001 ,977 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,977 
Huynh-Feldt ,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,977 
Lower-bound ,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,977 
Error(Task) Sphericity 
Assumed 
23,306 23 1,013   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
23,306 23,000 1,013   
Huynh-Feldt 23,306 23,000 1,013   
Lower-bound 23,306 23,000 1,013   
Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,001 1 ,001 ,001 ,974 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,974 
Huynh-Feldt ,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,974 
Lower-bound ,001 1,000 ,001 ,001 ,974 
Error(Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
13,415 23 ,583   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13,415 23,000 ,583   
Huynh-Feldt 13,415 23,000 ,583   
Lower-bound 13,415 23,000 ,583   
TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,525 10 ,153 1,458 ,156 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,525 3,670 ,416 1,458 ,226 
Huynh-Feldt 1,525 4,453 ,343 1,458 ,216 
Lower-bound 1,525 1,000 1,525 1,458 ,240 
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Error(TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
24,065 230 ,105   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
24,065 84,410 ,285   
Huynh-Feldt 24,065 102,424 ,235   
Lower-bound 24,065 23,000 1,046   
Task * Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,016 1 ,016 ,020 ,889
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,016 1,000 ,016 ,020 ,889
Huynh-Feldt ,016 1,000 ,016 ,020 ,889
Lower-bound ,016 1,000 ,016 ,020 ,889
Error(Task*Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,190 23 ,791   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,190 23,000 ,791   
Huynh-Feldt 18,190 23,000 ,791   
Lower-bound 18,190 23,000 ,791   
Task * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,840 10 ,084 ,859 ,573
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,840 3,910 ,215 ,859 ,490
Huynh-Feldt ,840 4,811 ,175 ,859 ,508
Lower-bound ,840 1,000 ,840 ,859 ,364
Error(Task*TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
22,490 230 ,098   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
22,490 89,932 ,250   
Huynh-Feldt 22,490 110,654 ,203   
Lower-bound 22,490 23,000 ,978   
Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,501 10 ,050 ,721 ,704
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,501 3,836 ,131 ,721 ,574
Huynh-Feldt ,501 4,699 ,107 ,721 ,601
Lower-bound ,501 1,000 ,501 ,721 ,405
Error(Event*TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,998 230 ,070   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,998 88,224 ,181   
Huynh-Feldt 15,998 108,086 ,148   
Lower-bound 15,998 23,000 ,696   
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Task * Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,491 10 ,049 ,986 ,456 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,491 5,538 ,089 ,986 ,434 
Huynh-Feldt ,491 7,497 ,066 ,986 ,446 
Lower-bound ,491 1,000 ,491 ,986 ,331 
Error(Task*Event*TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
11,454 230 ,050   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
11,454 127,380 ,090   
Huynh-Feldt 11,454 172,441 ,066   
Lower-bound 11,454 23,000 ,498   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 10,388 1 10,388 5,593 ,027 
Error 42,715 23 1,857   
 
 
EMG analysis of END-window. A repeated measure ANOVA 2 Task-Goal (W x 
WJ) x 2 Dynamic-Visual-Events (shrinking x opening) and 7 Time-Windows (7 x 100 ms) as 
within-subject factors. 
 
Valence composite index (EMGv) 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
100-RTEndB ,1325 ,40023 24
RTEndB ,0628 ,55482 24
RTEnd+100B ,0373 ,52606 24
RTEnd+200B -,0985 ,60953 24
RTEnd+300B -,1175 ,66501 24
RTEnd+400B -,3399 ,52573 24
RTEnd+500B -,2156 ,52422 24
100-RTEndQ -,0257 ,53020 24
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RTEndQ -,1463 ,51037 24
RTEnd+100Q -,1681 ,62767 24
RTEnd+200Q -,1871 ,81430 24
RTEnd+300Q -,3303 ,95233 24
RTEnd+400Q -,3674 ,92906 24
RTEnd+500Q -,2659 ,78341 24
100-VdEndB -,0502 ,52454 24
VdEndB -,0147 ,53151 24
VdEnd+100B ,0384 ,55926 24
VdEnd+200B ,1648 ,51460 24
VdEnd+300B ,1643 ,51436 24
VdEnd+400B -,0222 ,49387 24
VdEnd+500B -,0058 ,56325 24
100-VdEndQ -,1176 ,43127 24
VdEndQ -,0977 ,44581 24
VdEnd+100Q -,1387 ,48000 24
VdEnd+200Q -,0579 ,49404 24
VdEnd+300Q -,0682 ,43204 24
VdEnd+400Q -,1381 ,49364 24
VdEnd+500Q -,2849 ,56506 24
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse
-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
End 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
TWin ,007 103,758 20 ,000 ,359 ,398 ,167
End * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
End * TWin ,061 58,013 20 ,000 ,561 ,668 ,167
Event * TWin ,058 59,032 20 ,000 ,499 ,582 ,167
End * Event * 
TWin 
,155 38,685 20 ,008 ,670 ,830 ,167
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: End + Event + TWin + End * Event + End * TWin + Event * TWin + End 
* Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected 
tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
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Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
End Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,682 1 1,682 2,085 ,162
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,682 1,000 1,682 2,085 ,162
Huynh-Feldt 1,682 1,000 1,682 2,085 ,162
Lower-bound 1,682 1,000 1,682 2,085 ,162
Error(End) Sphericity 
Assumed 
18,560 23 ,807   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18,560 23,000 ,807   
Huynh-Feldt 18,560 23,000 ,807   
Lower-bound 18,560 23,000 ,807   
Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,888 1 3,888 3,524 ,073
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,888 1,000 3,888 3,524 ,073
Huynh-Feldt 3,888 1,000 3,888 3,524 ,073
Lower-bound 3,888 1,000 3,888 3,524 ,073
Error(Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
25,378 23 1,103   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
25,378 23,000 1,103   
Huynh-Feldt 25,378 23,000 1,103   
Lower-bound 25,378 23,000 1,103   
TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,543 6 ,591 2,778 ,014
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,543 2,157 1,643 2,778 ,068
Huynh-Feldt 3,543 2,388 1,484 2,778 ,062
Lower-bound 3,543 1,000 3,543 2,778 ,109
Error(TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
29,338 138 ,213   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
29,338 49,607 ,591   
Huynh-Feldt 29,338 54,913 ,534   
Lower-bound 29,338 23,000 1,276   
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End * Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,044 1 ,044 ,041 ,841
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,044 1,000 ,044 ,041 ,841
Huynh-Feldt ,044 1,000 ,044 ,041 ,841
Lower-bound ,044 1,000 ,044 ,041 ,841
Error(End*Eve
nt) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
24,512 23 1,066   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
24,512 23,000 1,066   
Huynh-Feldt 24,512 23,000 1,066   
Lower-bound 24,512 23,000 1,066   
End * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,493 6 ,582 3,042 ,008
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,493 3,364 1,038 3,042 ,029
Huynh-Feldt 3,493 4,010 ,871 3,042 ,021
Lower-bound 3,493 1,000 3,493 3,042 ,094
Error(End*TWi
n) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
26,406 138 ,191   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
26,406 77,382 ,341   
Huynh-Feldt 26,406 92,240 ,286   
Lower-bound 26,406 23,000 1,148   
Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,354 6 ,059 ,457 ,839
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,354 2,996 ,118 ,457 ,713
Huynh-Feldt ,354 3,494 ,101 ,457 ,742
Lower-bound ,354 1,000 ,354 ,457 ,506
Error(Event*T
Win) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
17,785 138 ,129   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17,785 68,899 ,258   
Huynh-Feldt 17,785 80,361 ,221   
Lower-bound 17,785 23,000 ,773   
End * Event * 
TWin 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,577 6 ,096 ,986 ,437
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,577 4,023 ,143 ,986 ,420
Huynh-Feldt ,577 4,982 ,116 ,986 ,429
Lower-bound ,577 1,000 ,577 ,986 ,331
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Error(End*Eve
nt*TWin) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
13,457 138 ,098   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13,457 92,523 ,145   
Huynh-Feldt 13,457 114,587 ,117   
Lower-bound 13,457 23,000 ,585   
  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Intercept 6,057 1 6,057 2,086 ,162
Error 66,788 23 2,904   
 
 
Corrugator Supercillis (EMGc) 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
100-RTEndB -,0419 ,27269 24
RTEndB ,0451 ,41201 24
RTEnd+100B ,1798 ,53074 24
RTEnd+200B ,2642 ,50052 24
RTEnd+300B ,2236 ,54288 24
RTEnd+400B ,3460 ,47612 24
RTEnd+500B ,2995 ,53917 24
100-RTEndQ ,1120 ,31296 24
RTEndQ ,2852 ,34791 24
RTEnd+100Q ,3855 ,40672 24
RTEnd+200Q ,3945 ,49881 24
RTEnd+300Q ,4390 ,57946 24
RTEnd+400Q ,3899 ,64576 24
RTEnd+500Q ,3172 ,50930 24
100-VdEndB ,1236 ,36771 24
VdEndB ,1374 ,41169 24
VdEnd+100B ,0481 ,40012 24
VdEnd+200B -,0437 ,52384 24
VdEnd+300B -,0794 ,50955 24
VdEnd+400B ,0831 ,43864 24
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VdEnd+500B ,0896 ,52365 24
100-VdEndQ ,2269 ,42627 24
VdEndQ ,2584 ,41493 24
VdEnd+100Q ,2684 ,41416 24
VdEnd+200Q ,1962 ,37354 24
VdEnd+300Q ,1356 ,32506 24
VdEnd+400Q ,1698 ,42514 24
VdEnd+500Q ,3780 ,51963 24
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauch
ly's W 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse
-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
End 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
TWin ,019 82,496 20 ,000 ,447 ,512 ,167
End * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000
End * TWin ,051 61,918 20 ,000 ,593 ,716 ,167
Event * TWin ,092 49,630 20 ,000 ,597 ,721 ,167
End * Event * TWin ,296 25,285 20 ,196 ,707 ,887 ,167
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: End + Event + TWin + End * Event + End * TWin + Event * TWin + 
End * Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected 
tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
End Sphericity 
Assumed 
2,327 1 2,327 3,041 ,095
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2,327 1,000 2,327 3,041 ,095
Huynh-Feldt 2,327 1,000 2,327 3,041 ,095
Lower-bound 2,327 1,000 2,327 3,041 ,095
Error(End) Sphericity 
Assumed 
17,600 23 ,765   
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Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17,600 23,000 ,765   
Huynh-Feldt 17,600 23,000 ,765   
Lower-bound 17,600 23,000 ,765   
Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
4,461 1 4,461 4,989 ,036
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4,461 1,000 4,461 4,989 ,036
Huynh-Feldt 4,461 1,000 4,461 4,989 ,036
Lower-bound 4,461 1,000 4,461 4,989 ,036
Error(Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
20,569 23 ,894   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
20,569 23,000 ,894   
Huynh-Feldt 20,569 23,000 ,894   
Lower-bound 20,569 23,000 ,894   
TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,674 6 ,279 2,339 ,035
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,674 2,683 ,624 2,339 ,089
Huynh-Feldt 1,674 3,071 ,545 2,339 ,079
Lower-bound 1,674 1,000 1,674 2,339 ,140
Error(TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
16,465 138 ,119   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
16,465 61,703 ,267   
Huynh-Feldt 16,465 70,623 ,233   
Lower-bound 16,465 23,000 ,716   
End * Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,062 1 ,062 ,087 ,771
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,062 1,000 ,062 ,087 ,771
Huynh-Feldt ,062 1,000 ,062 ,087 ,771
Lower-bound ,062 1,000 ,062 ,087 ,771
Error(End*Eve
nt) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
16,327 23 ,710   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
16,327 23,000 ,710   
Huynh-Feldt 16,327 23,000 ,710   
Lower-bound 16,327 23,000 ,710   
End * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,820 6 ,637 6,483 ,000
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Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,820 3,561 1,073 6,483 ,000
Huynh-Feldt 3,820 4,293 ,890 6,483 ,000
Lower-bound 3,820 1,000 3,820 6,483 ,018
Error(End*TWi
n) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
13,551 138 ,098   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13,551 81,898 ,165   
Huynh-Feldt 13,551 98,747 ,137   
Lower-bound 13,551 23,000 ,589   
Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,404 6 ,067 ,906 ,493
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,404 3,582 ,113 ,906 ,456
Huynh-Feldt ,404 4,324 ,094 ,906 ,469
Lower-bound ,404 1,000 ,404 ,906 ,351
Error(Event*T
Win) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
10,266 138 ,074   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10,266 82,377 ,125   
Huynh-Feldt 10,266 99,444 ,103   
Lower-bound 10,266 23,000 ,446   
End * Event * 
TWin 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,564 6 ,094 1,849 ,094
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,564 4,243 ,133 1,849 ,122
Huynh-Feldt ,564 5,322 ,106 1,849 ,104
Lower-bound ,564 1,000 ,564 1,849 ,187
Error(End*Eve
nt*TWin) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
7,010 138 ,051   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
7,010 97,580 ,072   
Huynh-Feldt 7,010 122,401 ,057   
Lower-bound 7,010 23,000 ,305   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 27,184 1 27,184 18,183 ,000
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Error 34,386 23 1,495   
 
 
Zygomaticus Major (EMGz) 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
100-RTEndB ,0905 ,28943 24
RTEndB ,1080 ,37651 24
RTEnd+100B ,2171 ,45749 24
RTEnd+200B ,1657 ,50804 24
RTEnd+300B ,1061 ,47182 24
RTEnd+400B ,0062 ,46255 24
RTEnd+500B ,0840 ,38102 24
100-RTEndQ ,0863 ,41204 24
RTEndQ ,1390 ,37538 24
RTEnd+100Q ,2174 ,48687 24
RTEnd+200Q ,2074 ,56870 24
RTEnd+300Q ,1086 ,61882 24
RTEnd+400Q ,0225 ,65073 24
RTEnd+500Q ,0512 ,57820 24
100-VdEndB ,0735 ,35345 24
VdEndB ,1227 ,33080 24
VdEnd+100B ,0865 ,40446 24
VdEnd+200B ,1210 ,28855 24
VdEnd+300B ,0848 ,34815 24
VdEnd+400B ,0609 ,45565 24
VdEnd+500B ,0838 ,36660 24
100-VdEndQ ,1093 ,34817 24
VdEndQ ,1607 ,34722 24
VdEnd+100Q ,1296 ,32188 24
VdEnd+200Q ,1384 ,33196 24
VdEnd+300Q ,0673 ,29199 24
VdEnd+400Q ,0317 ,30943 24
VdEnd+500Q ,0931 ,30693 24
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly'
s W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse
-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
End 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
TWin ,043 65,161 20 ,000 ,464 ,535 ,167 
End * Event 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
End * TWin ,031 71,924 20 ,000 ,487 ,565 ,167 
Event * TWin ,074 54,154 20 ,000 ,478 ,554 ,167 
End * Event * 
TWin 
,063 57,329 20 ,000 ,497 ,579 ,167 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: End + Event + TWin + End * Event + End * TWin + Event * TWin + End * 
Event * TWin 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests 
are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
End Sphericity 
Assumed 
,052 1 ,052 ,076 ,785
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,052 1,000 ,052 ,076 ,785
Huynh-Feldt ,052 1,000 ,052 ,076 ,785
Lower-bound ,052 1,000 ,052 ,076 ,785
Error(End) Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,821 23 ,688   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,821 23,000 ,688   
Huynh-Feldt 15,821 23,000 ,688   
Lower-bound 15,821 23,000 ,688   
Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,020 1 ,020 ,037 ,849
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,020 1,000 ,020 ,037 ,849
Huynh-Feldt ,020 1,000 ,020 ,037 ,849
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Lower-bound ,020 1,000 ,020 ,037 ,849 
Error(Event) Sphericity 
Assumed 
12,290 23 ,534   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
12,290 23,000 ,534   
Huynh-Feldt 12,290 23,000 ,534   
Lower-bound 12,290 23,000 ,534   
TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
1,306 6 ,218 2,346 ,034 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1,306 2,785 ,469 2,346 ,085 
Huynh-Feldt 1,306 3,207 ,407 2,346 ,076 
Lower-bound 1,306 1,000 1,306 2,346 ,139 
Error(TWin) Sphericity 
Assumed 
12,806 138 ,093   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
12,806 64,048 ,200   
Huynh-Feldt 12,806 73,764 ,174   
Lower-bound 12,806 23,000 ,557   
End * Event Sphericity 
Assumed 
,002 1 ,002 ,002 ,963 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,002 1,000 ,002 ,002 ,963 
Huynh-Feldt ,002 1,000 ,002 ,002 ,963 
Lower-bound ,002 1,000 ,002 ,002 ,963 
Error(End*Eve
nt) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
15,600 23 ,678   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15,600 23,000 ,678   
Huynh-Feldt 15,600 23,000 ,678   
Lower-bound 15,600 23,000 ,678   
End * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,378 6 ,063 ,603 ,728 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,378 2,921 ,129 ,603 ,611 
Huynh-Feldt ,378 3,392 ,111 ,603 ,635 
Lower-bound ,378 1,000 ,378 ,603 ,445 
Error(End*TWi
n) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
14,422 138 ,105   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14,422 67,191 ,215   
Huynh-Feldt 14,422 78,022 ,185   
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Lower-bound 14,422 23,000 ,627   
Event * TWin Sphericity 
Assumed 
,053 6 ,009 ,196 ,977
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,053 2,870 ,018 ,196 ,891
Huynh-Feldt ,053 3,322 ,016 ,196 ,915
Lower-bound ,053 1,000 ,053 ,196 ,662
Error(Event*T
Win) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
6,176 138 ,045   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6,176 66,006 ,094   
Huynh-Feldt 6,176 76,410 ,081   
Lower-bound 6,176 23,000 ,269   
End * Event * 
TWin 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,048 6 ,008 ,195 ,978
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,048 2,981 ,016 ,195 ,899
Huynh-Feldt ,048 3,473 ,014 ,195 ,922
Lower-bound ,048 1,000 ,048 ,195 ,663
Error(End*Eve
nt*TWin) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
5,714 138 ,041   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5,714 68,555 ,083   
Huynh-Feldt 5,714 79,889 ,072   
Lower-bound 5,714 23,000 ,248   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 7,577 1 7,577 5,569 ,027
Error 31,290 23 1,360   
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Experiment 2 
A repeated measure ANOVA with 2 Task-Condition (order x random), 2 Action-
Judgment (grasp-ability x pass-ability) and 3 Valence (neutral, positive and negative) 
components as within-subject factors were applied to the RTI values. 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
O_GI_Ng 519,0615 72,95412 84
O_GI_N 511,2808 72,91204 84
O_GI_P 519,1449 71,50290 84
O_FI_Ng 564,2462 115,96972 84
O_FI_N 560,6082 125,08537 84
O_FI_P 565,6185 119,96334 84
A_GI_Ng 541,5435 67,64023 84
A_GI_N 532,8658 68,82785 84
A_GI_P 536,3349 72,51064 84
A_FI_Ng 576,4890 120,36582 84
A_FI_N 568,46 114,846 84
A_FI_P 567,4561 110,70480 84
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly'
s W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhouse-
Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound 
OA 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
GF 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
NGNP ,884 10,121 2 ,006 ,896 ,914 ,500 
OA * GF 1,000 ,000 0 . 1,000 1,000 1,000 
OA * NGNP ,852 13,145 2 ,001 ,871 ,888 ,500 
GF * NGNP ,985 1,236 2 ,539 ,985 1,000 ,500 
OA * GF * 
NGNP 
,996 ,304 2 ,859 ,996 1,000 ,500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: OA + GF + NGNP + OA * GF + OA * NGNP + GF * NGNP + OA * GF * 
NGNP 
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b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests 
are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
OA Sphericity 
Assumed 
48442,646 1 48442,646 12,620 ,001
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
48442,646 1,000 48442,646 12,620 ,001
Huynh-Feldt 48442,646 1,000 48442,646 12,620 ,001
Lower-bound 48442,646 1,000 48442,646 12,620 ,001
Error(OA) Sphericity 
Assumed 
318611,451 83 3838,692   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
318611,451 83,000 3838,692   
Huynh-Feldt 318611,451 83,000 3838,692   
Lower-bound 318611,451 83,000 3838,692   
GF Sphericity 
Assumed 
412140,216 1 412140,216 8,670 ,004
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
412140,216 1,000 412140,216 8,670 ,004
Huynh-Feldt 412140,216 1,000 412140,216 8,670 ,004
Lower-bound 412140,216 1,000 412140,216 8,670 ,004
Error(GF) Sphericity 
Assumed 
3945540,450 83 47536,632   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3945540,450 83,000 47536,632   
Huynh-Feldt 3945540,450 83,000 47536,632   
Lower-bound 3945540,450 83,000 47536,632   
NGNP Sphericity 
Assumed 
8328,913 2 4164,456 3,610 ,029
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8328,913 1,792 4648,008 3,610 ,034
Huynh-Feldt 8328,913 1,829 4554,030 3,610 ,033
Lower-bound 8328,913 1,000 8328,913 3,610 ,061
Error(NGNP) Sphericity 
Assumed 
191485,698 166 1153,528   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
191485,698 148,730 1287,469   
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Huynh-Feldt 191485,698 151,800 1261,438   
Lower-bound 191485,698 83,000 2307,057   
OA * GF Sphericity 
Assumed 
10825,189 1 10825,189 2,442 ,122 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10825,189 1,000 10825,189 2,442 ,122 
Huynh-Feldt 10825,189 1,000 10825,189 2,442 ,122 
Lower-bound 10825,189 1,000 10825,189 2,442 ,122 
Error(OA*G
F) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
367909,785 83 4432,648   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
367909,785 83,000 4432,648   
Huynh-Feldt 367909,785 83,000 4432,648   
Lower-bound 367909,785 83,000 4432,648   
OA * NGNP Sphericity 
Assumed 
2678,971 2 1339,485 1,213 ,300 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2678,971 1,742 1537,885 1,213 ,296 
Huynh-Feldt 2678,971 1,776 1508,299 1,213 ,297 
Lower-bound 2678,971 1,000 2678,971 1,213 ,274 
Error(OA*N
GNP) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
183303,371 166 1104,237   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
183303,371 144,585 1267,792   
Huynh-Feldt 183303,371 147,421 1243,403   
Lower-bound 183303,371 83,000 2208,474   
GF * NGNP Sphericity 
Assumed 
581,409 2 290,704 ,260 ,771 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
581,409 1,971 295,055 ,260 ,768 
Huynh-Feldt 581,409 2,000 290,704 ,260 ,771 
Lower-bound 581,409 1,000 581,409 ,260 ,611 
Error(GF*N
GNP) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
185558,404 166 1117,822   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
185558,404 163,553 1134,549   
Huynh-Feldt 185558,404 166,000 1117,822   
Lower-bound 185558,404 83,000 2235,643   
OA * GF * 
NGNP 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
286,849 2 143,424 ,133 ,876 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
286,849 1,993 143,956 ,133 ,875 
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Huynh-Feldt 286,849 2,000 143,424 ,133 ,876
Lower-bound 286,849 1,000 286,849 ,133 ,716
Error(OA*G
F*NGNP) 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
178962,605 166 1078,088   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
178962,605 165,388 1082,080   
Huynh-Feldt 178962,605 166,000 1078,088   
Lower-bound 178962,605 83,000 2156,176   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 301520802,597 1 301520802,597 6150,269 ,000
Error 4069127,103 83 49025,628   
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Appendix C  
To touch or not to touch? Feelings as non-visual information for perceived reach-ability 
 
Material  
 
Study 1 
Screen1 Screen2 
Screen3 Screen4 
  
Screen5 Screen6 
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Screen7 Screen8 
  
Screen9 Screen10
  
Screen11 Screen12
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Screen13 Screen14
  
Screen15 Screen16
  
Screen17 Screen18
  
 
  
245 
 
 
Screen19 Screen20
  
Screen21 Screen22
 
Video File (Training Task) 
Screen23 Screen24
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Screen25 Screen26
  
Screen27 Screen28
  
Screen29 Screen30
Video File (Training Task) 
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Pre-tested of real touch areas of the computer screen  
Computer Screen Pre-Test Areas 
The 10 dot-movie films trajectories 
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Prime Faces  
 
 
Study 2 
 
Screen1 Screen2
 
 
  
249 
 
 
Screen3 Screen4
 
Screen5 Screen6
 
Screen7 Screen8
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Screen9 Screen10
  
Screen11 Screen12
  
Screen13 Screen14
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Screen15 Screen16
  
Screen17 Screen18
  
Screen19 Screen20
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Screen21 Screen22
  
 
 
36 Dots 
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36 Happy, Sad and Neutral Prime Faces 
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Statistical Analysis  
 
Study 1 
 
Release-key-time. The RTI values were subject to a repeated ANOVA with 3 Blocks 
(block1, block2, block3) and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factors. 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Blocks NGNP 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 1 Bl1Ng 
2 Bl1N 
3 Bl1P 
2 1 Bl2Ng 
2 Bl2N 
3 Bl2P 
3 1 Bl3Ng 
2 Bl3N 
3 Bl3P 
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Mean Std. Deviation N
Bl1Ng 1839,644 244,4396 23
Bl1N 1809,776 276,7294 23
Bl1P 1838,363 234,3850 23
Bl2Ng 1896,45 234,322 23
Bl2N 1846,553 232,1314 23
Bl2P 1887,277 288,6381 23
Bl3Ng 1860,209 290,0688 23
Bl3N 1834,609 295,0036 23
Bl3P 1842,076 285,0645 23
 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
df Sig. Epsilonb
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Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchl
y's W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
Greenhouse
-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
Blocks ,554 12,416 2 ,002 ,691 ,723 ,500
NGNP ,978 ,462 2 ,794 ,979 1,000 ,500
Blocks * NGNP ,711 6,969 9 ,642 ,878 1,000 ,250
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept  
 Within Subjects Design: Blocks + NGNP + Blocks * NGNP
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected 
tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Blocks Sphericity Assumed 80348,183 2 40174,091 1,040 ,362 
Greenhouse-Geisser 80348,183 1,383 58106,022 1,040 ,341 
Huynh-Feldt 80348,183 1,446 55581,519 1,040 ,344 
Lower-bound 80348,183 1,000 80348,183 1,040 ,319 
Error(Blocks) Sphericity Assumed 1700044,274 44 38637,370   
Greenhouse-Geisser 1700044,274 30,421 55883,377   
Huynh-Feldt 1700044,274 31,803 53455,440   
Lower-bound 1700044,274 22,000 77274,740   
NGNP Sphericity Assumed 45527,799 2 22763,900 5,049 ,011 
Greenhouse-Geisser 45527,799 1,957 23259,731 5,049 ,011 
Huynh-Feldt 45527,799 2,000 22763,900 5,049 ,011 
Lower-bound 45527,799 1,000 45527,799 5,049 ,035 
Error(NGNP) Sphericity Assumed 198395,288 44 4508,984   
Greenhouse-Geisser 198395,288 43,062 4607,196   
Huynh-Feldt 198395,288 44,000 4508,984   
Lower-bound 198395,288 22,000 9017,968   
Blocks * NGNP Sphericity Assumed 8014,323 4 2003,581 ,213 ,931 
Greenhouse-Geisser 8014,323 3,513 2281,637 ,213 ,913 
Huynh-Feldt 8014,323 4,000 2003,581 ,213 ,931 
Lower-bound 8014,323 1,000 8014,323 ,213 ,649 
Error(Blocks*NG
NP) 
Sphericity Assumed 829142,761 88 9422,077   
Greenhouse-Geisser 829142,761 77,276 10729,671   
Huynh-Feldt 829142,761 88,000 9422,077   
Lower-bound 829142,761 22,000 37688,307   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 708879917,948 1 708879917,948 1385,024 ,000 
Error 11259993,279 22 511817,876   
 
 
Study 2 
 
Hits. Hit values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x constraint) 
as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-factor. 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
NPNG 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 Hits_N 
2 Hits_P 
3 Hits_Ng 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 N 
Condicao combarra 21
sembarra 21
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Condicao Mean Std. Deviation N
Hits_N combarra ,9444 ,08471 21
sembarra ,9365 ,07409 21
Total ,9405 ,07870 42
Hits_P combarra ,88 ,133 21
sembarra ,92 ,107 21
Total ,90 ,121 42
Hits_Ng combarra ,89 ,137 21
sembarra ,90 ,114 21
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Total ,90 ,125 42
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects 
Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb
Greenhous
e-Geisser
Huynh-
Feldt
Lower-
bound
NPNG ,866 5,599 2 ,061 ,882 ,943 ,500
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed 
dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix.
a. Design: Intercept + Condicao  
 Within Subjects Design: NPNG 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected 
tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
  
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
NPNG Sphericity Assumed ,049 2 ,024 3,888 ,024 
Greenhouse-Geisser ,049 1,764 ,028 3,888 ,030 
Huynh-Feldt ,049 1,885 ,026 3,888 ,027 
Lower-bound ,049 1,000 ,049 3,888 ,056 
NPNG * Condicao Sphericity Assumed ,012 2 ,006 ,981 ,379 
Greenhouse-Geisser ,012 1,764 ,007 ,981 ,371 
Huynh-Feldt ,012 1,885 ,007 ,981 ,376 
Lower-bound ,012 1,000 ,012 ,981 ,328 
Error(NPNG) Sphericity Assumed ,504 80 ,006   
Greenhouse-Geisser ,504 70,564 ,007   
Huynh-Feldt ,504 75,418 ,007   
Lower-bound ,504 40,000 ,013   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 104,960 1 104,960 4331,135 ,000
Condicao ,006 1 ,006 ,227 ,636
Error ,969 40 ,024   
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False-Alarms. False-alarm values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 Conditions 
(free x constraint) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as within-
factor. 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
NPNG 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 FA__N 
2 FA_P 
3 FA_Ng 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 N 
Condicao combarra 21
sembarra 21
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Condicao Mean Std. Deviation N
FA__N combarra ,16 ,186 21
sembarra ,10 ,108 21
Total ,13 ,153 42
FA_P combarra ,17 ,190 21
sembarra ,08 ,087 21
Total ,12 ,152 42
FA_Ng combarra ,17063492063492 ,16346123919625
9
21
sembarra ,07539682539683 ,06924574748656
8
21
Total ,12301587301587 ,13302568067941
6
42
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects Effect df Sig. Epsilonb
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Mauchly
's W 
Approx. 
Chi-Square 
Greenhouse
-Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
NPNG ,984 ,636 2 ,728 ,984 1,000 ,500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept + Condicao  
 Within Subjects Design: NPNG 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table.
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
NPNG Sphericity 
Assumed 
,001 2 ,001 ,066 ,936
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,001 1,968 ,001 ,066 ,934
Huynh-Feldt ,001 2,000 ,001 ,066 ,936
Lower-bound ,001 1,000 ,001 ,066 ,798
NPNG * 
Condicao 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,009 2 ,004 ,403 ,670
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,009 1,968 ,004 ,403 ,667
Huynh-Feldt ,009 2,000 ,004 ,403 ,670
Lower-bound ,009 1,000 ,009 ,403 ,529
Error(NPNG) Sphericity 
Assumed 
,865 80 ,011   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,865 78,727 ,011   
Huynh-Feldt ,865 80,000 ,011   
Lower-bound ,865 40,000 ,022   
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 2,011 1 2,011 51,281 ,000 
Condicao ,192 1 ,192 4,893 ,033 
Error 1,568 40 ,039   
 
 
Sensitiveness (d’). Sensitiveness values were subject to a mixed ANOVA with 2 
Conditions (free x constrain) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive and negative) as 
within-factor 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
NPNG 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 d_N 
2 d_P 
3 d_Ng 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 N 
Condicao combarra 21
sembarra 21
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Condicao Mean Std. Deviation N
d'_N combarra 2,6348 ,86138 21
sembarra 2,7659 ,64007 21
Total 2,7004 ,75246 42
d'_P combarra 2,3410 ,91064 21
sembarra 2,8109 ,64118 21
Total 2,5759 ,81340 42
d'_Ng combarra 2,3748 ,55856 21
sembarra 2,7483 ,61703 21
Total 2,5616 ,61127 42
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
NPNG Sphericity 
Assumed 
,489 2 ,245 1,010 ,369
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,489 1,987 ,246 1,010 ,368
Huynh-Feldt ,489 2,000 ,245 1,010 ,369
Lower-bound ,489 1,000 ,489 1,010 ,321
NPNG * 
Condicao 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,640 2 ,320 1,321 ,273
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,640 1,987 ,322 1,321 ,273
Huynh-Feldt ,640 2,000 ,320 1,321 ,273
Lower-bound ,640 1,000 ,640 1,321 ,257
Error(NPNG) Sphericity 
Assumed 
19,375 80 ,242   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
19,375 79,485 ,244   
Huynh-Feldt 19,375 80,000 ,242   
Lower-bound 19,375 40,000 ,484   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 860,050 1 860,050 812,897 ,000
Condicao 3,325 1 3,325 3,143 ,084
Error 42,320 40 1,058   
 
 
Bias on estimate reach-ability (c’). The values of the criterion (c’) adopted by the 
participants when estimating a dot as touchable or not touchable were subject to a mixed 
ANOVA with 2 Conditions (free x constraint) as between factor and 3 Primes (neutral, positive 
and negative) as within-factor. 
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Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
NPNG 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 c_N 
2 c_P 
3 c_Ng 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 N 
Condicao combarra 21
sembarra 21
 
Descriptive Statistics
 Condicao Mean Std. Deviation N
c'_N combarra -,6023 ,24671 21
sembarra -,5057 ,19395 21
Total -,5540 ,22457 42
c'_P combarra -,4449 ,32530 21
sembarra -,4620 ,25928 21
Total -,4534 ,29067 42
c'_Ng combarra -,4344 ,37337 21
sembarra -,3997 ,28569 21
Total -,4170 ,32882 42
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Within Subjects Effect Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig.
Epsilonb 
Greenhouse-
Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound
NPNG ,795 8,929 2 ,012 ,830 ,883 ,500
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional 
to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept + Condicao  
 Within Subjects Design: NPNG 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests 
of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
NPNG Sphericity 
Assumed 
,423 2 ,211 4,572 ,013
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,423 1,660 ,255 4,572 ,019
Huynh-Feldt ,423 1,767 ,239 4,572 ,017
Lower-bound ,423 1,000 ,423 4,572 ,039
NPNG * 
Condicao 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
,068 2 ,034 ,737 ,482
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
,068 1,660 ,041 ,737 ,459
Huynh-Feldt ,068 1,767 ,039 ,737 ,467
Lower-bound ,068 1,000 ,068 ,737 ,396
Error(NPNG) Sphericity 
Assumed 
3,697 80 ,046   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3,697 66,411 ,056   
Huynh-Feldt 3,697 70,664 ,052   
Lower-bound 3,697 40,000 ,092   
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Intercept 28,406 1 28,406 184,639 ,000
Condicao ,046 1 ,046 ,297 ,589
Error 6,154 40 ,154   
 
 
